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Explosive Hazards Threat Assessment – Northeast Nigeria,

January-July 2019

Date: 4 September 2019

What: The following paper relates to analysis of the explosive threats and hazards and their resulting impact in the North East of Nigeria.

When: This analysis was based on explosive hazard events reported and recorded from 1 January 2019 to 30 July 2019.

Who: The dynamics within the parties to the conflict are complex, prone to sudden changes and at times shifting allegiances or leadership issues can make such determinations problematic. For this reason, the term "perpetrator" has been used to refer to such parties as defined in the United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal standards.

Where: Although most of the available information relates to Borno State, it covers the States in the Northeast states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa which are collectively referred to herein as BAY. Owing to the transnational nature of the perpetrator groups operating in BAY and where relevant, the wider Lake Chad Basin has been examined for Explosive Ordnance (EO) contamination, namely the regions surrounding Lake Chad in Chad, Niger (Diffa Region) and Cameroon (Extreme-Nord Region). It should be noted that most of recorded information is restricted to the accessible areas in BAY and the surrounding Lake Chad regions.

How: It has been compiled using reliable, confirmed from different sources and credible information concerning Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) along with a brief assessment of potential Anti-Personnel Mines (APM). It is noted that due to the absence of a dedicated process to collect the information pertaining to explosive hazards in BAY, some events have not been recorded and it is acknowledged that the available information does not permit an in-depth analysis. However, UNMAS is reasonably confident that this assessment reflects on the wider actual nature and trend of explosive hazards and associated threats in BAY. The information contained in this document are subject to change if additional details are received and as the explosive hazard threats continue to evolve. The technical and tactical terminology used in this assessment are defined in the glossary of terms annex.

Why: It serves to better understand the risks and threats affiliated to explosive ordnances, and consequently inform safety and security, access and inclusion of Mine Action in the humanitarian-development nexus response in BAY.

Acknowledgements: UNMAS would like to acknowledge and thank the International NGO Safety Organisation, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and the Mine Advisory Group for their kind review and inputs.

Security: As the subject contained herein is of a sensitive nature, the sharing of this information is based on need-to-know and should not be done without prior authorization from UNMAS Nigeria programme personnel.

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Introduction

Overall this assessment indicates that IEDs emplaced along routes of movement typically targeting Nigerian Security Forces (NSF) are the main explosive hazard threat at present in terms of the number of such their wide geographic spread. Person Borne IED (PBIED) constitute a persistent threat to lives although there has been a decline compared to previous years. The use of Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED) is limited in number and is used for specific tactical effect.

This assessment considers there to be three predominant IED perpetrator groups operating in BAY, namely: Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunna Liddaawati Wal Jihad (hereinafter referred to as JAS), Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and a third group, referred to as Ba Koura's faction, operating in the Diffa region of Niger and in the Lake Department in Chad, with Tactics, Techniques and Procedures similar to JAS's.

Also, of concern are incidents related to Explosive Remnant of War (ERW) which are assessed as a serious life threatening and destabilising issue that has not yet reached its peak due to restricted access to potentially affected areas, caused by the ongoing armed conflict. A brief overview of potential Anti Personal Mines threats is also provided. This assessment concludes with an outline of how best the humanitarian and development community can take this issue into account when considering the responses in order not to hamper operations required in this region.



Graph 1: number of incidents related to explosive ordnance in Lake Chad Basin from January to July 2019.

Concerning victims, available figures of casualties are assessed as inaccurate and likely too low; e.g. the most of incidents indicate those killed but not injured. When number of injured persons is indicated, there is much often a lack of information concerning the severity of injuries. It can be reasonably stated that some injuries subsequently result in death for lack of first aid or immediately accessible relevant medical care and casualty evacuation assets. A key finding is that civilians represent more than one third of victims being killed and more than a half of injured.

In assessing explosive hazard threats in BAY and Lake Chad Basin, the intended targets and actual victims are important metrics to track and understand. It is to be reminded in the light of technics used by the perpetrators

that the non-discriminatory nature of some IED constitutes a threat to the civilians, humanitarian and development workers.



Graph 2: repartition of victims by type of explosive ordnance from January to July 2019.NB: IEDs planted along roads are prevalent.

Mapping of explosive hazard incidents indicates ERW contamination resulting from frequent small-scale armed clashes, air strikes and indirect fire (rockets, mortar shelling, and artillery) is spread across Borno State, with some levels of ERW contamination in Yobe State (mostly on the eastern part, bordering with Borno State) and in the northern part of Adamawa State . ERW incidents are also recorded in the area near Lake Chad in the North West of Cameroon.

IED activity mapping indicates the areas where perpetrator groups are active in their efforts to attack members of the NSF, the Multi National Joint Task Forces (MNJTF) and in some cases members of the civilian population. IED activities are mainly concentrated in Borno State with lesser level of IED attacks occurring in Yobe and Adamawa States. These attacks are concentrated along routes of movement used by the NSF and MNJTF as well as in population centers. IED attacks have also been recorded in the wider region in Cameroon, Chad and Niger typically along the border with Nigeria.

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

Map 1: ERW and IED incidents recorded from January to July 2019

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I. Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)

a. Overview

There are three predominant uses of IEDs in BAY and Lake Chad Basin, namely:

- IEDs emplaced along roads;
- Person Borne IED (PBIED) attacks;
- Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED) attacks.

A. IEDs Emplaced Along Routes of Movement

This IED threat refers to the emplacement of IEDs along roads used by the NSF and MNJTF but also civilians and humanitarians.

Currently representing the greatest threat linked to explosive devices, IED emplaced along routes of movement represent a direct risk to lives and restrict freedom of movement for the humanitarian activities, the civilian population and the security forces.

There have been 105 recorded incidents related to IED emplaced along roads resulting in 115 persons being killed and 143 others being injured. These IED are equally employed by both JAS and ISWAP. In the absence of systematic exploitation and reporting of these incidents, the technical and tactical design cannot be precisely assessed. In addition, the absence of further information does not allow to count the number of victims or disaggregate them between civilians and security forces in many instances. However, in many cases, coordinates are available to map the incidents.



Map 2: IEDs emplaced along roads. It highlights the challenge to freedom of movement, access and security.

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From a combination of observed component of IED, interviews and narratives of the incidents it shows that majority of IEDs are Victim Operated (VOIED), more precisely in the form of Pressure Plates.

Picture 1: examples of pressure plates recovered in Gwoza area (September 2018)

VOIED do not discriminate targets once they have been armed and, unlike command IEDs, there is no triggerman in the loop that can choose the intended target. When armed the first victim (person or vehicle) to pass over the pressure plate causes the firing switch to actuate resulting in the IED functioning. It is also important to mention that although emplaced to destroy vehicles, the observed pressure plates can be activated by the weight of a person, giving these devices a *de facto* antipersonnel capability.

While most of the victims belong to the Nigerian military, civilians are also amongst the victims including NGO affiliated e.g. on 6 March 15 farmers were killed and 5 other injured in Khaddamari (Jere LGA); on 18 March, 8 civilians were killed in Warrabe (Gwoza); on 16 May, between Banki and Free Town, a civilian truck part of a convoy escorted by the military initiated an IED killing 3 civilians and injuring 2 others.

A similar incident, 22 June 2019, resulted in 5 civilians being killed. It happened in Fotokol, Cameroon. Although not in Borno, the close proximity to Gambara-Ngala once again highlights the actual threat these devices pose to civilians and the humanitarian community.

Picture 2: 16 May, a civilian truck part of convoy hit by an IED. 3 civilians were killed and 2 other injured.

There are no received reports nor indication that the humanitarian personnel and activities were specifically targeted. However, Pressure Plate IED do not discriminate victims. Road planted IEDs thus constitute a clear challenge and threat to the humanitarian in terms of access and safety. The explosion of an IED against a NGO rental truck on the Pulka-Gwoza road, 23 July, is a clear reminder of this risk.

Nigerian Security Forces managed to discover and neutralize at least 46 IEDs (approximatively with a ratio of 2:3 of Recovered:Actuated). Most of these IED have been recovered by the Nigerian Army. The Police Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit deployed in Maiduguri and in some LGAs also support this effort although to a lesser extent. In the absence of other clearance capability, UNMAS recommends continuing to make the best use of security forces assistance when and where appropriate.

However, the number of road planted IED that are not detected indicate that this capability requires further development and support. In the absence of any other similar capacity, both Civil Military Coordination and initiatives aiming at improving these EOD capacities are of primary importance.

In addition, UNMAS strongly recommends to specifically train –or reinforce existing trainings- of drivers and other personnel involved in movement planning and execution.



Graph 3: numbers of recovered and detonated IED along roads.

It is noted that the presence of Pressure Plate IEDs emplaced in locations other than roads have been recorded in previous periods. In 2018, 2 IEDs have been spotted by Mine Action partners during non-technical surveys thus avoiding further accidents

In addition to pressure plates other types of switches have been mentioned by the Nigerian military during interviews and a few elements corresponding to command wire switches have been observed. This type of switch allows to more precisely aim at an intended target.

B. Person Borne IED (PBIED)

A PBIED is an IED worn, carried or housed by a person, either willingly (suicide) or unwillingly (proxy). Observed vests indicate that the PBIED bearers initiate the detonation. There is no indication of additional switches allowing a second party to initiate the device from distance (so-called “chicken-switch”.)

During the period, 24 events related to PBIED have been registered: 16 in Northeast Nigeria, 5 in Niger and 3 in Cameroon. In 16 cases, PBIED were not successful. In Nigeria, 1 case has been registered in Yobe state, 4 in Adamawa and 11 in Borno.



Map 3: PBIED incidents from January to July 2019. The concentration of incidents in JAS area of operations is clearly visible.

The crossed analysis of the locations narrative and victims account of recorded events indicates a differentiated approach by JAS and ISWAP. Whereas both groups use PBIED, JAS continues to target civilians and ISWAP includes this weapon in its tactics to attack security forces. This difference in doctrinal use of PBIED between ISWAP and JAS is an important one to understand in order to inform the IED threat assessment and the

subsequent measures and efforts to be invested in. Another important issue in the use of PBIED is whether they are suicide bombers (willing and compliant) or are they proxy bombers (unwilling and coerced or unwitting).

The 5 cases reported in Niger bring even more complexity and may tend to confirm the rise of the Bakoura faction, reportedly closer to JAS views. The deliberate targeting of civilians and the use of female PBIEDs -17th February and 26th March – highlights JAS' modus operandi illustrated by the PBIED attack against civilians in Konduga on 16th June.

In Nigeria, 7 of the total events resulted in civilian victims: 43 killed and 92 injured. Amongst them, two PBIED resulted in a total of 34 killed and 83 injured and can be associated to JAS due to their location and modus operandi employed.

In all other cases no other victims -except the persons wearing the IED in some instances- have been accounted for. Most of them have been foiled by Nigeria Security Forces, especially at the moment when the PBIEDs tried to infiltrate their target. In other instances, the PBIED prematurely detonated their charge. This may indicate a low level of training and competency among PBIED bombers or handlers who may controlling them.

PBIED targeting civilians have been registered in urban areas and deliberately aimed at populated areas: security check-points, IDP camp, hospital, cinema, church and mosque. Most of them happened on the outskirts of these urban areas indicating that the PBIED come from the outside. Indeed, security forces stopped PBIED when trying to cross trenches or at the entrance of built-up areas on several occasions.

There is no indication that the humanitarian community is specifically targeted. However, UNMAS strongly encourages humanitarian partners to avoid locating in in the fringes of urban localities in JAS and Bakoura areas of operation. It is also recommended to limit the presence close to usual targets.

Picture 3: one of the 3 IEDs recovered following the attack against civilians in Konduga, 16th June, killing 29 and injuring 40. The technically simple designed IED remains deadly.

The geographical pattern of PBIED employment combined with an analysis of victims, confirms different doctrinal approaches between the IED perpetrator groups active in BAY. In the areas of operations of ISWAP, PBIED are most commonly used against military targets. Where JAS operates, civilians are the prevalent victims. This is consistent with the original Boko Haram credo based on religious exclusivism: *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* (exclusive loyalty to "true" Muslims and disavowal of non-Muslim persons and systems). Based on this approach, JAS considers that civilians who are not joining them are legitimate targets.

While the information concerning the gender of perpetrators is incomplete, it appears that female PBIED are still used to perpetrate attacks. Concerning the age of perpetrators, there is no clear indication. However, and whereas an elderly PBIED was reported once, pictures and information collected through interviews and different sources indicate that most of PBIED are young adults and likely children.

C. Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED)

A VBIED is an IED delivered or concealed in a ground-based vehicle. VBIEDs involve IEDs that are packed into and/or concealed inside vehicle' compartments such as dashboard, door compartments, boot, back seat, main load carrying area, within voids and spare wheel compartments.

During the period, 4 events relate to VBIED: 3 in Nigeria and 1 in Niger, resulting in 18 members of security forces being killed. Given the context and the location of the attacks, most of these VBIED can be attributed to ISWAP faction. However, ISWAP did not claim the attack in Molai (outskirts of Maiduguri) on 7th May. As a reminder, JAS previously made use of VBIED on February 2018 in Sambisa forest against security forces.

Of note, ISWAP makes an effort to armor VBIED which is likely inspired by similar Islamic State (IS) technics used in Iraq and Syria with the intention of preventing the security forces stopping them. There is no indication that the humanitarian community is specifically targeted as it clearly appears that the VBIED have been used against the military, either as a defensive or offensive weapon.

Summary of IED Threats

From Maiduguri to Banki and from Banki to Madagali (Adamawa state), the use of Victim Operated IED and PBIED matches with the presence of JAS. This area corresponds to the east and west fringes of Sambisa forest known as JAS safe heaven. Further north in Borno State as well as on the Bamboa-Maiduguri and Maiduguri-Damaturu directions, the use of IED is persistent but seems to be more dependent on the fluidity of security force operations. Of note, Niger, Chad and Cameroon are also subject to the use of IED although to a lesser extent that likely relates to a lesser volume of activities.

IED are a protection issue. Because of their technical nature or their intended use, they represent a threat to the lives of civilians and humanitarian-development workers. IED are also an obstacle to the access to humanitarian-development support and more generally to freedom of movement.

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II. Explosive Remnant of War

The contamination by ERW due to unexploded and abandoned ordnance (UXO and AXO), is the result of past and present armed confrontations. A full analysis requires to take into account data prior to 2019. This analysis will be presented in a separate document. It is however possible to present an overview and some key findings concerning ERW contamination in BAY, from the data collected in 2019.



Map 4: known armed confrontations with the use of indirect fires (artillery, rockets, and mortar) and airstrikes from January to July 2019.

ERW in northeast Nigeria range from small arms ammunition to air dropped bombs. They are the results of confrontation between NSF and Non State Armed Groups: ground battles, skirmishes, artillery and indirect fires, airstrikes. The risk to encounter ERW in newly or temporary accessible areas is highly likely. For example, on 21 June, the locality of Doro Naira (Kukawa LGA) was retaken from ISWAP by NSF following a battle including ground fights, artillery fires and air strikes.

The likelihood of contamination by explosives is significant given that from 10 to 20% of fired explosive ammunitions do not function properly. The rocket attack against Maiduguri on 23rd February illustrates this ratio with one unexploded 122mm rocket landing in vicinity of a primary school and another one landing in Teachers' village IDP camp.

While constituting a risk to the humanitarian community, ERW have been less challenging in terms of access during the considered period. Most of the places currently accessible by humanitarians are not heavily contaminated by ERW and as such does not represent an obstacle to access. However, reinforced tailored explosive ordnance awareness and Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE), to include refresher training, is required by people in the field in order to avoid accidents involving ERW.



Graph 5: number of ERW recovered and number of ERW accidents in BAY from January to July 2019.

Recorded accidents resulting in casualties, in Yobe and Borno, involve civilians who detonated Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) for lack of awareness. In 2 other instances, NGO spotted UXO in the proximity of their compound and reported them to security forces who disposed of them. In other places, Non-technical surveys conducted by Mine Action partners resulted in the mapping of Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHA)–that is to say areas where the presence of explosive devices was confirmed.

Nigeria Army and Police EOD are responsive when ERW are reported. However, it seems that many civilians are reluctant to report findings by fear to be in trouble. As a pilot, UNMAS delivered pilot 1st Responder trainings to both Nigerian Police Force and Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps. In addition to procedural skills aiming at consolidating the management of incidents involving reported explosives or detonations, it was the opportunity to insist on the right of civilians for protection.

Picture 4: this UXO was recovered in the back of an NGO compound in Monguno, 16th March 2019.



Graph 6: known number of civilians injured and killed by ERW and unknown explosive devices from January to July 2019.

Out of 11 civilians killed by ERW, 8 have been clearly reported as boys, 1 as a male and 1 as a female. Overall, boys and men seem to be more at risk. It should be noted that unsafe behavior developed by civilian populations may endanger humanitarian workers.

UNMAS recommends pursuing efforts to educate the civilian population in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). This risk education must also aim at improving communities' sustainable resilience to include the development of first aid to decrease the mortality resulting from wounds and reactions to news threats such as indirect fires. Equally, it is needed to reinforce the training of the humanitarian and development workers in order to provide the appropriate knowledge that supports those actions and practices that lead to safe behavior. UNMAS also recommends conducting Non-Technical Surveys when the humanitarian and development communities plan to access new areas. For example, the expansion or relocation of IDP camps and guesthouses, or the creation of new ones requires to make sure the area is safe. In addition, and in a context where socio-economical structures are already fragile, it is recommended to invest in assisting the reintegration of survivors. Mine Action partners have a limited footprint in the field and mostly operate through roving teams. Thus, it is essential to prepare other Protection partners with a permanent presence in LGAs to collect information and refer it to the Mine Action Sub Sector in order to ensure an adequate and timely response. Whereas the security forces are now better experienced against IED and whereas they are keen on disposing of ERW that are reported to them, there is no formal process to conduct the systemic and certified clearance of areas from ERW. It results in a lack of guarantees that areas claimed to be cleared are effectively safe.

III. Anti-Personnel Mines (APM)

Nigeria is a party to the Anti-Personnel Mines Ban Convention (APMBC) since 2001 and the Convention entered into force for Nigeria on 1 March 2002. At the 2011 Meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Nigeria announced that it had fulfilled its obligation under Article 5 of the Convention. On 29 November 2011, at the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties in Phnom Penh, Nigeria presented a formal Declaration of Completion.

It has been recorded that some VOIED employed by perpetrator groups are actuated similarly to Anti-Personnel Mines (APM).

The delegation of Nigeria at the intersessional meetings and first preparatory meeting for the fourth review conference of anti-personnel mine ban convention 22-24 May, 2019 at Geneva, Switzerland, recognize the issue of contamination by mines in northeast Nigeria and emphasized on the need for non-technical survey.

In addition, the question of manufactured landmines requires additional investigation. So far and in the absence of tangible element, the threat posed by manufactured APM cannot be currently evidenced. In July 2019, unconfirmed but credible information about the presence of manufactured APM in the region of Damboa was shared with UNMAS. A different source had previously reported that on 3rd April 2019, 1 hunter was killed and another 1 was injured after stepping on an unknown explosive device in the vicinity of Bula Njimbam, 15 kilometers west of Damboa. Although it could also be due to a VOIED or an item of ERW, the possibility of a manufactured APM cannot be excluded. Although this information requires further investigation and subsequent assessment of its potential geographical extent, Mine Action partners will include APM mine risk education in their safety messages delivered in the region of Damboa.

Conclusion

The analysis of events from January to July 2019 confirms that the use of explosive devices continues to affect the population in BAY thus constituting an unabated protection issue. The maintenance and development of a scaled-up Mine Action response is thus necessary. It also represents a risk to the United Nations, International and Local Non-Governmental Organizations, and Civil Society Organizations personnel deployed in BAY as well as representing an obstacle to their operations if not addressed properly. UNMAS recommends the following support so as such explosive hazards do not hamper humanitarian and development operations required in this region.

- Development of Mine Action activities, with an emphasis on conducting Non-Technical Surveys especially when the humanitarian and development communities plan to access new areas and in areas of returns.
- Improvement in the understanding of the contamination and its impact through an appropriate referral system. This will require support from other Protection partners with a permanent presence in LGAs to collect information and refer it to the Mine Action Sub Sector, thus ensuring an appropriate and timely threat aligned responses. It will initially require to train and mentor these partners.
- Delivery of bespoke Explosive Ordnance Risk Education to prepare the civilian population in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and to train the humanitarian and development workers in order to provide the appropriate knowledge that supports those actions and practices that lead to safe behavior.
- Continuation of bilateral efforts to develop the Nigerian Army EOD capacity and support to Mine Action partners' projects aiming at consolidating Police EOD capacity.
- Support to the Mine Action Sub Sector's efforts to consolidate knowledge management –to include the monitoring of survivors- and to strengthen response capacity of institutions.
- Support to the Mine Action Sub Sector's efforts to include Nigerian authorities in the development of a Mine Action normative and operational framework.

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Annex A

Glossary of Terms

Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO): explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under control of the party that left it behind or dumped it. Abandoned explosive ordnance may or may not have been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for use. *Source: CCW protocol V*

Accident: an undesired event which results in harm. *Source: IMAS 4.10*

Anti-Personnel Mines (APM): a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. *Source: IMAS 4.10*

Command Wire IED (CWIED): A switch where the firing point and contact point are separate but joined together by a length of wire. A Command Wire may contain multiple power sources located near both the firing point and the contact point to overcome the resistance in the length of the wire. *UNMAS IED Lexicon* 2018

Explosive Hazard (EH): An explosive hazard is any hazard containing an explosive component. All explosive hazards encountered can be broken down into the categories: Mines, ERW, IEDs and compoBAYts and precursor chemicals thereof. *Source: UN IEDD Standards May 2018;*

Explosive Ordnance (EO): all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature. [AAP-6] *Source: IMAS 4.10*

Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE): activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from explosive ordnance by raising awareness of men, women, and children in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles and needs, and promoting behavioural change including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.

Explosive Remnants of War (ERW): Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO). *Source: CCW protocol V.*

Incident: an event that gives rise to an accident or has the potential to lead to an accident.

IED Risk Mitigation (IED-RM). IED-RM refers to all tactical responses intended to mitigate the risk posed of IED attacks to such a level to allow those required to operate in an IED threat environment to do so effectively to execute wider security strategies as well as stabilisation, developmental and humanitarian initiatives through efficient & lean processes.

Non-Technical Survey (NTS): refers to the collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritisation and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. *Source: IMAS 4.10*

Perpetrator: *Term used to describe any person or group of persons or organization that has the intent and capacity to inflict physical violence. Source: UN IEDD Standards May 2018*

Person Borne IED (PBIED): An IED worn, carried, or housed by a person, either willingly (*see Suicide*) or unwillingly (*note: see Proxy*). *Source: UNMAS IED Lexicon* 2018

Pressure: A switch designed to function when pressure is applied in a predetermined direction (plate, tube, plunger, crush wire). *Source: UNMAS IED Lexicon 2018*

Pressure Plate IED (PPIED): An IED utilising a triggering device that occurs when an object is used to complete a circuit when pressure is applied or removed in a predetermined direction. Many pressure initiated IEDs explode when pressure plates are compressed under the weight of passing vehicles or foot soldiers. *Source: IMAS 04.10, 2nd Ed, 01 Jan 03, Amd 7, Aug 14, Glossary of Mine Action*

Proxy: A person (unwitting or coerced) who acts as a means of delivery of an IED. *Source: UNMAS IED Lexicon 2018*

Suicide: An IED initiated by the attacker at a time of their choosing in which they intentionally kill themselves as part of the attack, or possibly to deny capture. *Source: UNMAS IED Lexicon 2018*

Survivor: a man, or a woman or a child who has suffered harm as a result of a **mine, ERW** or **cluster munition accident**. *Source: IMAS 4.10*

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO): EO that has been primed, fuzed, armed or otherwise prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected yet remains unexploded either through malfunction or design or for any other reason. *Source: IMAS 4.10*

Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED): An IED delivered by or concealed in a ground-based vehicle. *Source: UNMAS IED Lexicon*

Victim: persons either individually or collectively who have suffered physical, emotional and psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to the use of mines or the presence of ERW. Victims include directly impacted individuals, their families, and communities affected by landmines and ERW. *Source: IMAS 4.10*

Victim assistance/survivor assistance: refers to all aid, relief, comfort and support provided to victims (including survivors) with the purpose of reducing the immediate and long-term medical and psychological implications of their trauma. *Source: IMAS 4.10*

Victim Operated IED (VOIED): A type of switch that is activated by the actions of an unsuspecting individual. These instruments rely on the intended target to carry out some form of action that will cause it to function. *Source: UNMAS IED Lexicon 2018*

Annex B

Lexicon of Abbreviations

APM	Anti-Personnel Mine(s)
AXO	Abandoned Explosive Ordnance
CHA	Confirmed Hazard Area
EH	Explosive Hazard(s)
EHAT	Explosive Hazard Awareness Training
EO	Explosive Ordnance
EORE	Explosive Ordnance Risk Education
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IED-RM	Improvised Explosive Device Risk Mitigation
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IS	Islamic State
ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
JAS	Jama'atu Ahlis-Sunna Liddaawati Wal Jihad
LGA	Locally Governed Area
MNJTF	Multi-National Joint Task Force
MRE	Mine Risk Education
NSF	Nigerian Security Forces
NTS	Non-Technical Survey
PBIED	Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VOIED	Victim Operated Improvised Explosive Device
UXO	Unexploded Explosive Ordnance