

Request for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Production, Use, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

Zimbabwe

**Submitted to His Royal Highness Prince Mired Raad
Al-Hussein of Jordan
President of the Eighth Meeting of the State Parties to the Convention**

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Zimbabwe still has 813.3 km² of land contaminated with anti-personnel mines. The clearing efforts that started soon after independence in 1980 have seen 306.6 km² cleared from an initial contaminated area of 1 119.9 km², recovering 33 032 AP mines in the process. Zimbabwe is doing everything possible within its capacity and without any meaningful international support to rid itself of anti-personnel mines in compliance with the Convention and to facilitate national development.

The anti-personnel mines in the country were laid during the war of liberation, which lasted up to 1980, when Zimbabwe gained independence from the British. At independence, the new government of Zimbabwe inherited numerous mined areas within the country and six well-marked minefields along its borders with Zambia on the North and Mozambique on the East and South East. The minefields covering a total area of 1071.4 square kilometres were estimated to contain a total of 2 605 400 AP mines of the following types: Ploughshear, VS 50, R2M2, Carrot, R1M1 and M972. Apart from the marked minefields, other smaller minefields were discovered either during clearance of the marked minefield or when reported by the locals.

With assistance from the United States of America, Zimbabwe cleared the Victoria Falls to Mlibizi minefield, which was 286 km² in length. However, the support dried up or was abruptly stopped after one and half years of operations, leaving the Zimbabwean government to complete the clearance on its own - an operation that lasted a total of seven years. The EU also funded, during the same period, the clearance of Musengezi-Rwenya minefield by commercial deminers. Again, when funding abruptly dried up, the deminers left, leaving the job uncompleted. No quality assurance was done, and, as a result, the area cannot be considered safe.

The mines have caused untold suffering to the communities living in affected areas. Individuals are unable to carry out economic activities such as farming, and in some cases their livestock detonate mines. Since 1980, 1 550 people were reported killed or maimed and 120 000 livestock killed. The areas where the minefields were laid are remote, therefore, some casualties likely go unreported. The communities are denied a total of 45 700 ha of productive land. Tourism has also been affected, especially by the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield, where a tripartite (South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe) game park was established. The operation of this park is affected by the presence of mines on the Zimbabwean side.

Zimbabwe established a National Mine Action Authority (NAMAZ) through an Act of Parliament, the Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act Chapter 11:19, which is responsible for the general policy direction of mine action activities in the country. The Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) is responsible for planning and coordinating all mine action activities in the country. Currently, demining activities are undertaken by military engineers. A squadron of six officers and 132 men (with 10 support staff) are currently deployed on humanitarian demining. Extensive mine risk education is carried out in the affected areas. A total of 25 000 people have been reached since 2004. These people include community leaders but most of them were woman and youth.

In carrying out demining operations, both mechanical and manual means have been applied. Safe lanes are opened first by driving a bulldozer across the minefield with its blade raised,

thereby detonating some mines. This process is repeated at least three times. A survey team then moves in with mine detectors carrying out manual clearance of the safe lanes. The safe lanes opened are then the baseline for the subsequent manual demining operation.

Due to limited resources, Zimbabwe relies on old surveys conducted 1994. However, technical surveys are conducted on every area being demined. This way, Zimbabwe does not run a risk of spending time, effort and resources clearing an uncontaminated area. Zimbabwe recognises that it should carry out fresh surveys in all minefields to determine the correct and more accurate extent of the remaining contaminated area.

Zimbabwe would have made far much more progress on its obligation to clear the country of landmines if more resources had been made available. What has been achieved so far has largely been due to Zimbabwe's own efforts. If Zimbabwe continues at the current funding level of about US \$10,000 per year, Zimbabwe projects it could take more than 30 years to complete implementation of Article 5. In addition to a lack of international support, Zimbabwe has been impeded in fulfilling its obligations in a ten year period due to its isolation from the international mine action community. This isolation has resulted in Zimbabwe lagging behind in adopting up to date survey and demining techniques.

As a way forward we it will be appropriate if we resurvey all the remaining minefields while at the same time continue with demining of Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield where we are engaged at the moment. This will allow us to come up with a more accurate extend of our mine problem and thereby estimate the resources, time and effort that will be required to clear. Zimbabwe is therefore requesting an initial 22 month extension of its deadline. By requesting a extension of the deadline until 1 January 2011, Zimbabwe intends to seek and receive international technical assistance in order to acquire up to date survey and demining techniques, to survey areas where the exact locations of mined areas are unknown, to develop a plan that takes into account advanced techniques and then to submit a subsequent request for a period of time to implement the plan. This subsequent extension request will include a time schedule and budget for implementing Article 5, including a projection of funds that may be required from the international community.

II. EXTENSION REQUEST

1. ORIGINS OF THE ARTICLE 5 IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGE

The origin of Zimbabwe's Article 5 implementation challenge derives from the War of Liberation between 1976 and 1979. The Rhodesian Army laid minefields along the northern and eastern borders of the country to disrupt the supply lines of liberation movements operating from Zambia and Mozambique. Combat action between the two forces also resulted in a large amount of unexploded ordnance lying around the country.

2. NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5 CHALLENGE: QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS

Background to the Zimbabwe Minefields

a. Following considerable research by the then Rhodesian army, minefield construction commenced in 1976 in the North East border area of what is now Zimbabwe. By 1979 minefields had been laid in six areas. Several other small minefields were also laid further inland to protect key infrastructure and permanent bases. The six minefields laid are:

- (1). Area 1 Victoria Falls to ^{Mlibizi} (286 km²) Cleared.
- (2). Area 2 Musengezi to Rwenya Minefield (435.5 km²).
- (3). Area 3 Sheba Forest to Beacon hill (65 km²)
- (4). Area 4 Burma Valley (3.9 km²) Still intact.
- (5). Area 5 Rusitu to Muzite Mission (97.5 km²).
- (6) . Area 6 Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner (182 km²).

b. Other minefields laid inland are:

- (1). Mukumbura Minefield not yet surveyed.
- (2). Kariba Power Station. 1.5 km².
- (3). Lusulu in Gwayi Matebeleland North. Not yet surveyed to ascertain the extent of the minefield.
- (4). Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner 3 minefield. Newly discovered and not yet surveyed to ascertain its extent.

Please note that some minefields' area are not given as they are newly discovered and a survey has yet to be done.

c. Three types of minefields were laid:

(1) Cordon Sanitaire (CS). A 25 m wide strip of ground fenced on both sides, containing 5 500 AP Mines per km laid in no fixed pattern. Mines were laid in clusters of three mines using a knotted rope system to place a cluster every 1/ 2 / 3m

(2) Ploughshare Minefield (PSF). Initially laid behind the Cordon Sanitaire minefield in order to reinforce it. A PSF could vary in depth from 0.5 km to 23 km although only three lanes (rows) of ploughshare mines (PS) were laid within that area. Mine density in a PSF was 100 PS and 300 AP mines per km. A PS is an above ground AP mine placed on a stake/picket 0.75 to 1 m in height and activated by tripwire. Around each picket, three AP mines were laid at the 3/ 12 / 9 o'clock positions within 1.0 m of the picket. The tripwire was linked to a further picket some 30m away, which was placed at the 11 o'clock position to the PS. The tripwire picket was generally placed immediately in front of the previous PS, thus creating an inter-laced line of tripwires covering the entire front. The PS device itself was a directional AP mine, which fired shrapnel forward in a 45⁰ (degree) The lethal range was 100 m. Subsequently, in some areas, PSFs were laid on their own.

(3) Reinforced Ploughshare Minefield (RPSF) An RPSF is a PSF reinforced with a single lane of AP mines laid in front of each of the lanes of PS. AP mines were laid in clusters of three mines, each at 3/ 12 /9 o'clock positions. Each cluster was laid at no set distance in front of each lane of PS, but not less than 2 - 3 m forward. The method of laying AP mine clusters was as for Cordon Sanitaire minefield, using a 1/ 2 / 3 m knotted rope in no fixed pattern. Mine density in a RPSF was 100 PS and 5 800 AP mines per km of front. In some areas there is only a RPSF.

(4) As the Liberation War progressed, there were areas where Rhodesian Army Engineers laid booby traps within minefields. They also increased the number of mines per each hole. Up to five AP mines were laid, one on top of another in a single hole. AP mine clusters were linked with detonating cord so that a mine detonating in one part of the minefield would initiate a simultaneous detonation elsewhere. Mine clusters were sometimes reinforced by aircraft bombs and, in the Mutare area, by 90mm ATK ammunition.

(5) AP-mine types varied and up to six different types. Different models can be found in any minefield since maintenance/replacement used whatever mines which were available at the time.

d. Minefield Types and Current Activity Levels

(1) Minefield types vary from area to area and over the years, many mines have detonated due to either being activated by humans or animals or due to bush fires. Hence, the recent mine activity levels are lower than when the minefields were first established some 28-32 years ago.

(2) Minefields types and estimated present activity levels are:

Area	Minefield Type	Minefield Mine density		Estimated present density	
		AP	PS	AP	PS
1	CS & PSF	1 796 200	35 900	Cleared	Cleared
2	RPSF	290 000	5 000	246 500	250
3	PSF	1 200	400	60	20
4	PSF	21 600	7 200	12 960	720
5	RPSF	353 800	6 100	247 660	2 440
6	PSF	66 000	22 000	19 800	1 110
7	AP	3 000	Nil	3 000	-
	Total	2 528 800	76 600	1 529 980	4 530
GRAND TOTAL		2 605 400		1 534 510	

3. NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE ORIGINAL ARTICLE 5: QUALITATIVE ASPECTS

Socio-Economic Impact of Landmines in Zimbabwe.

Minefields in Zimbabwe were laid mostly on the borders and some further inland. After the hostilities, people who lived closer the borders and those in mined areas were greatly affected, as they could no longer enjoy free movement and socialise with their relatives across the mined areas. Agricultural activities, tourism, mining, infrastructural development and grazing land were also affected as mines claimed some of the land. Some people also got injured and some killed due to mines. Casualties for both human and animals given below could be very much understated since there are no official records. Information was gathered by interviews in the areas, but only from a sample number of people relative to the total number of inhabitants in an area. In essence, no impact survey to account for landmine casualties has ever been conducted in Zimbabwe to date. Details on the impact posed by landmines is as given below.

a. Casualties (Since 1980)

(1) Human

(a) Killed or maimed 1,550

(2) Animal

(a) Cattle Killed 120,000

(b) Wild Animals No records

b. Land Denial

Land denied include communal lands (30 000ha) commercial farm land (10 700ha) game parks (5 000ha) plantations (tea and timber), mining and border posts. It is estimated that only 5% of the total 1119.9 km² is not required for immediate economic development. This area is predominantly mountainous and rugged, but its potential for minerals cannot be overruled. Further details of the land denied will be covered on each minefield.

c. **Impact: Communal Lands**

The areas of communal land are inhabited by rural (peasant) farmers. The impact of the minefields is both economic and social and very severe, especially to areas adjacent to minefields, where there is land pressure. Loss of cattle has a got telling effect on the ordinary rural peasant. Cattle represent the only real wealth of a peasant family being the only savings and insurance they have. Income from crops is minimal, and then only likely if there is good harvest, rare occurrence since most of the mined areas are in dry region where good rain are rare occurrence. Thus the loss of cattle and other livestock is very, very serious. The denial of arable land, access to water and grazing caused by minefields is equally serious. The denial is, with very few expectations, the direct cause of most deaths in the minefields.

d. **Impact: Commercial Farming**

(1) Denial of arable land to commercial farming enterprises affects both crop farming and forestry. However, taken over period that the minefields have existed in the particular area affected, this represents Z\$45 Billion on straight-line basis.

(2) Denial of access to commercial timber is far more serious, being estimated at Z\$500 trillion now. Losses that can be attributed by denial of re-planting would make this figure much more significant. Timber losses are important in a macro-economic sense since most of the timber lost/denied could be exported to earn hard currency. Much of the timber affected is now well past its maturity and obviously has already lost its intended commercial value.

e. **Impact: Tourism**

Area 1: Victoria Falls was initially affected by the minefields before the successful clearance of the Victoria Falls to Mlibizi minefield in 2005. The expansion of the town was severely hampered. Access to the Zambezi river, game viewing and hunting activities were inhibited by minefields. However, the area is now free of mines and development now taking place.

Area 6: Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner lies largely within the Gonarezhou National Park, which has now been merged into the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP), which Zimbabwe shares with South Africa and Mozambique. Hundreds of wild animals (particularly elephants) have been killed or maimed by mines in this area of which the carnage is on-going. Regrettably, no records of these deaths are available, but National Parks sources indicate that the level is very high and is causing a serious ecological impact. Whilst this minefield is being cleared albeit at a slow pace because of economic challenges the country is facing, it is feared that Zimbabwe will lose a considerable amount of foreign currency if this minefield is not cleared before the 2010 Soccer World Cup to be hosted by South Africa.

Having realised the threat posed by mines to the social and economic structures of Zimbabwe. The government of Zimbabwe is clearing these mined areas though at a slow pace. The pace of demining is greatly affected by a number of factors: Funding being the major factor soil characteristics, terrain, weather, accessibility to mined areas, correct details about the minefields' patterns and its extent and the discovery of other minefields.

In some areas, the ground is hard and difficult to unearth thereby posing a lot of care and reduce pace. In areas with loose soil, mines were either unearthed by running water or were deeply buried down by the effect of soil erosion. There are cases of ragged terrain and mountains where access to the minefield becomes very difficult. More so the pace of demining is equally reduced as more concentration and care will be called for in such terrain. The pattern of the minefield also varies inconsistently in bad terrain. Furthermore, there are some minefields which were recently discovered either along or at tangent to the known ones. The type, density and extent of these newly discovered minefields is yet to be established as no survey has been done on them.

Weather conditions in the mined areas is also another factor affecting the demining pace. Most places are in dry and very hot regions, such that deminers cannot withstand the heat for too long before they become exhausted. In essence it implies that demining work has to be done in the early hours of the day before it is too hot. The rainfall pattern also puts the demining activity to a total halt. No demining activities take place when it is raining. However it should be noted that lack of funding remains the major reason affecting the pace of demining in Zimbabwe.

4. METHOD USED TO IDENTIFY AREAS CONTAINING AP MINES AND REASONS FOR SUSPECTING THE PRESENCE OF AP MINES IN OTHER AREAS


Initially, information about minefields in Zimbabwe was obtained from ex-Rhodesian Armed Forces members after attaining independence in 1980. Existence of other minefields was established either after action of the mine to both personnel and animals. Level 1 survey was carried out in areas suspected to be mined and more often results of the survey indicated the presence of minefields in such areas. Most of the minefields used to be fenced making it easy to locate them. The fence has since been vandalised by the local populace but the fence pickets are still in place. Additional to the remaining pickets concrete beacons were erected to mark the minefield line.

5. NATIONAL DEMINING STRUCTURES

NATIONAL MINE ACTION AUTHORITY OF ZIMBABWE (NAMAZ)

Chairman	Deputy Sec Policy PR & International Affairs
Committee member	Deputy Sec Environment & Tourism
	Deputy Sec MLGPW & UD
	Deputy Sec Min of Finance
	Deputy Sec Min of Labour Social and Welfare
	Deputy Sec Min of Home Affairs
	UNDP Rep
	Director Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre

ZIMBABWE MINE ACTION CENTRE (ZIMAC)



Zimbabwe has one national mine action body the National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAZ) which is a regulatory and implementation body. There is the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) under the NAMAZ which is the national mine action coordination centre. ZIMAC reports all its activities to NAMAZ. ZIMAC is the focal point and the coordination centre of all mine action activities in the country. The NAMAZ was established in 1999 and has got eight (8) members on board. It is anticipated that the Chairmanship and administration of NAMAZ will shift to Ministry of Environment and Tourism. ZIMAC was established in 2000 with nine officers and clerical staff to run its affairs. It is also to be administered by Ministry of Environment and Tourism. The National Mine Clearance Squadron was established in 1982 with 200 deminers.

MANDATE OF NAMAZ


- Policy making and mine action implementation coordinating body.
- Conscientising the nation and International Community about the landmine problem and demining activities in Zimbabwe.
- Sourcing funds to finance various mine action projects.
- Setting out national mine action programme priorities.
- National Landmine Victim Assistance Policy formulation.¹
- Seeking any assistance required from the UN and other organisations or states parties on the implementation of national plan under article 6 of the mine ban treaty.

MANDATE OF ZIMAC

- Co-ordination of all landmine victims, care, rehabilitation and reintegration.
- Establishment and maintenance of a mine action database.
- Production and co-ordination of a national plan to destroy banned landmines.
- Monitoring adherence to the OTTAWA convention in Zimbabwe and elsewhere.
- Supervision of the destruction of banned AP mines.
- Planning for the conduct of Mine Risk Education (MRE) campaigns.
- Establish communication with all mine action stakeholders and interested groups at both national and international level.

Demining operations are being carried out by National Mine Clearance Squadron (NMC) which is a military unit. No commercial demining company is clearing mines in Zimbabwe at present due to funding problems. The organisational structure for NMC is as given below.

NATIONAL MINE CLEARANCE SQUADRON



6. NATURE AND EXTENT OF PROGRESS MADE: QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS

	Name of area under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines were/are known to be emplaced	Location	Coordinates	Total area under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines were/are known to be emplaced (km ²)	Total area in which State Party destroyed or ensured the destruction of all anti-personnel mines contained within (km ²)	Suspected mines	Number of mines destroyed by animals and climate	Number of AP mines destroyed	Number of AT mines destroyed	Number of other explosive ordnance destroyed	Area in which State Party must still destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines contained within (km ²)	Number of mines pending destruction	Completion Date
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(p)
1	Victoria Falls to Mlibizi			286	286	1800100	788843	25959		12			June 2005
2	Musengezi to Rwenya			435.5	169	295000	48250	162419				246750	
3	Sheba Forest to Beacon hill			65	5			500					
4	Burma Valley			3.9		28800	15120				3.9	13680	
5	Rusitu to Muzite Mission			97.5									
6	Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner			182	5.6	88000	68200	4573			182	19800	
7	Kariba Power Station			1.5									
8	Lusulu in Gwayi-Matebeleland			Not yet surveyed									

	North												
9	Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner third minefield			Not yet surveyed									
10	Rushinga district minefields			Not yet surveyed									

MINEFIELDS MEASUREMENT VARIATIONS

	Minefield	Level 1 Survey By Mine Tech	Zimbabwe Assessment Report By UN	History Study of Landmines By Retired Lt Col M Rupiya	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	Vic Falls to Mlibizi	143 km ²	220 km ²	220 km ²	220 km After demining
2	Msengezi to Rwenya	335 km ²	359 km ²	359 km ²	
3	Sheba Forest to Beacon hill	50 km ²	50 km ²	50 km ²	
4	Burma Valley	3 km ²	4 km ²	4 km ²	
5	Rusitu to Muzite	75 km ²	72km ²	72 km ²	
6	Sango to Crooks Corner	50 km ²	61 km ²	61 km ²	
7	Kariba		1 km ²	1 km ²	Laid in 1963

NOTE

Differences shown in distances given above are as a result of errors made during level 1 survey. The Vic falls to Mlibizi minefield was initially reported as 143km² but turned out to be 220km after demining. The Sango to Crook Corner minefield was initially reported as 50km but we established 70km double stretch. Proper distances may only come out after the level 2 survey.

Sheba Forest to Beacon Hill minefield and Stapleford to Vumba mountains are one minefield.

Other Study is a document on landmines in Zimbabwe, which was written by a retired Colonel Martin R Rupiah of the Department of History, University of Zimbabwe.

7. NATURE AND EXTENT OF PROGRESS MADE: QUALITATIVE ASPECTS

Mine Action Achievements to Date

Zimbabwe's notable achievements are the destruction of all anti-personnel mines stockpiles in 2001 and the clearance of 286 km² in the Victoria Falls to Mlibizi minefield, in addition to the gaps cleared prior to 1998. (See list below.)

In the North Eastern Border on the 435.5 km² Rwenya to Musengezi minefield, 169 km² were cleared but this area continues to kill or maim people since it was not properly cleared and therefore needs total re-clearance. This was cleared by a commercial company courtesy of funding from the EU in 1999-2000.

On cleared gaps, people have been able to move freely from one point to another. Construction of government offices and other infrastructure developments have also taken place.

An area which has been achieved, albeit not comprehensively, is the delivery of MRE to vulnerable communities. We plan to conduct more comprehensive MRE programmes. Lack of funding has not been doing our endeavors any good.

Areas Cleared So Far Are:

- a. 286 km² Victoria Falls to Mlibizi minefield.
- b. Cleared gaps 10 km².
- c. Forbes border post for ZESA pylons, the railway line and oil pipeline from Beira. (5 square kilometres)
- d. 5.6 km² Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner.

8. METHODS AND STANDARDS USED TO RELEASE AREAS KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TO CONTAIN AP MINES

	Name of mined area	Total area cleared (km ²)	Means used to destroy the mines	Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed	Number of other explosive munitions destroyed
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	Victoria Falls to Mlibizi minefield	286	Explosive demolitions	25 959	No records on all minefields
2	Sheba Forest to Beacon Hill (Forbes border Post)	5	Explosive demolitions	500	
3	Sango to Crooks Corner minefield	5.6	Explosive demolitions	4573	
4	Cleared gaps	10	Explosive demolitions	2000	
5	TOTAL	306.6		33 032	

A survey team would move in first to ascertain the existence of mines in an area reported to be having mines. In carrying out the demining operations, both mechanical and manual means were applied. Safe lanes are opened first by driving a bulldozer across the minefield with its blade raised thereby detonating some mines. This process is repeated at least three times to ascertain the number of lanes within that minefield. A survey team would then move in with mine detectors carrying out manual clearance of the safe lanes. The safe lanes opened would then be the base line for the subsequent manual demining operation. After the confirmation of the presents of mines, demining teams would start clearing the assigned particular area. All recovered mines were destroyed on site by explosive demolitions.

All the cleared area was cleared by military deminers save for the 130 km stretch in Musengezi to Rwenya minefield which was done by a contracted commercial demining company.

There are no records for UXOs recovered from a particular minefield. However, annual recoveries of about 600 are currently reported country wide which gives a cumulative figure of 19 800 since 1980.

9. METHODS AND STANDARDS OF CONTROLLING AND ASSURING QUALITY

In respect to the progress noted in section 8, after the total clearance of a particular minefield, a Quality Control/Quality Assurance team would carry out quality inspection on the cleared area. This was done on all cleared portions save for the Sango to Crooks Corner minefield which is still under demining operations. However it should be noted that even after the quality inspections have been done, elements of up to 0.01% of either UXO or mines may go unnoticed due to human and mechanical error. No quality assurance was done to the Musengezi to Rwenya minefield and reports of incidents continue to be received even to present date. This is major reason why we are considering it as still intact and no work was done on it.

Quality Control/Quality Assurance involves the process of an inspection of cleared land before it is formally released to the beneficiaries for use. A different team of deminers is engaged to go through the once cleared area carrying out manual demining to ascertain the quality of work done.

10. EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVE EXCLUSION OF CIVILIANS FROM MINED AREAS

The need to clear the minefields became apparent soon after the cessation of hostilities between the then Rhodesian Government and liberation movements in 1980. Massive demining operations started in the year 1998 and the USA government also responded by donated a host of demining equipment and tools. This was all effort directed towards ensuring the effective clearance of landmines from ground. However civilians were not removed from their places to allow for demining. This was probably due to land pressure in Zimbabwe and the costs involved in relocating to some other areas. The perimeter fence, which was used to mark the minefields, was removed by the local civilians for their domestic use. No other fence was later on put save

for danger warning signs to alert civilians of the existence of a minefield. In some other places, there are fencing steel poles which were used to mark minefields.

A lot has been done to educate civilians on the dangers of mines. Mostly on all national and social gatherings, mine risk education is being carried out in places that are severely affected by mines. Face to face and small media methods are being used to communicate with the targeted audiences. As earlier alluded to, funding to effectively reach out some other places still remains our major challenge to use mass media.

11. RESOURCES MADE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT PROGRESS MADE TO DATE

The Government Zimbabwe is fully committed to rid the country of all landmines. Since 1980, the government has been consistently allocating an annual budget to demining operations, though inadequate to totally clear all the mines. The allocations fall far too short of the total requirements especially in the area of contracting commercial demining companies to complement the military's efforts to carry out humanitarian demining.

The USA donated demining equipment and tools in 1998, which saw the start of the total demining of the Victoria Falls – Mlibizi minefield. Unfortunately the USA withdrew its support in 2000. The EU funded the clearance of the North Eastern minefields from 1999 - 2000. The EU also withdrew its support when only 130 kilometre of the Musengezi – Rwenya minefield had been cleared.

Funding level of the demining operations in Zimbabwe

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(k)	(l)
Financial resources made available by the State Party				US\$ 10 000						
Financial resources made available by actors other than the State Party			Nil							
Totals				US\$ 10 000						

12. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT IMPEDE COMPLIANCE IN A 10 YEAR PERIOD

	Circumstance	Comments	Degree to which circumstance may impede the ability of Zimbabwe to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Economic sanctions imposed by Britain and her allies.	Current and anticipated to last long until the bilateral impasse between Britain and Zimbabwe is resolved.	Zimbabwe is unable to access funds from multilateral financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Zimbabwe will be unable to import the necessary equipment and contract commercial demining companies.
2	Demining equipment shortage.	Few ageing equipment currently in use. Need immediate re-equipping to sustain operations. Zimbabwe does not have the capacity to manufacture most of the important demining equipment and therefore rely on imports.	In the medium term, military demining will grind to a halt once the few pieces of equipment is expended.
3	Inability for the Government of Zimbabwe to fully fund demining operations.	The government being under sanctions can only provide the little they can. The government has other pressing commitments such as food imports, power and fuel imports.	It will take Zimbabwe not less than 30 years to fully comply without other assistance.
4	International Support	Zimbabwe has not been supported by the International Community since 2000. This isolation has resulted in the lagging behind in mine clearance techniques and receive minimum funding.	No international verification of its standard. Mine action is slowed down

13. HUMANITARIAN, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATION

A lot more benefits will be realised in humanitarian, economic, social and environmental aspect in the endeavour to fulfil the work to be carried out during the requested period. This will allow for more land to be relieved of mines thereby creating more room for greater opportunities. Business opportunities in areas of agriculture, tourism, mining, game ranging and industrial sites would be realised over the period. On the social aspect, local inhabitants will freely access their water sources, have grazing land for their domestic animals and travel across lands to visit their

relatives without fear. In such a situation, investors would be much more willing to make business in a mine free land.

**14. NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE REMAINING ARTICLE 5 CHALLENGE:
QUALITATIVE ASPECTS**

The challenges that remains for the Article 5 are not much different from the original challenges faced given that not much has been done to address the problem although much effort is being put. Only 40% of the mined area has been cleared leaving the greater portion of land still under the control of mines. Equally the factors mentioned in section 3 to be affecting the pace of demining continue to demonise the demining operations.

Economic growth cannot be expected for as long as the land is still tied down by landmines in various places. The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park dream can not be realised unless the Sango to Crooks Corner minefield is totally cleared. Agricultural activities, Infrastructural developments, mining and other social activities remain at threat with the continued existence of landmines in Zimbabwe.

**16. AMOUNT OF TIME REQUESTED AND A RATIONALE FOR THIS AMOUNT OF
TIME**

STRATEGIC PLAN

STRATEGY: The Zimbabwe Strategy is to embark on combine commercial and humanitarian military demining as a long term strategy once a resurvey is completed. As a way forward we it will be appropriate if we resurvey all the remaining minefields while at the same time continue with demining of Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield where we are engaged at the moment. This will allow us to come up with a more accurate extend of our mine problem and thereby estimate the resources, time and effort that will be required to clear. Zimbabwe is therefore requesting an initial 22 month extension of its deadline. By requesting a extension of the deadline until 1 January 2011, Zimbabwe intends to seek and receive international technical assistance in order to acquire up to date survey and demining techniques, to survey areas where the exact locations of mined areas are unknown, to develop a plan that takes into account advanced techniques and then to submit a subsequent request for a period of time to implement the plan. This subsequent extension request will include a time schedule and budget for implementing Article 5, including a projection of funds that may be required from the international community.

EXECUTION PLAN (SHORT TO MEDIUM TERM PLAN ONLY)

Survey Thirty surveyors will be trained and divided into two teams of twenty (team A) and ten (team B) surveyors. Team A will carry out resurvey of known minefields while team B will focus on new contaminated areas.

Survey Team A

Conduct level 2 of already known minefields.

These minefields were last surveyed in 1994 using the then available survey technology. If latest technology and survey techniques are used, it might be possible to release some area without clearance. The resurvey will start on the second quarter of 2009 to allow for training and preparations. We hope we will receive international support in form of funding and training of the surveyors.

Survey Team B.

Team B will focus on newly discovered and unsurveyed minefields. For now the known minefields which are still to be surveyed are Lusulu and Mukumbura (these are small minefields around and/or near the already surveyed minefield). As we do not know whether other minefields will be discovered, the team will remain active for the two years from 2009.

DEMINING Demining will continue to be conducted by the military; however another squadron will be trained to boost the capacity of those currently deployed. Focus will remain Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner Minefield. It is our hope that the additional staff will be trained on the latest clearance techniques and we would be supported by the international community to acquire mine clearance equipment. Once the resurvey is complete, we will draw up another plan for the confirmed minefields.

. DEMINING, SURVEY AND RESURVEY OF UNKNOWN AND KNOWN MINEFIELDS

Ser	Activity	Area	timeframe			Remarks
			2009	2010	2011	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	
1.	Resurvey of newly discovered mined areas	Lusulu and Mukumbura.				
2.	Demining Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner 70km double stretch x 1.3km	182km ²				Current strength of deminers will be doubled to accelerate completion by 1 year
3.	Resurvey at Rusitu to Muzite Mission 75km x 1.3km	97.5km ²				
4.	Resurvey at Sheba Forest to Beacon hill 50km x 1.3km. Resurvey of the Burma Valley 3km x 1.3km.	65km ² 3.9km ²				

FOOT NOTES:

Actual survey will start in earnest after six months from the day of securing international funding.

17. HUMANITARIAN MILITARY DEMINING BUDGET AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

Ser	Objective	Activities	Budget Description		Remarks
			Key Requirement	Cost (USD)	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	1. To resurvey known uncleared mined areas by 2010.	1.1 Training of surveyors to boost the current strength.	Survey equipment and accessories.	23 000	To deploy (1.2) suitably transport should be acquired.
		1.2 Deployment to known uncleared minefields	Transport and other logistics support.	2 000 000	
		1.3 Resurvey known uncleared minefields	Administration and variable cost	5 000	
		1.4 Data collation and analysis and submission of report	Total requirement to resurvey uncleared mined areas	2 028000	
	2. Conduct survey on newly discovered minefields by year 2010	2.1 Mobilization of trainees.	Survey equipment and accessories.	23 000	
		2.2 Training of surveyors.	Transport and other logistics support.	1 500 000	
		2.3 Deployment.			

		2.4 Survey of newly discovered minefields	Administration and variable cost	5 000	
		2.5 Data collation and analysis and submission of reports	Total requirement to resurvey uncleared mined areas	1 528 000	
Sub Total				3 556 000	
3	3.Complete clearance Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner by 2011	3.1 Conduct Technical resurvey of minefields	Detection equipment and accessories	1 000 000	To boost current strength
		3.2 Training of additional deminer	Transport and logistical support.	2 000 000	
		3.3 Deployment additional strength.	Administration and variable	25 000	
		3.4 Continue clearance and land release.	Medical	5 000	
			Total required to clear Sango border Post to Crooks Corner	3 030 000	
4	Total requirement up to 2011			6 856 000	

18. INSTITUTIONAL, HUMAN RESOURCES AND MATERIAL CAPACITY AVAILABLE

Mine Clearance Equipment in the Inventory

Ser	Date of acquisition	Organisation responsible for inventory	Detector type held	Total number of detectors	Number serviceable	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1.	1998	Army	Schiebel	100	Nil	Donated by Mine Tech Not operationally suitable in Zimbabwe.
2.	1998	Army	EBEX	40	Nil	Donated by USA Government.
3.	2002	Army	VHM1	25	23	Donated by USA Government.
4.	2004	Army	VHM3	49	47	Purchased by Zimbabwe Government.

Ser	Date of acquisition	Organisation responsible for inventory	Personnel protective clothing	Total	Percentage serviceable	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1.	1998	Army	Helmet with visor	200	90%	All protective clothing donated by USA govt.
2.	1998	Army	Genital protectors	40	Nil	.
3.	1998	Army	Anti-fragmentation trousers	40	75%	
4.	1998	Army	Apron	100	50%	
5.	1998	Army	Deminers boots	80	25%	

Ser	Date of acquisition	Organisation responsible for inventory	Mechanical equipment	Total	Number serviceable	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1.	2000	Army	Dozer D7G	2	1	
2.	2000	Army	Champion Grader	1	1	
3.	2000	Army	Bush Muncher	1	1	
4.	2000	Army	3 ton Horse	1	50%	
5.	2000	Army	Low-bed trailer	1	1	
6.	2000	Army	Tipping truck	1	Nil	

National and International Mine Clearance Organisations.

	Name of Organisation	Type Organisation	Number of Demining personnel	Status of Teams	Remarks
1.	National Mine Clearance Squadron.	Military	200	Operational	Currently deployed on the Sango to Crooks Corner minefield. There is capacity to double the number of personnel resources permitting.
2.	Mine Link	Commercial	Recruit as necessary	Not operational	International experience.
3.	MACHIMO Mine International	Commercial	Recruit as necessary	Not operational Just been formed.	International experience.
4.	Croxenham	Commercial	Recruit as necessary	Not operational	International experience.
5.	SADSA	Commercial	Recruit as necessary	Operational	International experience.
6.	Eco-Mine International	Commercial	Recruit as necessary	Not operational	International experience.
7.	Mine-Tech	Commercial	Recruit as necessary	Operational	Conducted the technical survey for all minefields in Zimbabwe. Has vast demining experience in Africa and the Middle East.

Remarks:

- Demining companies listed above less the military are operating outside Zimbabwe since there are no funds to contract them locally. Otherwise they are relying on exporting labour to other countries.
- Even those companies which are not currently operational have the capacity to quickly mobilise the abundant demining expertise in the country. All are staffed with personnel with various international experience.
- ZIMAC estimates that there are more than 1000 deminers with operational experience either gained in commercial companies or retirees from the military. ZIMAC is yet to register all deminers in the country.