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**Consideration of the general status
and operation of the Convention**

**ACHIEVING THE AIMS OF THE NAIROBI ACTION PLAN:
THE GENEVA PROGRESS REPORT 2007-2008***

Submitted by the President-Designate of the Ninth Meeting of the States Parties

INTRODUCTION

1. On 3 December 2004 at the First Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (hereinafter “the Convention”) the States Parties adopted the **Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009**. In doing so, the States Parties “reaffirmed their unqualified commitment to the full and effective promotion and implementation of the Convention,” and their determination “to secure the achievements to date, to sustain and strengthen the effectiveness of their cooperation under the Convention, and to spare no effort to meet (their) challenges ahead in universalizing the Convention, destroying stockpiled anti-personnel mines, clearing mined areas and assisting victims.”¹

2. The **Nairobi Action Plan**, with its 70 specific action points, lays out a comprehensive framework for the period 2005-2009 for achieving major progress towards ending, for all people for all time, the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines. In doing so, it underscores the supremacy of the Convention and provides the States Parties with guidance in fulfilling their Convention obligations. To ensure the effectiveness of the **Nairobi Action Plan** as a means of guidance, the States Parties acknowledge the need to regularly monitor progress in the pursuit of the aims of the **Nairobi Action Plan** and to identify challenges that remain.

3. The purpose of the **Geneva Progress Report 2007-2008** is to support the application of the **Nairobi Action Plan** by measuring progress made during the period 22 November 2007 to 28 November 2008. While all 70 points in the **Nairobi Action Plan** remain equally important and should be acted upon, the **Geneva Progress Report** aims to highlight priority areas of work for the States Parties, the Co-Chairs and the Convention’s President in the period between the

* Submitted after due date and as soon as complete information was received by the Secretariat.

¹ **Nairobi Action Plan** (APLC/CONF/2004/5, Part III) Introduction.

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Ninth Meeting of the States Parties (9MSP) and the Second Review Conference. It is the fourth in a series of annual progress reports prepared by Presidents of Meetings of the States Parties in advance of the 2009 Second Review Conference.

I. UNIVERSALISING THE CONVENTION

4. At the close of the 18-22 November 2007 Eighth Meeting of the States Parties (8MSP), 156 States had deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession and the Convention had entered into force for 153 of these States. Since that time, the Convention entered into force for **Kuwait** (on 1 January 2008), **Iraq** (on 1 February 2008) and **Palau** (on 1 May 2008). The Convention has now entered into force for all 156 States that have ratified, accepted or approved the Convention or that have acceded to it. (See Annex I)

5. At the 2 June 2008 Meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, **the Marshall Islands**, one of two States that signed the Convention but which has not ratified it, reaffirmed its support for global action on the landmine issue and its commitment to the general principles of the Convention. It indicated that it was not yet able to provide a timeline for the ratification of the Convention as it is currently reviewing all its treaty commitments with a view to clarifying national priorities. Also at the 2 June 2008 Meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, the **Lao People's Democratic Republic** indicated that its government is considering eventually joining the Convention but it still has some concerns about the implementation of Article 5. On 24 November 2008, **Finland** confirmed its intention to accede to the Convention in 2012. On 26 November 2008, the **Micronesia (Federated States of)** confirmed its intention to accede to the Convention, reporting that a draft resolution will go before Congress in January 2009 for approval.

6. The 8MSP placed a priority, in keeping with Action #3 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, on increasing universalisation efforts targeting those States not parties that continue to use, produce, or possess large stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, including those developing new kinds of anti-personnel mines. In this context, since the 8MSP, the President of the 8MSP visited **Finland, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Singapore** and the **United States of America** – States not parties that are presumed to hold large stocks of anti-personnel mines – to deliver the message that the world would be a better place if they joined the States Parties' common effort. With respect to States not parties developing new kinds of anti-personnel mines, it was announced that the armed forces of the **United States of America** would not acquire a victim-activated version of a newly developed anti-personnel force protection system.

7. Action # 4 of the Nairobi Action Plan encourages States Parties to accord particular importance to promoting adherence in regions where the level of acceptance of the Convention remains low, strengthening universalisation efforts in the Middle East and Asia. In this context it should be noted that Indonesia and Canada, with the support of Australia, and Malaysia convened regional workshops partially intended to promote further acceptance of the Convention in Asia. In addition, Palau, with support from Australia, convened a workshop intended to increase acceptance of the Convention in the northern Pacific. In addition, Canada conducted

high level missions to the **Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nepal** and **Vietnam** to promote acceptance to the Convention.

8. On 23 June 2008 the European Union adopted a "Joint Action" that aims in part to promote the universalisation of the Convention. In addition, on 13 December 2007, the European Parliament passed a resolution marking the tenth anniversary of the Convention and urging all States to sign and ratify the Convention, underlining in particular the importance of the **China, India, Pakistan, Russian Federation** and the **United States of America** acceding to the Convention and also encouraging the two EU Member States (**Finland** and **Poland**) that have not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so before the Second Review Conference in 2009.

9. States Parties undertook a variety of efforts, in accordance with Action #6 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, to "actively promote adherence to the Convention in all relevant multilateral fora." On 5 December 2007, 164 States, including 20 States not parties, expressed their support for the Convention in the United Nations General Assembly by voting in favour of the annual resolution on the implementation and universalisation of the Convention. On 3 June 2008, the Organization of American States' General Assembly adopted a resolution urging its member States that have not yet done so to consider acceding to the Convention as soon as possible to ensure its full and effective implementation.

10. Pursuant to Action #8 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, the United Nations (UN), other institutions and regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and other non-governmental organizations, parliamentarians and interested citizens continued their involvement and active cooperation in universalisation efforts. Prominent examples included an appeal made by the United Nations Secretary General on 4 April 2008 for all States that have not yet done so to ratify all disarmament, humanitarian and human rights law instruments related to landmines, other explosive remnants of war and the survivors of the devastating effects of these devices. The United Nations Mine Action Team expressed a commitment to focus advocacy efforts on mine-affected States that are not parties to the Convention, particularly those receiving UN mine action support. In addition, the ICBL undertook visits to Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Poland and the United Arab Emirates to promote the Convention.

11. 39 States have not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention. Among these are two States – the **Marshall Islands** and **Poland** – that signed the Convention but which have not yet ratified it. While "the desirability of attracting adherence of all States to this Convention"² remains a matter of emphasis for the States Parties, these two signatory States remain of special interest with respect to universalization.

12. Also among the 39 States that have not expressed their consent to be bound by the Convention are some that produce, use, transfer and / or maintain large stockpiles of anti-personnel mines. According to the ICBL, 2 States not parties – **Myanmar** and the **Russian Federation** – made new use of anti-personnel mines since the 8MSP.

² Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Preamble.

13. According to the ICBL, armed non-State actors in 7 States (Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) made new use of anti-personnel mines since the 8MSP.

14. States Parties and other actors continued to advocate for the end of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines by armed non-State actors. Several States Parties and the UN expressed their support and/or made financial commitments to the Geneva Call for its work to engage armed non-State actors and promote their adherence to the Convention's norms. The Geneva Call obtained a further signing of its "Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action" since the 8MSP. States Parties remained of the view that, when engagement by non-governmental organizations of armed non-State actors is considered, vigilance is required to prevent those organizations which carry out terrorist acts, or promote them, from exploiting the Ottawa Process for their own goals. With respect to one previous signing, one State Party again noted with concern that the Geneva Call proceeded in a manner not consistent with paragraph 17 of the Zagreb Progress Report³, which states:

"Also in this context, as rights and obligations enshrined in the Convention and commitments in the **Nairobi Action Plan** apply to States Parties, some States Parties are of the view that when engagement with armed non-state actors is contemplated, States Parties concerned should be informed, and their consent would be necessary in order for such an engagement to take place."

15. Since the 8MSP, the Philippines Campaign to Ban Landmines launched the "Rebel Group Declaration of Adherence to International Humanitarian Law on Landmines."

Priorities for the period leading to the Second Review Conference

16. Given that no additional States ratified or acceded to the Convention since the 8MSP, there is even greater need for the States Parties to turn their commitment to universalisation into action in accordance with Actions #1 to #8 of the **Nairobi Action Plan** prior to the Second Review Conference, in particular by placing a priority on the following:

- (i) **All States Parties should direct specific efforts towards encouraging quick progress by those States not parties which have indicated that they could ratify or accede to the Convention in the near-term. As discussed by the Universalisation Contact Group, these include: Bahrain, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Poland, Tonga, Tuvalu and United Arab Emirates.**
- (ii) **In keeping with Action #3 of the Nairobi Action Plan, all States Parties and those that share their aims should continue to increase universalisation efforts that place a priority on those States not parties that produce, use,**

³ APLC/MSP.6/2005/5, Part II, 3 April 2006.

transfer and maintain large stockpiles of anti-personnel mines, including those developing new kinds of anti-personnel mines.

- (iii) **Further to Actions #5 and #6 of the Nairobi Action Plan, States Parties should continue to use bilateral, regional and multilateral meetings and events to promote the Convention including in the United Nations General Assembly and its committees.**
- (iv) **All States Parties should take advantage of the Second Review Conference to elevate in 2009 to a high political level the matter of promoting universal acceptance of the Convention, including by seeking to ensure that their heads of state and government and ministers of foreign affairs and defence engage their counterparts from States not parties in promoting ratification or accession.**

II. DESTROYING STOCKPILED ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

17. At the close of the 8MSP, it was recorded that the obligation to destroy or ensure the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines contained in Article 4 of the Convention was still relevant for eight States Parties. Since that time, five States Parties have had deadlines for fulfilling Article 4 obligations. Two of these States Parties, **Burundi** and **Sudan**, reported that they completed the destruction of their stockpiled anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 4. Three of these States Parties, **Belarus**, **Greece** and **Turkey**, reported that they had not yet complied with their Article 4 obligations by their respective deadlines.

18. **Indonesia** and **Kuwait** submitted initial transparency reports confirming or indicating that they possess stockpiled anti-personnel mines they must destroy. On 26 November 2008 **Indonesia** indicated that it had completed the destruction of its stockpiled anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 4. **Iraq** submitted an initial transparency report to confirm no stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it or under its jurisdiction or control. However **Iraq** indicated that the matter will be further investigated and if stockpiled anti-personnel mines are identified, they will be reported and appropriate plans will be developed for their destruction. **Palau** submitted an initial transparency report to confirm no stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it or under its jurisdiction or control. **Ethiopia** indicated that approximately 60 per cent of its stockpiled anti-personnel mines have been destroyed and that, with the exception of a small quantity retained for training, the remaining stocks will be destroyed by its deadline. Hence the obligation to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines remains relevant for six States Parties: **Belarus**, **Ethiopia**, **Greece**, **Kuwait**, **Turkey** and **Ukraine**. Timelines for States Parties to complete stockpile destruction in accordance with Article 4 are in Annex II.

19. Three States Parties, **Equatorial Guinea**, **Gambia** and **Haiti**, that are assumed to not possess stockpiled anti-personnel mines, remain overdue in submitting an initial transparency report. As well, one State Party, **Cape Verde**, for which information emerged prior to the 8MSP indicating that it indeed held stocks and that these have been destroyed, is overdue in providing

an initial transparency report to clarify the types and quantities of mines destroyed after entry into force.

20. **Tajikistan** reported that it had either transferred for destruction or had destroyed over 49,000 previously unknown stockpiled anti-personnel mines. **Niger** reported that 5,000 anti-personnel mines were seized in the context of a weapon collection programme and that all of them were destroyed in situ.
21. 150 States that have ratified or acceded to the Convention now no longer hold stocks of anti-personnel mines, either because they never did or because they have completed their destruction programmes. Together the States Parties have reported the destruction of more than 41 million stockpiled mines.
22. In the **8MSP's Dead Sea Progress Report 2006-2007**, it was noted that while the number of States Parties which must fulfil Article 4 obligations is small, serious challenges remain. At the 2 June 2008 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, it was noted that these challenges are even more profound than initially anticipated and expressed at the 8MSP. In particular, the failure by **Belarus, Greece and Turkey**, which together have almost eight million stockpiled anti-personnel mines, to comply with the obligations contained in Article 4 by their deadlines represents a matter of serious concern. Discussions were held in the context of the meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction on how to address such concerns about compliance and on how to prevent additional instances of non-compliance, including on the basis of a paper presented to the Standing Committee by its Co-Chairs.
23. The updates on progress achieved provided by **Belarus, Greece and Turkey** at the 2 June 2008 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction were welcomed but some States Parties expressed serious concern regarding these three cases of non-compliance and called on these three States Parties to rectify the situation as soon as possible. Subsequent to the 2 June 2008 meeting, Greece communicated to the 8MSP President that it would complete the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines no later than 28 May 2009. Belarus and Turkey did not provide timelines for the completion of their stockpile destruction. Belarus, Greece and Turkey were encouraged to do their utmost to fulfil their obligations under Article 4 as soon as possible and respect the commitment they made when they acceded to the Convention.
24. On 18 February 2008 **Belarus** informed States Parties that it had completed the destruction of its non-PFM type stockpiled anti-personnel mines and that, due to the failure of a cooperation and assistance programme with the European Commission, Belarus would be unable to destroy its PFM type anti-personnel mines by its 1 March 2008 deadline. Belarus indicated that both it and the European Commission remained committed to continue cooperation with the goal of destroying all PFM type mines in Belarus. Belarus further noted that, on 22 January, 2008, Belarus and the European Commission signed a financing agreement aimed at realising this goal. At the 2 June 2008 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Belarus repeated this information. Further to that meeting, Belarus reported that both it and the European Commission were in the process of negotiating terms of reference to define responsibilities and the timeframes for destruction.

25. Also at the 2 June 2008 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, **Greece** indicated that complex and time consuming procedures in coordinating and implementing the stockpile destruction efforts as well as changes in the national legislation were the reasons for which it had not been able to fulfil its obligations within the four-year deadline. Greece further reported that the draft contract between the Greek Ministry of Defence and the private company chosen to carry out the destruction project was still undergoing audit and legal review. However, Greece indicated that the stockpiled anti-personnel mines have been assembled in a number of sites to facilitate their collection and transport and necessary financial resources have been earmarked for the project.

26. On 28 February 2008, **Turkey** informed all States Parties that it was continuing to pursue the destruction process with utmost care and the Turkish Munitions Disposal Facility was operating at maximum capacity. On 23 May 2008, Turkey organised a briefing on and field trip to its disposal facility, which featured the participation of the ICBL, the ICRC and the Implementation Support Unit. At the 2 June 2008 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Turkey reported that although the fuses of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines were removed and destroyed, the destruction process could not be completed by the deadline. Turkey indicated that it was unable to give an accurate time-frame for the completion of the process as its disposal facility operates under environmental scrutiny, with a recycling methodology that requires time and with a growth in daily destruction capacity still unknown. On 7 October, Turkey organised a briefing on and field trip to its disposal facility for the 8MSP President.

27. **Ukraine** reported that following the collapse of assistance arrangements with the European Commission to destroy all remaining stockpiled PFM type mines, it had the resources and capacity to destroy only half the remaining stockpile by its deadline. Ukraine further reported that taking into account the destruction productivity of the Pavlograd Chemical Plant, which does not exceed 1.8-2 million mines per year, if further delay with international assistance was to be experienced, Ukraine might not be in a position to fulfil its Article 4 obligations by its deadline.

28. The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, in keeping with Actions #14 and #16 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, gave special attention to the challenges to comply with Article 4 obligations on the part of those States Parties that must destroy vast quantities of Soviet-era PFM mines. They did so in part by convening on 11 April 2008 informal closed consultations with representatives of the States Parties concerned, with the participation of interested donors, experts and relevant intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. This initiative was welcomed by all participants and its conclusions were presented to the 2 June 2008 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction.

29. The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction continued to highlight the importance of applying Action #15 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, which states that “all States Parties will, when previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information and destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority.” It was recalled that the 8MSP adopted amendments to the Article 7 reporting format to facilitate reporting on this matter.

Priorities for the period leading to the Second Review Conference

30. While the list remains short in terms of the number of States Parties for which Article 4 remains relevant, the outstanding challenges relating to implementation are more profound than ever before. All States Parties must act to comply with their deadlines, placing a priority in the period leading to the Second Review Conference on the following:

- (i) **States Parties that failed to comply with their Article 4 obligations by their deadlines should act in a committed and transparent way, immediately communicating, preferably in the form of a note verbale addressed to all States Parties, the reasons, which should be extraordinary, for failing to comply and providing a plan to ensure compliance as soon as possible, including an expected completion date. They should commit national resources to fulfil their obligations and, if relevant, actively pursue assistance.**
- (ii) **In order to prevent future instances of non-compliance with Article 4 obligations, States Parties in the process of implementing Article 4 should communicate to other States Parties, including through annual transparency reports, at every meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction and at every Meeting of the States Parties or Review Conference, plans to implement Article 4, successively reporting progress that is being made towards the fulfilment of Article 4 obligations, including the number of mines destroyed. If necessary, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction should hold, well in advance of deadlines, informal consultations with concerned States Parties, donors and relevant experts.**
- (iii) **States Parties should use a variety of means to encourage and facilitate, where appropriate, the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines by States Parties concerned, including by engaging States Parties that must implement Article 4 in a dialogue if, one year after entry into force, such States Parties do not have plans to implement Article 4 by their deadlines and if, two years after entry into force, no progress in the destruction of stockpiled mines has been reported.**
- (iv) **The State Party with a deadline for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines that occurs prior to the Second Review Conference should, in accordance with its Convention obligations and as emphasized in Action #11 of the Nairobi Action Plan, ensure that it communicates as soon as possible the amount of stockpiles still to be destroyed and completes its destruction programme on time. Others with deadlines that occur following the Second Review Conference should aim to comply as soon as possible but no later than their four year deadlines.**
- (v) **States Parties in a position to do so should, in accordance with their Convention obligations and as emphasized in Action #13 of the Nairobi Action Plan, promptly assist States Parties with clearly demonstrated needs for**

external support for stockpile destruction, responding promptly to appeals for assistance by States Parties in danger of not meeting deadlines under Article 4.

- (vi) **States Parties should continue to report previously unknown stockpiles discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, and may make use of the means adopted at the 8MSP to facilitate such reporting and taking advantage of other informal means to share such information. They should destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority.**

III. CLEARING MINED AREAS

31. At the close of the 8MSP, it was reported that the obligation contained in Article 5 of the Convention, to destroy or ensure the destruction of all emplaced anti-personnel mines remained relevant for 44 States Parties. Since then, **France** and **Malawi** reported that they have completed implementation of Article 5 and **Niger** indicated that the presence of anti-personnel mines was no longer suspected on its territory. In addition, **Iraq** submitted an initial transparency report confirming areas under its jurisdiction or control which are dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of anti-personnel mines. Hence the obligation to destroy or ensure the destruction of all emplaced anti-personnel mines remains relevant for the following 42 States Parties: **Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Greece, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.** Timelines for these States Parties to destroy or ensure the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5 are contained in Annex III.

32. Of the remaining 16 States Parties with deadlines in 2009, one State Party (**Uganda**) indicated that it plans to complete implementation by its 2009 deadline, and, the following 15 States Parties submitted, pursuant to Article 5.3 and the process adopted by the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties (7MSP), requests for extensions of deadlines for completing the destruction of emplaced anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5.1: **Bosnia and Herzegovina** (10 years requested); **Chad** (16 months requested); **Croatia** (10 years requested); **Denmark** (22 months requested); **Ecuador** (8 years requested); **Jordan** (3 years requested); **Mozambique** (5 years requested); **Nicaragua** (1 year requested); **Peru** (8 years requested); **Senegal** (7 years requested); **Thailand** (9.5 years requested); the **United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland** (10 years requested); **Venezuela** (5 years requested); **Yemen** (5.5 years requested); and, **Zimbabwe** (22 months requested).

33. Since the 8MSP, the process adopted at the 7MSP of preparing, submitting and analysing requests for extensions came to life and started being implemented for the first time. Pursuant to the decision to “encourage States Parties seeking Article 5 extensions to submit their request to

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the President no fewer than nine months before the Meeting of the States Parties (...) at which the decision on the request would be taken,” the 8MSP President wrote on 8 February 2008 to States Parties with deadlines in 2009 to encourage requests to be submitted in March 2008. In addition, pursuant to the agreement “that requesting States Parties are encouraged, as necessary, to seek assistance from the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in the preparation of their requests”, the President encouraged the use of the advisory services of the ISU in the preparation of requests. Many of the requesting States Parties made use of the services provided by the ISU.

34. Pursuant to the 7MSP agreement that the President and the Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs of the Standing Committees would jointly prepare analyses of the requests submitted, the States Parties mandated to prepare these analyses met for the first time on 11 March 2008 and several times thereafter. In keeping with the Convention’s practice of transparency, all States Parties were notified of the working methods agreed to by the States Parties mandated to prepare analyses and chair’s summaries of meetings were made available on the Convention’s website. In addition, in accordance with the decisions of the 7MSP, the States Parties were notified by the 8MSP President of the receipt of requests and all requests were made openly available on the Convention’s website.

35. In accordance with the 7MSP decision “that in preparing the analysis, the President, Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs, in close consultation with the requesting State, should where appropriate, draw on expert mine clearance, legal and diplomatic advice, using the ISU to provide support,” expert advice was sought from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the ICBL, the ICRC, the Coordinator of the Resource Utilization Contact Group and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to assist the States Parties mandated to prepare analyses.

36. The chair of the group of States Parties mandated to prepare analyses (i.e., the 8MSP President) emphasised the importance of working in close collaboration with requesting States Parties and that the analysis process should be a cooperative one. The analysis process led in many instances to improved requests being produced and submitted.

37. It was observed that the States Parties were well served by applying the decisions of the 7MSP in a practical minded manner that is consistent with the working culture of the Convention. It was noted that they were greatly aided by the calendar established pursuant to the decisions of the 7MSP which saw, for example, that in 2008 requests were submitted well in advance of the 9MSP by only those States Parties with deadlines in 2009. It was further noted that many requesting States Parties applied in a practical minded way the voluntary template for assisting States Parties in requesting extensions.

38. It was further observed that the process of analysing requests was extremely challenging in 2008 in part because it was the first year of use of the process and in part because of the volume of requests received. It was noted that these challenges were compounded by late requests and by requests that lacked clarity and contained data discrepancies. It was further noted that the commitment required on the part of States Parties mandated to prepare analyses may have been too great for many, that participation in the analysis process was mixed and that the work load associated with this task should be taken into account by States Parties considering proposing that they serve as Co-Rapporteurs / Co-Chairs.

39. It was further observed that many States Parties seeking an extension under Article 5 seized the opportunity presented by the extension process to provide the most comprehensive information on all aspects of implementation of Article 5 in their country since the entry-into force of the Convention. In addition, it was noted that some States Parties seized the opportunity presented through an extension request to reinvigorate interest in national demining plans, in large part by demonstrating national ownership and that implementation is possible in a relatively short period of time.

40. During the June 2008 meetings of the Standing Committees, Co-Chairs reminded States Parties that the extension request provision should not distract them from the urgent need to comply with Article 5 obligation. Some States Parties expressed the view that that the number of requests was inconsistent with the obligation under the Convention to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas as soon as possible. Others expressed that States Parties requesting extensions should present a realistic plans for extension period. As well, some States Parties shared the view that each request is analysed on its own merits taking into account the characteristics and conditions particular to each request State Party.

41. All States Parties in the process of fulfilling Article 5 obligations were encouraged to provide information on the status of implementation, especially with respect to the development of national plans consistent with Convention obligations, progress achieved, work remaining and circumstances that may impede the fulfilment of Article 5 obligations in the 10-year period. Once again, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies attempted to guide States Parties in the preparation of their updates for the 4-5 June 2008 meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies by encouraging them to use questionnaires they had prepared. 38 States Parties took advantage of this opportunity and prepared presentations on the matters highlighted in the questionnaires. However, the quality of the information reported by the States Parties varied considerably. While all States Parties provided detailed reports of past progress, few indicated very clearly the extent of the remaining challenge and their plans to achieve the full implementation of Article 5 within their respective deadlines.

42. In 2008, significant progress in implementing Article 5 was reported by many States Parties, with progress achieved by many by applying the full range of methods in addition to clearance to release areas previously suspected to contain anti-personnel mines. **Albania** reported that it has cleared about 90 percent of all contaminated land and plans to release another five percent by the end of 2008. **Algeria** reported that the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas is ongoing and that it has commenced with undertaking a landmine impact survey (LIS). **Angola** reported that since the completion of its LIS in 2007, it has released 85 square kilometers of land. **Bosnia and Herzegovina** reported that in the first quarter of 2008, 3 million square meters of had been released through technical survey and mine clearance operations, 28 million square meters through general survey and 19 million square meters through other systematic survey operations. **Burundi** reported that of a total of 238 suspected mined areas, 99.1 % have been cleared. Burundi further reported that at the beginning of November 2008 following a survey, 58 new areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines were discovered. **Chile** reported that as of 30 April 2008, 24 minefields have been cleared and 17,770 anti-personnel mines and 6,307 anti-tank mines destroyed. **Colombia** reported that it has cleared 7 of

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34 military bases as well as 2 areas identified through population reports, resulting in the release of 46,606 square meters and the destruction of 1,093 anti-personnel mines and 775 UXO.

Croatia reported that of the 997 square kilometres of suspected mined area as of 1 January 2008, 12.5 square kilometres had been cleared in the first 5 months of 2008 and returned to local communities.

43. **Cyprus** reported the destruction of 392 antipersonnel mines from two minefields. **Denmark** reported that the second of two areas containing mines was cleared in April 2008 with 47,000 square metres released and 13 anti-personnel mines, 5 anti-tank mines and 131 other items (detonators, explosives, or UXO) destroyed. **Eritrea** reported that as of April 2008, it had cleared a total of 54 square kilometers of contaminated land. **Ethiopia** reported that since 2007, 375 square kilometers were released through technical survey and rapid response teams. **Greece** reported that more than 70 percent of all mined areas have been cleared. **Guinea Bissau** reported that 218,036 square meters of land had recently been released through manual clearance. **Jordan** reported that it had cleared and handed over more than 14 million square meters of land in Aqaba and the Wadi Araba region, having destroyed 58,624 landmines. **Mauritania** indicated that thanks to technical surveys and demining operations carried out in the last two years, twice as much land was released as during the period from entry into force.

44. **Mozambique** reported having released 2,123, 912 square meters in 2007. **Nicaragua** reported that it has destroyed 161,429 of the 176,076 mines sown throughout territory and has completed 964 of the 1006 areas to be addressed. **Rwanda** reported that since the last reporting period it has cleared eight minefields totalling 100,244 square meters, and that one remaining area to be released, totalling approximately 600,000 square meters, is currently being cleared with mechanical equipment. **Sudan** reported that 3.44 square kilometers were released and another 820 kilometers of road were cleared as well. **Tajikistan** reported that over the past year more than 750,000 square meters had been cleared with 2,400 mines and more than 758 UXO destroyed and that the amount of suspected hazardous areas had been reduced by more than 17 million square metres. **Tunisia** reported that over 80 percent of all minefields have now been cleared and that it will be able to fulfil its Article 5 obligations by its 10-year deadline. **Turkey** reported to have undertaken efforts to demine its border with Syria with about 350,000 square metres cleared. **Uganda** reported that during the first trimester of 2008 it has cleared 35 areas in the district of Pader resulting in the destruction of 6 anti-personnel mines and 237 UXO. Furthermore, operations in the areas of Gulu, Kitgum and Amuru had located and destroyed 144 UXO.

45. Some States Parties indicated that survey activities are still required to clarify the nature and extent of their Article 5 implementation challenges. The **Republic of Congo** reported that it is still in the process of determining whether the areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines indeed contain anti-personnel mines and, to this end, it is planning to conduct an impact survey when funds are available. The **Democratic Republic of Congo** indicated that it believes a landmine impact survey is still needed in order to make progress in the fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations. **Zambia** reported that it will soon undertake a survey to better evaluate the extent of mine and other explosive remnants of war contamination in seven of Zambia's nine provinces.

46. While significant progress has been achieved by many States Parties in fulfilling their Article 5 obligations, many challenges remain. This was illustrated in part through the requests

for extensions submitted by several States Parties. Of the 15 States Parties that submitted requests in 2008, 8 cited the level of international assistance as a factor impeding implementation in a 10 year period. Eleven indicated that, in order to complete implementation during their requested extension periods, they will require international assistance. Four stated that instability had impeded and may continue to impede implementation. Two stated that overestimations of suspected mined areas had impeded progress. Two indicated that border demarcation in areas where mines were suspected to be emplaced was a matter that could affect implementation during extension periods. Several noted that environmental, climatic and geographical factors had affected and could affect the pace of implementation.

47. Of the 6 remaining States Parties that have reported anti-personnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control and that have deadlines in 2010 for the fulfilment of obligations under Paragraph 5.1 of the Convention: (a) Three States Parties – **Argentina, Cambodia and Tajikistan** – indicated that they will submit a request for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas; and, (b) three States Parties – **Albania, Rwanda and Tunisia** – indicated that they will destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control by their deadlines. The status as it concerns all 6 States Parties with deadlines in 2010 with respect to requests for extensions can be found in Annex IV. In accordance with Article 5.3 of the Convention and in line with the decisions of the 7MSP, States Parties with deadlines in 2010, which are preparing requests, will need to have their requests considered at the Second Review Conference and they are encouraged to submit their requests to the 9MSP President in March 2009. An overview of timelines for the extensions process as it concerns these and other relevant States Parties can be found in Annex V.

48. It was recalled that, in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, States Parties must “make every effort to identify all areas under (their) jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced” and undertake “to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under (their) jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of (the) Convention for (a particular) State Party.” It was again noted that the Convention does not contain language requiring each State Party to search every square metre of its territory to find mines. But the Convention does require the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas which a State Party has made every effort to identify. Moreover, it was noted that oft-used terms like “mine-free”, “impact-free”, and “mine-safe” do not exist in the Convention text and are not synonymous with obligations contained in the Convention.

49. It was further recalled that the 8MSP highlighted the value of States Parties making use of the full range of emerging practical methods to more rapidly release, with confidence, areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines. The wealth of information contained in Article 5 extension requests submitted in 2008 further illustrated the importance of relevant States Parties doing so. For instance, some States Parties have not made use of the full range of actions available to release previously suspected hazardous areas and are developing plans for Article 5 implementation that assume that technical surveys and manual or mechanical clearance methods are the only ones that will be used. Others only recently have applied the full range of actions available to release previously suspected hazardous areas, resulting in several instances in a dramatic increase in the amount of area released. And, with respect to some States Parties, a full

range of actions available to release previously suspected hazardous areas has been taken for several years but in the absence of a national standard or policy.

50. Due in large part to the emphasis placed on the matter of land release by the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies and by the Coordinator of the Resource Utilisation Contact Group, it was highlighted that three main actions can be undertaken to release land that has been identified and reported as “mined areas” as defined by the Convention: through non-technical means, technical survey, and clearance. It was noted that land released through non-technical means, when undertaken in accordance with high quality national policies and standards that incorporate various key principles, is not a short-cut to implementing Article 5.1 but rather is a means to more expediently release, with confidence, areas at one time deemed to be “mined areas”.

51. Of particular relevance for the quality of implementation of Article 5, it was recalled that there are significant gender dimensions to mine action, with the core point being that women, men, girls and boys are differently affected by landmines. In particular it was noted that the integration of a gender perspective in mine action should target and result in benefits for all members of society, that gender mainstreaming in mine action does not have to be complex or costly, that culture and tradition do not constitute the main obstacles to mainstreaming gender within mine action activities but rather a lack of resources, knowledge and will constitute the real barriers, and that gender mainstreaming is more than simply employing women as such a focus often simply reinforces gender stereotypes.

52. It was recalled that while the term **mine risk education** (MRE) is not found in the Convention, it is recognised that there are various obligations related to MRE in the Convention.⁴ It was noted that field experience has shown that when MRE and clearance are implemented as an integrated package, MRE has the effect of being an *impact multiplier*. It was further noted that the challenge remains to consistently implement mine action field programmes as seamless packages, rather than implementing MRE and clearance as separate activities.

53. Representatives of several States Parties participated in a mine action technologies workshop in September 2008, which was hosted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The workshop covered a range of topics from the field of applied technology and methodology within humanitarian demining, including the use of new technology to enhance the process of land release through technical survey. The information exchanged during the workshop highlighted that a number of humanitarian demining programmes have made efforts to better integrate the use of machines into their work and that they are focusing more and more on making use of existing technology.

Priorities for the period leading to the Second Review Conference

⁴ In 2000, the mine action community replaced the term “mine awareness” with “mine risk education” to better describe the broad range of non-clearance activities that inform prioritisation, ensure beneficiaries have a voice in this process and help reduce physical impact prior to clearance taking place.

54. In recalling that the First Review Conference emphasised that Article 5 implementation will be the most significant challenge to be addressed in the period leading to the Second Review Conference, States Parties should place a priority on the following:

- (i) **In order to facilitate progress in implementing Article 5, all States Parties in the process of implementing the Article 5 should, as required, report on the location of all mined areas that contain or are suspected to contain anti-personnel mines under their jurisdiction or control and on progress made in ensuring that these areas have been cleared or otherwise released as to ensure that they are no longer dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of anti-personnel mines. States Parties concerned are encouraged to take all necessary steps to effectively manage information on changes in the status of previously reported mined areas and to communicate to other States Parties and relevant communities within their own countries such changes in status.**
- (ii) **In order to ensure the expedient, efficient and safe release of mined areas, States Parties in the process of implementing Article 5 are encouraged to develop national plans that employ, as required, the full range of methods, in addition to clearance, available to release land, and States Parties preparing Article 5 extension requests are encouraged to incorporate into their requests, in accordance with Article 5.4(d), an indication of how clearance and other methods of land release will be applied in the fulfilment of obligations during the requested extension period.**
- (iii) **States Parties providing assistance to mine action activities are encouraged to ensure that the support provided facilitates the application of the full range of actions, in addition to clearance, for releasing mined areas.**

IV. ASSISTING THE VICTIMS

55. Since the 8MSP, greater emphasis continued to be placed on fulfilling responsibilities to landmine victims by the States Parties that have indicated that they hold ultimate responsibility for significant numbers – hundreds or thousands – of landmine survivors. Since the 8MSP, **Jordan** clarified through the Article 5 extension request it submitted in March 2008, that it too has a responsibility for significant numbers of mine survivors. In addition, **Iraq** clarified through its initial Article 7 transparency report that it also has a responsibility for significant numbers of mine survivors. Therefore, there are now 26 States Parties that have identified themselves as holding ultimate responsibility for significant numbers – hundreds or thousands – of landmine survivors: **Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.** As noted in the **Nairobi Action Plan**, “these States Parties have the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance.”

56. Since the 8MSP, the efforts of these 26 States Parties, with the support of others, continued to be guided by the clear framework regarding victim assistance in the context of the Convention which was agreed to at the First Review Conference which includes the following core principles:

- (i) that “the call to assist landmine victims should not lead to victim assistance efforts being undertaken in such a manner as to exclude any person injured or disabled in another manner;”
- (ii) that victim assistance “does not require the development of new fields or disciplines but rather calls for ensuring that existing health care and social service systems, rehabilitation programmes and legislative and policy frameworks are adequate to meet the needs of all citizens – including landmine victims;”
- (iii) that “assistance to landmine victims should be viewed as a part of a country’s overall public health and social services systems and human rights frameworks;” and,
- (iv) that “providing adequate assistance to landmine survivors must be seen in a broader context of development and underdevelopment.”

57. Guided by the conclusions of the First Review Conference and Actions #29 to #39 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration provided support and encouragement to the 26 relevant States Parties to set specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound (SMART) objectives and a plan of action to fulfil their victim assistance responsibilities, or to provide clarity on how victim assistance obligations are being addressed within policies and programmes to assist all persons with disabilities, in the period leading up to the Second Review Conference. Particular effort was made to overcome the fact that as of the end of the 8MSP only 10 of the then 24 relevant States Parties had developed or initiated an inter-ministerial process to develop and / or implement, a comprehensive plan of action to meet their objectives. Some States Parties had not responded with SMART objectives, and some had failed to spell out what is known or not known about the status of victim assistance. In addition, in some instances preparation of victim assistance objectives had not taken broader national plans into consideration, some States Parties lacked the capacity and resources to develop and implement objectives and national plans and in some there was limited collaboration between mine action centres and relevant ministries and other key actors in the disability sector.

58. Since 2005, Co-Chairs have recognised that overcoming these challenges requires intensive work on a national basis in the relevant States Parties. In this regard, with assistance provided by Australia, Austria, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland, the ISU continued to support national inter-ministerial processes to enable those States Parties with good objectives to develop and implement good plans, to help those with unclear objectives to develop more concrete objectives, and to assist those least engaged in developing objectives and plans in 2005, 2006 and 2007 to get engaged. The ISU provided or offered some degree of support to each of the 26 relevant States Parties and undertook process support visits to Afghanistan, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Jordan, Senegal Tajikistan, Thailand and Uganda.

59. Progress is being made to varying degrees by all relevant States Parties. While not all have initiated an inter-ministerial process, all have engaged to some extent in developing objectives. Much of this progress was reported to the June 2008 meeting of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration with 18 of the then 26 relevant States Parties having provided updates on the application of relevant provisions of the **Nairobi Action Plan**. Through these updates and from information otherwise provided by these States Parties, progress in strengthening objectives and / or developing, revising or implementing plans was reported by all these States Parties, including by 13 that provided specific updates on progress in achieving or developing objectives.

60. The potential for progress in some States Parties has been hindered by a lack of financial resources. In this regard, it was recalled that States Parties in a position to do so have an obligation to provide assistance for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of mine victims and have made commitments in this regard in the **Nairobi Action Plan**. The importance of ensuring that victim assistance (in the context of broader efforts to respond to the needs of persons with disabilities) is on the agenda in bilateral development cooperation discussions with relevant States Parties was highlighted.

61. As concerns Action #33 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, there were further developments related to the normative framework that protects and ensures respect for the rights of persons with disabilities including landmine survivors. 16 of the 26 States Parties that have identified themselves as holding ultimate responsibility for significant numbers of landmine survivors have signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) that opened for signature on 30 March 2007. In total, 113 States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention have signed the CRPD. 7 States Parties that have identified themselves as holding ultimate responsibility for significant numbers of landmine survivors – **Croatia, El Salvador, Jordan, Nicaragua, Peru, Thailand, and Uganda** – have ratified the CRPD. The CRPD entered into force on 3 May 2008 following the twentieth ratification on 3 April. The CRPD has the potential to promote a more systematic and sustainable approach to victim assistance in the context of the Convention by bringing victim assistance into the broader context of policy and planning for persons with disabilities more generally.

62. Also as concerns Action #33 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, the experience of implementing the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention was built upon in the Convention on Cluster Munitions through legal provisions that embody the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention's States Parties' strategic approach to victim assistance. In addition, progress towards further coherence in assisting the victims of conventional weapons was sought through the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons drawing on the experience of the AP Mine Ban Convention.

63. It was noted that the place of victim assistance within the broader context of disability, health care, social services, rehabilitation, reintegration, development and human rights efforts should promote the development of services, infrastructure and policies to address the rights and needs of all persons with disabilities, regardless of the cause of the disability. It was further

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highlighted that the framework developed for victim assistance in the context of the Convention is equally applicable to addressing the rights and needs of victims of other explosive remnants of war, including unexploded submunitions. The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration called for States Parties to avoid duplication of efforts when implementing other relevant instruments of international law in relation to victim assistance.

64. Pursuant to Action #37 of the **Nairobi Action Plan** to “monitor and promote progress in the achievement of victim assistance goals,” the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance continue efforts to overcome the challenge of establishing clear measures and indicators of progress in the pursuit of the victim assistance aim of the Convention. To assist the States Parties in the period leading up to the Second Review Conference, the Co-Chairs developed a set of indicators, which could be used in a variety of ways to indicate relative degrees of progress in fulfilling key aims in relation to victim assistance. The indicators are based on relevant actions in the **Nairobi Action Plan** as these are the benchmarks against which States Parties agreed to measure progress in the period between 2005 and 2009. It was noted that such indicators would serve as a useful complement to States Parties’ own objectives to assess progress, by the Second Review Conference, in assisting the victims.

65. In keeping with Action #38 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, at least 11 experts with a disability participated in the June 2008 meetings of the Standing Committees, including one who was a member of the delegation of a State Party.

66. In keeping with Action #39 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, 14 of the 26 relevant States Parties included health, rehabilitation, social services or disability professionals in their delegations to the June 2008 meetings of the Standing Committees. In order to make the best possible use of the time dedicated by such experts in the work of the Convention, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration organised for these professionals a programme parallel to meetings of the Standing Committees. This programme increased the knowledge of the expert participants on victim assistance in the context of the Convention and key components of victim assistance, emphasised the place of victim assistance in the broader contexts of disability, health care, social services, and development, reaffirmed the importance of key principles adopted by the States Parties in 2004, and provided an opportunity for experts to share experiences at the national level. In response to proposals made in 2007 by experts participating in parallel programmes prior to the 8MSP, the ISU established a victim assistance resources section in the Convention’s Documentation Centre and finalised a checklist to assist in the development of SMART objectives and a national plan of action. The ISU also produced *A Guide to Understanding Victim Assistance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention*.

Priorities for the period leading to the Second Review Conference

67. Despite advances since the 8MSP, States Parties should continue to deepen their understanding of principles accepted and commitments made through the Convention and at the First Review Conference and the work undertaken since by the Standing Committee on Victim

Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, in particular by placing a priority in the period leading to the Second Review Conference on the following:

- (i) **As progress in victim assistance should be specific, measurable and time-bound, with specific measures logically needing to be determined by individual States Parties based on their very diverse circumstances, relevant States Parties that have not yet done so should provide an unambiguous way to assess progress with respect to victim assistance as concerns their States by the time of the Second Review Conference.**
- (ii) **In fulfilling their responsibilities to landmine survivors, relevant States Parties and those assisting them should apply the understandings adopted at the First Review Conference, particularly by placing victim assistance in the broader context of development and seeing its place as a part of existing State responsibilities in the areas of health care, social services, rehabilitation and human rights frameworks.**
- (iii) **In fulfilling their responsibilities to landmine survivors, relevant States Parties and those assisting them should recall the need to reinforce existing State structures to ensure the long-term sustainability of victim assistance efforts, noting that the need to pursue the aim of assisting the victims will persist long after the completion of implementation of other Convention aims.**
- (iv) **In fulfilling their responsibilities to landmine survivors, relevant States Parties and those assisting them should recall that meeting the rights and needs of persons with disabilities requires a holistic approach that can only be achieved through collaboration and coordination between all relevant ministries and actors in the disability sector, including persons with disabilities.**
- (v) **States Parties should continue to strengthen the involvement in the work of the Convention at national and multilateral levels by health care, rehabilitation and disability rights experts and do more to ensure that landmine survivors are effectively involved in national planning and contribute to deliberations on matters that affect them.**
- (vi) **In fulfilling their responsibilities to landmine survivors, relevant States Parties should establish priorities according to what is achievable and what will make the greatest difference. They should ensure that their ministries of finance budget for the costs of services for persons with disabilities. States Parties in a position to provide assistance should support the building of national capacities in the areas that are priorities for the recipient State.**
- (vii) **In order to truly measure progress since the First Review Conference and to develop sound strategies for the period following the Second Review Conference, States Parties and those that share their aims, in the spirit of**

cooperation that has been the hallmark of this Convention, should ensure that the information on the national implementation of the victim assistance aim of the Convention is as comprehensive as possible to reflect the reality of the situation on the ground.

V. OTHER MATTERS ESSENTIAL FOR ACHIEVING THE CONVENTION'S AIMS

A. Cooperation and assistance

68. The use, for the first time, of provisions in Article 5 which permit States Parties to request extensions on the period required to fulfil the obligation to destroy all emplaced anti-personnel mines highlighted the need for States Parties in a position to do so to act upon their obligations to assist others. Of the States Parties that submitted requests for extensions in 2008, 12 (**Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, Yemen and Zimbabwe**) indicated that in order to complete implementation during their respective requested extension period they will require international assistance. In addition, other States Parties still in the process of implementing Article 5 also expressed the need for ongoing assistance from the international community.

69. The Article 5 extensions process also highlighted that assistance is most likely to flow to those States Parties that act with urgency to fulfil their obligations and that demonstrate national ownership, establish effective national demining structures and put in place plans to ensure completion of Article 5 obligations in as short a period as possible.

70. It was noted that not necessarily less money was flowing from donors to recipients but what was changing were funding modalities with budget and sector support becoming increasingly important and with less earmarked funding. It was highlighted that this implies that final decisions on how a donor State's development assistance funding would be used rests to a much greater extent with recipient countries and that this demands new thinking on the part of national demining authorities and advocacy groups regarding securing sufficient funding for the implementation of the Convention.

71. At the 8MSP, it was reported that a linking mine action and development (LMAD) practitioners network was established. Since that time the network has expanded to include over 200 mine action and development practitioners. In addition, since the 8MSP, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has published draft LMAD guidelines for humanitarian and development non-governmental organisations (NGOs), for mine action centres and for official development cooperation agencies. and co-organised with development NGOs the workshop, **Tackling Poverty in Conflict-Affected Contexts: Linking Development, Security and the Remnants of Conflict**. The workshop promoted poverty reduction in mine-affected communities by strengthening coordination between mine action and development organisations.

72. At the 8MSP, concern was noted regarding how mainstreaming mine action support into development programming can put at risk accessibility to and the allocation of mine action

funding. In this context, the 12 December 2007 resolution of the European Parliament marking the tenth anniversary of the Convention called on the European Commission to fully ensure its determination and continuity of efforts to financially assist communities and individuals affected by anti-personnel mines through all available instruments to reinstate a specific anti-personnel mine budget line for the financing of mine action, victim assistance and stockpile destruction required of States Parties that cannot be funded through the new funding instruments.

73. The need, more than ever, to ensure that resources are spent in the most effective and efficient way was again highlighted, particularly through the Norwegian coordinated Resource Utilisation Contact Group. In particular, the Contact Group sought to increase knowledge, understanding and application of the full range of methods to achieve the full, efficient and expedient implementation of Article 5, including through non-technical means.

74. The importance of a two-track approach to cooperation on victim assistance was again noted. Such an approach involves assistance provided by or through specialised organisations in which assistance specifically targets landmines survivors and other war wounded, and assistance in the form of integrated approaches in which development cooperation aims to guarantee the rights of all individuals, including persons with disabilities.

75. Two States Parties implementing Article 4 (**Belarus** and **Ukraine**) again made it clear that cooperation and assistance will be fundamental to the fulfilment of obligations.

76. Further to Action #46 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, which calls upon States Parties in a position to do so to continue to support, as appropriate, mine action to assist affected populations in areas under the control of armed non-State actors, particularly in areas under the control of actors which have agreed to abide by the Convention's norms, it was reported that assistance efforts led to the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines by seven armed non-State actors⁵ that are signatories to the Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment since the 8MSP.

Priorities for the period leading to the Second Review Conference

77. In recalling their obligations and the commitments they made in the **Nairobi Action Plan** to cooperate with and assist each other, States Parties should place a priority in the period leading to the Second Review Conference on the following:

- (i) **With a large number of States Parties continuing to need external resources reminding the international community that anti-personnel mines is not yet “yesterday’s issue”, States Parties in a position to do so should place an increased emphasis on fulfilling their obligations under Article 6 of the Convention.**
- (ii) **States Parties requiring assistance should strive to facilitate cooperation initiatives by demonstrating national ownership, establishing effective**

⁵ The Polisario Front, the PDKI (Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan), CNF (Chin National Front) and Lahu Democratic Front, Puntland, the CNDDFDD and the SPLA (Sudan).

national demining structures and putting in place plans to ensure completion of Article 5 obligations in as short a period as possible.

- (iii) States Parties requiring assistance to fulfil their obligations should ensure that mine action is well placed in national development priorities and in bilateral development cooperation discussions with development partners.**
- (iv) Given that two States Parties implementing Article 4 have made it clear that cooperation and assistance will be fundamental to the fulfilment of stockpile destruction obligations, all States Parties concerned should recall the obligation of each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of Article 6 to cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.**
- (v) States Parties in a position to do so should continue to report on practical measures that they have undertaken in order to support or encourage mine action in areas under the control of armed non-State actors, in accordance with Action # 46 of the Nairobi Action Plan.**

B. Transparency and the exchange of information

78. Since the 8MSP, initial transparency reports in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 1 have been submitted by six States Parties: Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Palau and Sao and Principe. Hence, there are four States Parties **Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia and Haiti** that have not yet complied with this obligation.

79. In terms of compliance with Article 7, paragraph 2, at the close of the 8MSP, 56 States Parties had not provided an updated transparency report covering calendar year 2006 as required. In addition, at the close of the 8MSP, the overall reporting rate in 2007 stood at almost 60 percent. In 2008, the following 57 States Parties have not provided an updated transparency report covering calendar year 2007 as required: Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago and Turkmenistan. As of 28 November 2008 the overall reporting rate in 2008 stood at over 60 per cent.

80. The 8MSP emphasised that those States Parties that are late in submitting initial transparency reports and those that did not provide updated information in 2007 covering the previous calendar year should submit their reports as a matter of urgency. In addition, Action # 52 of the **Nairobi Action Plan** encourages States Parties to annually update Article 7 transparency reports and maximise reporting as a tool to assist implementation, particularly in cases where States Parties must still destroy stockpiled mines, clear mined areas, assist mine

victims or take legal or other measures referred to in Article 9. As of 28 November 2008: of the 77 States which, as of the close of the 8MSP, had reported that they had retained anti-personnel mines for reasons permitted under Article 3, each provided transparency information covering the previous calendar year on this matter as required in 2008 with the exception of the following: **Angola, Bhutan, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Djibouti, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Togo and Uganda**. One State Party: the **Democratic Republic of the Congo** stated that a decision concerning anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 is pending.⁶ Two States Parties – **Suriname and Tajikistan** – reported that in 2007 they destroyed all anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3. In addition since the 8MSP, three States Parties – **Kuwait, Palau and Sao Tome and Principe** – reported for the first time that they have not retained mines for purposes permitted under Article 3. One State Party – **Iraq** – reported for the first time that it has retained mines for reasons permitted under Article 3. An update on the numbers of anti-personnel mines retained and transferred for permitted reasons is contained in Annex VI.

81. At the 8MSP, the States Parties adopted amendments to Forms B and G of the transparency reporting format with a view to facilitate, pursuant to Action #15 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, reporting on stockpiled anti-personnel mines discovered and destroyed after Article 4 deadlines have passed. In 2008, **Tajikistan** used the amended reporting format to provide such information. The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction invited States Parties to volunteer relevant information on the destruction of previously unknown stockpiles and to make use of the 2 June 2008 meeting of the Standing Committee. No State Party took advantage of this opportunity.

82. States Parties may share information beyond what is minimally required through the Article 7 reporting format's Form J. Since the 8MSP, the following 41 States Parties made use of Form J as a voluntary means of reporting: Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Japan, Iraq, Italy, Lithuania, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Of these, the following 25 States Parties used Form J to report on assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims: Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Japan, New Zealand, Peru, Senegal, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe

83. The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention provided an opportunity on 6 June 2008, pursuant to Action #55 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, to exchange views and share experiences on the practical implementation of the various provisions of the Convention, including Articles 1, 2 and 3. With respect to matters concerning Article 2, discussions during the 2 to 6 June 2008 meeting of the Standing Committee served to remind States Parties of the results of several years work on the issue of sensitive fuses carried out in the context of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which identified fuses that cannot be designed to prevent detonation by a person. In

⁶ One additional State Party – **Botswana** – which did not submit a transparency report in 2008 previously had indicated that a decision concerning anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 is pending.

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addition, States Parties were reminded that the Convention defines an anti-personnel mine as any mine “designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” Some States Parties expressed the view that all mines that fall within this definition are prohibited, regardless of whether their main purpose of usage is directed towards vehicles or whether they are called something other than anti-personnel mines.

84. Since the 8MSP, three States not parties – **Azerbaijan, Morocco and Poland** submitted a voluntary transparency report. Poland shared information on all pertinent matters mentioned in Article 7. Azerbaijan and Morocco did not provide transparency information on stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

85. The informal Article 7 Contact Group, coordinated by Belgium, continued to work to raise awareness on transparency reporting obligations and played an important role in serving as a point of contact for requests for assistance. On 4 February 2008, the Coordinator of the Contact Group wrote to all States Parties to remind them of their obligations, particularly the 30 April deadline by which updated information covering the last calendar year should be submitted. In addition, the Contact Group met to discuss the status of initial and annual Article 7 reporting as well as ways to assist and encourage States Parties to fulfil their Article 7 obligations. The Contact Group also highlighted the importance of providing in transparency reports all relevant information required by Article 7.

Priorities for the period leading to the Second Review Conference

86. Further to the recognition made by the States Parties that transparency and the effective exchange of information will be crucial to fulfilling their obligations during the period 2005-2009, States Parties should place a priority in the period leading to the next Second Review Conference on the following:

- (i) Those States Parties which are late in submitting initial transparency reports and those that did not provide updated information in 2007 covering the previous calendar year should submit their reports as a matter of urgency, making use if necessary of the available international assistance to this end.**
- (ii) As the overall annual transparency reporting rate having steadily fallen since the First Review Conference, the States Parties should place an increased emphasis on fulfilling their obligations under Article 7.2 of the Convention to provide updated information not later than 30 April of each year.**
- (iii) States Parties should consider making better use of the variety of informal mechanisms of information (e.g., the Intersessional Work Programme, Contact Group meetings, etc.) to provide information on matters not specifically required but which may assist in the implementation process and in resource mobilisation.**

C. Preventing and suppressing prohibited activities and facilitating compliance

87. Since the 8MSP, **Burundi, the Cook Islands, Cyprus, Jordan and Mauritania** reported that they had adopted legislation to implement the Convention. In addition, **Chile, Ukraine and Venezuela** indicated that they considered their existing national laws to be sufficient in the context of Article 9 obligations. There are now 57 States Parties that have reported that they have adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations. An additional 32 have reported that they consider existing laws to be sufficient. 67 States Parties have not yet reported having adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations or that they consider existing laws to be sufficient. An overview of implementation of Article 9 is contained in Annex VII.

88. The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention invited States Parties to volunteer information at the 6 June 2008 meeting of the Standing Committee on their progress in adopting legislative, administrative and other measures in accordance with Article 9 and if relevant, to make their priorities for assistance known. Seven States Parties took advantage of this opportunity and provided updated information in this forum.

89. Since the 8MSP, the States Parties remained committed to work together to facilitate compliance under the Convention. In addition, since the 8MSP, no State Party submitted a request for clarification to a Meeting of the States Parties in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 2, nor has any proposed that a Special Meeting of the States Parties be convened in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 5. As well, the UNODA continued fulfilling the UN Secretary General's responsibility to prepare and update a list of names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts designated for fact finding missions authorized in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 8. Since the 8MSP, 15 States Parties: Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cyprus, France, Guatemala, Germany, Mali, Moldova, Portugal, Peru, Tunisia, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland and Ukraine, provided new or updated information for the list of experts.

90. At the June 2008 meetings of the Standing Committees, States Parties expressed concern with the three cases of non-compliance with Article 4 and called on Belarus, Greece and Turkey to rectify their respective situations as soon as possible. One State Party noted that the States Parties could be more methodological in dealing with compliance issues and that this could be considered in the period leading to the Second Review Conference.

91. Since the 8MSP, concern was again expressed about a UN Monitoring Group's report on Somalia referring to the alleged transfer of landmines into Somalia by three States Parties to the Convention and by one State not party. The President of the 8MSP wrote to the Chair of the Monitoring Group to seek further information. The President did not receive a response. It was noted that the States Parties concerned rejected claims made in the report.

92. Two States Parties, Cambodia and Thailand, informed the 9MSP respectively of their views on, and ongoing investigations of, the circumstances under which two Thai army rangers were seriously injured by landmines on 6 October 2008 and the ongoing process of bilateral consultations under Article 8.1 of the Convention.

Priorities for the period leading to the Second Review Conference

93. In recalling the commitment made in the Nairobi Action Plan to continue to be guided by the knowledge that individually and collectively they are responsible for ensuring compliance with the Convention, the States Parties should place a priority in the period leading to the Second Review Conference on the following:

- (i) **Given that approximately 40 per cent of the States Parties have not yet reported having implemented Article 9, State Parties should place a renewed emphasis on the obligation to take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party by the Convention.**
- (ii) **The President will continue to follow up to seek clarity with respect to reports, such as those of UN Monitoring Groups, which allege violations of the Convention.**

D. IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT

94. Since the 8MSP, the Coordinating Committee met six times to prepare for and assess the outcome of the Intersessional Work Programme and to coordinate the work of the Standing Committees with the work of the Meeting of the States Parties since the 8MSP. The Coordinating Committee continued to operate in an open and transparent manner with summary reports of meetings made available to all interested parties on the Convention's web site.

95. With respect to the Intersessional Work Programme, at the June 2008 meetings of the Standing Committees there were approximately 500 registered delegates representing 92 States Parties, 18 States not parties and numerous international and non-governmental organizations. These meetings featured discussions on the implementation of key provisions of the Convention and on assuring that cooperation and assistance would continue to function well. The meetings were again supported by GICHD.

96. In 2008, the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of the GICHD continued to assist States Parties to implement the Convention's obligations and objectives. The ISU supported the President, the President-Designate, the Co-Chairs, the Contact Group Coordinators, the Sponsorship Programme donors group and individual States Parties with initiatives to pursue the aims of the **Nairobi Action Plan**. In addition, through the provision of professional advice, support and information services, the ISU assisted individual States Parties in addressing various implementation challenges.

97. The ISU shouldered an additional heavy work load between the 8MSP and 9MSP in providing advice to individual States Parties in the preparation of Article 5 extension requests and in supporting the work of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests. In addition, the ISU assumed an additional financial burden in 2008 when, due to the end of a traditional funding mechanism, the Coordinating Committee endorsed the use of the ISU Trust Fund to cover the costs of interpretation at meetings of the Standing Committees.

98. The continuing operations of ISU were assured by voluntary contributions by the following States Parties since the 8MSP: Albania, Austria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Qatar, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey. In addition, pursuant to the decision of the 7MSP “to encourage all States Parties in a position to do so to provide additional earmarked funds to the ISU Trust Fund to cover costs related to support the Article 5 extensions process,” the 2008 ISU budget provided a means for such earmarking. The following States Parties provided earmarked funding: Canada, Czech Republic and Norway. As well, the ISU was able to continue to provide victim assistance **process support** to the inter-ministerial coordination efforts of States Parties that have reported the responsibility for significant numbers of mine victims through project funding provided by Australia, Norway, New Zealand and Switzerland.

99. The UNODA and Switzerland, with the assistance of ISU, made arrangements for the 9MSP. The States Parties continued to participate in Contact Groups on universalisation, Article 7 reporting, resource utilization and linking mine action and development.

100. The Sponsorship Programme continued to ensure participation in the Convention’s meetings by States Parties normally not able to be represented at these meetings by relevant experts or officials. In advance of the June 2008 meetings of the Standing Committees, the programme’s Donors’ Group invited 45 States Parties to request sponsorship for up to 68 delegates to provide updates on Convention implementation. 40 States Parties accepted this offer with 54 representatives of States Parties sponsored to attend the June meetings. The programme’s Donors’ Group invited 45 States Parties to request sponsorship for up to 77 delegates to attend the 9MSP. 35 States Parties accepted this offer with 56 representatives of States Parties sponsored to attend the 9MSP.

101. Sponsorship of States Parties’ delegates was again instrumental in the application of Action #39 of the **Nairobi Action Plan**, to include health and social service professionals in deliberations. 16 relevant States Parties accepted the Donors Group offer of support at the June 2008 meetings. And 20 relevant States Parties took advantage of the Donors’ Group offer of support for participation by such a professional in the 9MSP.

102. The Sponsorship Programme also contributed to the aims of universalisation, with the Donors’ Group having offered sponsorship to eight States not parties for the June 2008 meetings of the Standing Committees and eight States not parties for the 9MSP. Four States not parties accepted this offer in June 2008, with most providing an update on their views on the Convention at the 2 June meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. Five States not parties accepted this offer for the 9MSP.

103. The continuing operations of the Sponsorship Programme were assured in 2008 by contributions from the following States Parties since the 8MSP: Italy and Spain.

Priorities for the period leading to the Second Review Conference

104. In recalling the commitments they made in the **Nairobi Action Plan** regarding the implementation mechanisms they have established or which have emerged on an informal basis, the States Parties should place a priority in the period leading to the Second Review Conference on the following:

- (i) **All States Parties should continue to provide on a voluntary basis the necessary financial resources for the operation of the Implementation Support Unit, particularly given the increased work load being absorbed by the ISU.**
- (ii) **All States Parties in a position to do so should continue to contribute on a voluntary basis to the Sponsorship Programme thereby maintaining widespread representation at meetings of the Convention, particularly by mine-affected developing States Parties.**

Annex I**States that have ratified or acceded to the Convention**

State	Date of Formal Acceptance	Date of Entry-into-force
Afghanistan	11 September 2002	1 March 2003
Albania	29 February 2000	1 August 2000
Algeria	9 October 2001	1 April 2002
Andorra	29 June 1998	1 March 1999
Angola	5 July 2002	1 January 2003
Antigua and Barbuda	3 May 1999	1 November 1999
Argentina	14 September 1999	1 March 2000
Australia	14 January 1999	1 July 1999
Austria	29 June 1998	1 March 1999
Bahamas	31 July 1998	1 March 1999
Bangladesh	6 September 2000	1 March 2001
Barbados	26 January 1999	1 July 1999
Belarus	3 September 2003	1 March 2004
Belgium	4 September 1998	1 March 1999
Belize	23 April 1998	1 March 1999
Benin	25 September 1998	1 March 1999
Bhutan	18 August 2005	1 February 2006
Bolivia	9 June 1998	1 March 1999
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8 September 1998	1 March 1999
Botswana	1 March 2000	1 September 2000
Brazil	30 April 1999	1 October 1999
Brunei Darussalam	24 April 2006	1 October 2006
Bulgaria	4 September 1998	1 March 1999
Burkina Faso	16 September 1998	1 March 1999
Burundi	22 October 2003	1 April 2004
Cambodia	28 July 1999	1 January 2000
Cameroon	19 September 2002	1 March 2003
Canada	3 December 1997	1 March 1999
Cape Verde	14 May 2001	1 November 2001
Central African Republic	8 November 2002	1 May 2003
Chad	6 May 1999	1 November 1999
Chile	10 September 2001	1 March 2002
Colombia	6 September 2000	1 March 2001
Comoros	19 September 2002	1 March 2003
Congo (Brazzaville)	4 May 2001	1 November 2001
Cook Islands	15 March 2006	1 September 2006
Costa Rica	17 March 1999	1 September 1999
Côte d' Ivoire	30 June 2000	1 December 2000
Croatia	20 May 1998	1 March 1999
Cyprus	17 January 2003	1 July 2003
Czech Republic	26 October 1999	1 April 2000
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2 May 2002	1 November 2002
Denmark	8 June 1998	1 March 1999

State	Date of Formal Acceptance	Date of Entry-into-force
Djibouti	18 May 1998	1 March 1999
Dominica	26 March 1999	1 September 1999
Dominican Republic	30 June 2000	1 December 2000
Ecuador	29 April 1999	1 October 1999
El Salvador	27 January 1999	1 July 1999
Equatorial Guinea	16 September 1998	1 March 1999
Eritrea	27 August 2001	1 February 2002
Estonia	12 May 2004	1 November 2004
Ethiopia	17 December 2004	1 June 2005
Fiji	10 June 1998	1 March 1999
France	23 July 1998	1 March 1999
Gabon	8 September 2000	1 March 2001
Gambia	23 September 2002	1 March 2003
Germany	23 July 1998	1 March 1999
Ghana	30 June 2000	1 December 2000
Greece	25 September 2003	1 March 2004
Grenada	19 August 1998	1 March 1999
Guatemala	26 March 1999	1 September 1999
Guinea	8 October 1998	1 April 1999
Guinea Bissau	22 May 2001	1 November 2001
Guyana	5 August 2003	1 February 2004
Haiti	15 February 2006	1 August 2006
Holy See	17 February 1998	1 March 1999
Honduras	24 September 1998	1 March 1999
Hungary	6 April 1998	1 March 1999
Iceland	5 May 1999	1 November 1999
Indonesia	16 February 2007	1 August 2007
Iraq	15 August 2007	1 February 2008
Ireland	3 December 1997	1 March 1999
Italy	23 April 1999	1 October 1999
Jamaica	17 July 1998	1 March 1999
Japan	30 September 1998	1 March 1999
Jordan	13 November 1998	1 May 1999
Kenya	23 January 2001	1 July 2001
Kiribati	7 September 2000	1 March 2001
Kuwait	30 July 2007	1 January 2008
Latvia	1 July 2005	1 January 2006
Lesotho	2 December 1998	1 June 1999
Liberia	23 December 1999	1 June 2000
Liechtenstein	5 October 1999	1 April 2000
Lithuania	12 May 2003	1 November 2003
Luxembourg	14 June 1999	1 December 1999
Madagascar	16 September 1999	1 March 2000
Malawi	13 August 1998	1 March 1999
Malaysia	22 April 1999	1 October 1999
Maldives	7 September 2000	1 March 2001
Mali	2 June 1998	1 March 1999
Malta	7 May 2001	1 November 2001

State	Date of Formal Acceptance	Date of Entry-into-force
Mauritania	21 July 2000	1 January 2001
Mauritius	3 December 1997	1 March 1999
Mexico	9 June 1998	1 March 1999
Monaco	17 November 1998	1 May 1999
Montenegro	23 October 2006	1 April 2007
Mozambique	25 August 1998	1 March 1999
Namibia	21 September 1998	1 March 1999
Nauru	7 August 2000	1 February 2001
Netherlands	12 April 1999	1 October 1999
New Zealand	27 January 1999	1 July 1999
Nicaragua	30 November 1998	1 May 1999
Niger	23 March 1999	1 September 1999
Nigeria	27 September 2001	1 March 2002
Niue	15 April 1998	1 March 1999
Norway	9 July 1998	1 March 1999
Palau	18 November 2007	1 May 2008
Panama	7 October 1998	1 April 1999
Papua New Guinea	28 June 2004	1 December 2004
Paraguay	13 November 1998	1 May 1999
Peru	17 June 1998	1 March 1999
Philippines	15 February 2000	1 August 2000
Portugal	19 February 1999	1 August 1999
Qatar	13 October 1998	1 April 1999
Republic of Moldova	8 September 2000	1 March 2001
Romania	30 November 2000	1 May 2001
Rwanda	8 June 2000	1 December 2000
Saint Kitts and Nevis	2 December 1998	1 June 1999
Saint Lucia	13 April 1999	1 October 1999
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1 August 2001	1 February 2002
Samoa	23 July 1998	1 March 1999
San Marino	18 March 1998	1 March 1999
Sao Tome and Principe	31 March 2003	1 September 2003
Senegal	24 September 1998	1 March 1999
Serbia	18 September 2003	1 March 2004
Seychelles	2 June 2000	1 December 2000
Sierra Leone	25 April 2001	1 October 2001
Slovakia	25 February 1999	1 August 1999
Slovenia	27 October 1998	1 April 1999
Solomon Islands	26 January 1999	1 July 1999
South Africa	26 June 1998	1 March 1999
Spain	19 January 1999	1 July 1999
Sudan	13 October 2003	1 April 2004
Suriname	23 May 2002	1 November 2002
Swaziland	22 December 1998	1 June 1999
Sweden	30 November 1998	1 May 1999
Switzerland	24 March 1998	1 March 1999
Tajikistan	12 October 1999	1 April 2000
Thailand	27 November 1998	1 May 1999

State	Date of Formal Acceptance	Date of Entry-into-force
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	9 September 1998	1 March 1999
Timor-Leste	7 May 2003	1 November 2003
Togo	9 March 2000	1 September 2000
Trinidad and Tobago	27 April 1998	1 March 1999
Tunisia	9 July 1999	1 January 2000
Turkey	25 September 2003	1 March 2004
Turkmenistan	19 January 1998	1 March 1999
Uganda	25 February 1999	1 August 1999
Ukraine	27 December 2005	1 June 2006
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	31 July 1998	1 March 1999
United Republic of Tanzania	13 November 2000	1 May 2001
Uruguay	7 June 2001	1 December 2001
Vanuatu	16 September 2005	1 March 2006
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	14 April 1999	1 October 1999
Yemen	1 September 1998	1 March 1999
Zambia	23 February 2001	1 August 2001
Zimbabwe	18 June 1998	1 March 1999

Annex II

Deadlines for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

	2007												2008												2009												2010												2011												2012													
State Party	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F
Belarus																																																																										
Ethiopia																																																																										
Greece																																																																										
Kuwait																																																																										
Turkey																																																																										
Ukraine																																																																										

Annex IV

**States Parties in the process of implementing Article 5 which have a deadline in 2010:
 Status with respect to the submission of extension requests**


<p>States Parties with deadlines for the fulfilment of obligations under Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention which have indicated that they will submit a request for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control:</p>	<p>States Parties with deadlines for the fulfilment of obligations under Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention which have indicated that they will destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control no later than 10 years after entry into force of the Convention for each State Party:</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Argentina ▪ Cambodia ▪ Tajikistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Albania ▪ Rwanda ▪ Tunisia



<p>These States Parties will need to have their requests considered at the Second Review Conference at the end of 2009.</p> <p>In accordance with the decisions of the 7MSP, these States Parties are encouraged to submit their requests no fewer than nine months before the Second Review Conference (i.e., approximately March 2009).</p>	<p>In accordance with the decisions of the 7MSP, these States Parties, when they have completed implementation of Article 5, paragraph 1, may wish to use the model declaration as a voluntary means to report completion of Article 5 obligations.</p>
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Annex V

Timelines for the Article 5 extensions process



Annex VI

Table 1. Anti-personnel mines reported retained or transferred by the States Parties for reasons permitted under Article 3, and, a summary of additional information provided by these States Parties

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party in since the 8MSP
	2007	2008	
Afghanistan	2,692	2,680	Afghanistan reported that UNMACA uses retained anti-personnel mines in its test centres in Kabul and Kandahar to accredit the mine detection dogs of implementing partners and stores mines that may be needed in the future in a secure bunker. The implementing partners, under the oversight of UNMACA, use anti-personnel mines for training of their mine detection dogs and deminers.
Algeria	15,030	15,030	
Angola	2,512		
Argentina	1,471	1,380	Argentina indicated that in 2007 the navy destroyed 81 mines SB-33 during training activities conducted by the Company of Amphibious Engineers on destruction techniques. The army retains mines to develop an unmanned vehicle for the detection and handling of mines and explosives. Development of this vehicle started on 1 March 2004 and is 60% complete. The vehicle is currently at the stage of assembling. During 2007 no mines were destroyed for this project. Mines are also retained by the Institute of Scientific and Technical Research of the Armed Forces to test charges for the destruction of UXO/mines. In 2007, 10 mines were destroyed in the testing grounds.
Australia	7133	6,998	Australia reported that stocks are now centralised, with small numbers in ammunition depots throughout Australia to support regional training. Training is conducted by the School of Military Engineering in Sydney. Australia indicated that stock levels would be regularly reviewed and assessed, that only a realistic training quantity was held, and that this would be depleted over time. Stocks in excess of this figure will be destroyed on an ongoing basis.
Bangladesh	12,500	12,500	
Belarus	6,030	6,030	
Belgium	3,569	3,287	Belgium reported that in 2007, 282 mines were used during different sessions of courses organised by the Belgian Armed Forces with the aim of educating and training EOD specialists and deminers with live ammunition and training militaries in mine risk education.
Benin	16	16	
Bhutan	4,491		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,708	1,920	

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party in since the 8MSP
	2007	2008	
Botswana ¹			
Brazil	13,550	12,381	Brazil indicated that the Brazilian Army decided to keep its landmine stockpiles for the training of demining teams up to 2019, taking into consideration the prorogation of the deadline for the destruction of landmines, in accordance with Article 3.
Bulgaria	3,670	3,682	
Burundi		4	
Cameroon ²			
Canada	1,963	1,963	<p>Canada reported that it retains live anti-personnel mines to study the effect of blast on equipment, to train soldiers on procedures to defuse live anti-personnel mines and to demonstrate the effect of landmines. For example, live mines help determine whether suits, boots and shields will adequately protect personnel who clear mines. The live mines are used by the Defence department's research establishment located at Suffield, Alberta and by various military training establishments across Canada. The Department of National Defence represents the only source of anti-personnel mines which can be used by Canadian industry to test equipment. Since the last report Canada has not acquired or used anti-personnel mines mainly due to the closure of the Canadian Centre for Mine Action Technologies.</p> <p>A variety of anti-personnel mines are necessary for training soldiers in mine detection and clearance. Counter-mine procedures and equipment developed by Canada's research establishment must also be tested on different types of mines member of the Canadian Forces or other organisations might encounter during demining operations. The Department of National Defence retains a maximum of 2,000. This number is to ensure Canada has a sufficient number of mines for training and for valid testing in the area of mine detection and clearance.</p> <p>Canada will continue to conduct trials, testing and evaluation as new technologies are developed. There will be a continuing requirement for provision of real mine targets and simulated minefields for research and development of detection technologies.</p>
Cape Verde ³			
Chile	4,484	4,153	Chile reported that its retained anti-personnel mines were under the control of the army and the navy. In 2007, 328 mines were destroyed in anti-personnel mines detection, disposal, and destruction training courses organized for deminers at the School of Military Engineers of the Army. 3 mines were destroyed to prepare the Partida de Operaciones de Minas Terrestres (Chilean Navy's demining unit) in humanitarian demining.
Colombia	586	586	
Congo	372		

¹ In its report submitted in 2001, Botswana indicated that a "small quantity" of mines would be retained. No updated information has since been provided.

² In its report submitted in 2005, Cameroon reported the same 3,154 mines under Article 4 and Article 3.

³ Cape Verde has not yet submitted a transparency report in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party in since the 8MSP
	2007	2008	
Croatia	6,179	6,103	<p>In 2003, CROMAC established the Centre for Testing, Development and Training (CTDT), whose prime task is to conduct testing on demining machines, mine detection dogs and metal detectors, as well as research and development of other demining techniques and technologies. CTDT is the only organisation in the Republic of Croatia authorised to use live anti-personnel mines in controlled areas and under the supervision of highly qualified personnel. In 2004, for that purpose, CTDT established a test site “Cerovec” near the city of Karlovac.</p> <p>Croatia reported that 76 mines were used in 2007 during testing and evaluating of demining machines on the test polygon in Cerovec. On the basis of current estimates regarding requirements for testing of demining machines in 2007, Croatia estimates that 175 anti-personnel mines will be needed in 2008.</p>
Cyprus	1,000	1,000	
Czech Republic	4,699	4,699	
Democratic Republic of the Congo ⁴			
Denmark	2,008	2,008	Denmark reported that its retained mines are used as follows: a demonstration of the effects of anti-personnel mines is given to all recruits during training; during training of engineer units for international tasks, instructors in mine awareness are trained to handle anti-personnel mines; and, during training of ammunition clearing units, anti-personnel mines are used for training in ammunition dismantling. Anti-personnel mines are not used for the purpose of training in mine laying.
Djibouti ⁵			
Ecuador	1,000	1,000	
El Salvador ⁶			
Equatorial Guinea ⁷			
Eritrea ⁸	109	109	
Ethiopia		1,114	

⁴In its reports submitted in 2007 and 2008, the Democratic Republic of the Congo indicated that the decision concerning mines retained is pending.

⁵ In its report submitted in 2005, Djibouti indicated that 2,996 mines were retained under Article 3.

⁶ In its report submitted in 2006, El Salvador indicated that 96 mines were retained under Article 3.

⁷Equatorial Guinea has not yet submitted a transparency report in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention.

⁸ In its report submitted in 2005, Eritrea indicated that the mines retained under Article 3 were inert. In its report submitted in 2008, Eritrea indicated that 8 of the 109 retained mines were inert.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party in since the 8MSP
	2007	2008	
France	4,170	4,152	France reported that its retained mines were used to: 1) test mine detection devices, including the "Mine Picker", a mine detection robot developed by Pegase Instrumentation (the cost-efficiency study carried out in 2007 concluded that this project would be abandoned) and the MMSR-SYDERA system. 2) to assess the anti-personnel mine threat, 3) to test protective anti-personnel boots (no tests having been carried out since 2005, France does not plan to continue with this activity).
Germany	2,526	2,388	<p>At the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Germany reported that pursuant to Article 3, it has set itself an upper ceiling of 3,000 anti-personnel mines to the maximum. These stocks of APMs clearly earmarked and stored for non-operational purposes, are regarded as necessary for the effective continuation and improvement of the protection of Germany's deployed soldiers against anti-personnel mines.</p> <p>The available anti-personnel mines pool enables a cost-saving and efficient execution of technical examinations in the area of Force Protection. Due to the International Test and Evaluation Programme for Humanitarian Demining (ITEP), many efforts have been undertaken to test and evaluate mine action equipments, systems and technologies. Nevertheless, efforts have continued in order to develop field equipment and tools based on realistic and future needs for the Federal Armed Forces.</p> <p>All together since 1998, Germany has used up a total of 685 antipersonnel mines for testing. For training purposes, German Armed Forces are using dummies. At the moment Germany is undertaking a study to elaborate if a special test field could be set up in Germany for testing multiple sensor mine detection and search systems. If this project can be realized, it is envisaged to also offer these facilities for testing procedures to NATO Member States as well as to Partners in the International Test and Evaluation Programme for Humanitarian Demining.</p> <p>In 2007, at the Federal Armed Forces Technical Centre 91, 14 anti-personnel mines were used for the vehicle mine protection programme, 20 anti-personnel mines were used for mine clearance equipment testing and 56 anti-personnel mines were demilitarized during ammunition surveillance.</p>
Greece	7,224	7,224	
Guinea-Bissau		109	
Haiti ⁹			
Honduras	826		
Indonesia	N/A	4,978	Indonesia reported that the anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 will be used as instruction/teaching materials which will further enhance the students capability to identify, detect and destruct landmines in general, particularly in preparing Indonesia's participation in peacekeeping operations.
Iraq	N/A	9	
Ireland	75	70	

⁹Haiti has not yet submitted a transparency report in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party in since the 8MSP
	2007	2008	
Italy	750	721	Italy indicated that warfare mines are utilized for bomb disposals and pioneers training courses. Four such training courses are organised every year.
Japan	4,277	3,712	<p>At the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Japan indicated that in accordance with the exceptions in Article 3, Japan has used anti-personnel mines for the purposes of training in mine detection, mine clearance, and mine destruction techniques, as well as for developing mine detection and mine clearance equipment. Within its annual Article 7 reports, Japan supplied information on the use of its retained mines and the results of such use. Specifically, Japan provided data on: (1) mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques developed and under development; (2) training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction; and (3) the number of personnel trained. In 2008, Japan plans to use anti-personnel landmines retained under Article 3 for the purpose of training infantry and engineering units of the Self Defense Force in mine detection and mine clearance.</p> <p>In accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, Japan retains anti-personnel mines for the purpose of training in and development of mine detection, mine clearance and mine destruction techniques (At the time of entry into force in 1999: 15,000 retained. As of December 2007: 3,712 retained). However, the number possessed is the minimum absolutely necessary for training the Self Defense Force units and technology development trails.</p> <p>Japan reported that it consumed 565 mines in 2007 for education and training in mine detection and mine clearance, and for the development of mine detectors and mine clearance equipment.</p>
Jordan	1,000	950	<p>Jordan reported at the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that NPA-Jordan carried out mine detection training of 4 new mine detection dog teams in May 2007 and July 2007 using a total of 50 retained mines. Training took place in the south of Jordan for the Wadi Araba/Aqaba Mine Clearance Project as well as in the north of Jordan for the Northern Border Project.</p> <p>The MDD Teams are trained by first creating a sample mine field using a small number of retained mines of the same type the MDD teams will be expected to encounter. The mines are laced in the ground prior to the training. The training is then carried out by the MDD teams in order for the dogs to learn to recognize the scent of those particular mines.</p>
Kenya	2,460	3,000	
Latvia	902	899	Latvia indicated that there were no reasons for retaining mines other than training EOD experts for participation in international operations. In 2007, 3 mines were destroyed during mine destruction training.
Luxembourg	900	855	
Malawi ¹⁰			
Mali ¹¹			

¹⁰In its report submitted in 2005, Malawi indicated that mines reported as retained under Article 3 are in fact “dummy” mines.

¹¹In its report submitted in 2005, Mali indicated that 600 mines were retained in accordance with Article 3.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party in since the 8MSP
	2007	2008	
Mauritania	728	728	
Mozambique ¹²			
Namibia ¹³			
Netherlands		2,516	
Nicaragua	1,004	1,004	
Niger ¹⁴			
Palau ¹⁵	N/A		
Peru	4,012	4,000	
Portugal	1,115	760	
Romania	2,500	2,500	
Rwanda		65	In 2007, Rwanda reported that the 65 mines retained under Article 3 were uprooted from minefields to (a) train deminers to IMAS, (b) to practice EOD personnel and c) to train mine detection dogs. So far 25 EOD personnel have been trained into 5 EOD technicians, 10 operators and 10 Recce agents.
Serbia ¹⁶		5,565	<p>Serbia reported at the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that mines retained in accordance with Article 3 are retained in depots at 3 locations in the Republic of Serbia. They have been retained for the purpose of organizing personnel training for probable engagement in UN peace operations, protection equipment testing and mine detectors.</p> <p>From December 2007 to March 2008, the ITF and the Government Centre for Demining of the Republic of Serbia organised and carried out a basic demining and battle area clearance course using different type of exercise mines and ammunition provided by the Ministry of Defence. 35 participants completed the basic course and 7 of them completed an additional course for team leaders for bomb disposal officers.</p>
Slovakia	1,427	1,422	
Slovenia	2,993	2,992	

¹² In its report submitted in 2006, Mozambique indicated that 1,319 mines were retained in accordance with Article 3.

¹³ In its report submitted in 2006, Namibia indicated that 3,899 mines were retained in accordance with Article 3.

¹⁴ In its report submitted in 2006, Niger indicated that 146 mines were retained in accordance with Article 3. The same number of mines reported in 2003 were also reported in Form B.

¹⁵ Palau's initial report is not due until 28 October 2008.

¹⁶ In its report submitted in 2008, Serbia indicated two different figures for the number of mines retained under Article 3 (5,565 and 5,307).

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party in since the 8MSP
	2007	2008	
South Africa	4,406	4,380	South Africa indicated that 4,291 mines were retained by Defencetek, as formally mandated by Ministerial authorization dated 7 March 2006 and 89 were retained by the South African Police Service, Explosive Unit, Office Bomb Disposal and Research. Of the 4,317 anti-personnel retained by the Department of Defence reported in 2007, 6 anti-personnel mines were used in accordance with Article 3. Of the 109 antipersonnel mines retained by the South African Police Service reported in 2007, 21 were used in accordance with Article 3 and one additional anti-personnel mine, a MON 50, was recovered from an arms cache and retained for training purposes.
Spain	2,034	1,994	
Sudan ¹⁷	10,000	4,997	
Suriname	150	0	Suriname indicated that 146 mines of the type M/969 were destroyed.
Sweden	10,578	7,531	
Tajikistan	105	0	During 2006, Tajikistan destroyed 150 mines in the course of training activities. Mines retained are used for demining training and research activities.
Thailand	4,713	3,650	
Togo ¹⁸			
Tunisia	5,000	4,995	
Turkey	15,150	15,150	
Ukraine	1,950	223	Ukraine indicated that 1,727 mines were destroyed and used for personal protective equipment for deminers.
Uganda		1,764	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	650	609	The United Kingdom indicated that anti-personnel mines are retained with the objective of identifying APM threat to UK forces and maintaining and improving detection, protection, clearance and destruction techniques.
United Republic of Tanzania	1,102	950	
Uruguay		260	
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	4,960	4,960	
Yemen ¹⁹			

¹⁷ In its report submitted in 2006, Sudan reported for the first time both the anti-personnel mines retained by the Government of National Unity (5,000) and by the Government of Southern Sudan (5,000).

¹⁸ In its report submitted in 2004, Togo reported retaining 436 mines in accordance with Article 3.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party in since the 8MSP
	2007	2008	
Zambia	3,346	2,232	
Zimbabwe ²⁰	700	600	Zimbabwe reported that retained mines will be used during training of Zimbabwe's troops and deminers in order to enable them to identify and learn how to detect, handle, neutralise and destroy the mines in Zimbabwean minefields.

¹⁹ In 2007, Yemen indicated that 4,000 mines were transferred from the military central storage facilities in Sana'a and Aden to the military engineering department training facility and MDDU and that 240 mines had been used for dogs training. In 2008, reported that 3,760 mines were transferred.

²⁰ In its report submitted in 2008, Zimbabwe reported 700 mines retained for training in Form D and indicated that 100 had been destroyed during training in 2007 in Form B.

Table 2. Anti-personnel mines reported transferred in accordance with Article 3^a

State Party	Mines reported transferred	Additional information
Afghanistan	250	UNMACA and the implementing partners transferred 250 mines in 2007 from stockpile destruction sites for training and accreditation purposes.
Burundi	664	Transferred for destruction by the Ministry of Defence
Cambodia	1,616	1022 mines transferred from various sources to the CMAC/HQ for destruction and 594 mines transferred from various sources and demining units. CMAC found them in the mined areas.
Ethiopia	303	Transferred to training areas/centres Gemhalo, Entot and Togochole.
Jordan	50	
Nicaragua	72	26 PMN mines were transferred from the Nicaraguan Army to the Corps of Engineers and 46 mines were transferred to the army's dogs unit.
Suriname	146	Transferred for destruction. In the period June-July 2007 and August-November 2007, the last 146 anti-personnel mines were destroyed. The National Army and the Ronco Corporation Company from the United States of America worked together on the project regarding the disposal of ammunition. As of November 2007, the National Army of Suriname did not possess anti-personnel mines in stockpile.
Thailand	1,063	Thailand transferred 63 mines for the purpose of training and 1,000 mines for the purpose of destruction.
Yemen	3,760	Transferred from the military central storage facilities in Sana'a and Aden to the military engineering department training facility and MDDU.
Zambia	1,020	Used in minefield laying and demining techniques for military students at the Staff College and School of Engineers.

^a This table includes only those States Parties that reported mines transferred in accordance with Article 3 since the 8MSP.

Annex VII

**THE STATUS OF LEGAL MEASURES TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE
WITH ARTICLE 9**

A. States Parties that have reported that they have adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations

- | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| 1. Albania | 21. El Salvador | 42. Niger |
| 2. Australia | 22. France | 43. Norway |
| 3. Austria | 23. Germany | 44. Peru |
| 4. Belarus | 24. Guatemala | 45. St Vincent and the
Grenadines |
| 5. Belgium | 25. Honduras | 46. Senegal |
| 6. Belize | 26. Hungary | 47. Seychelles |
| 7. Bosnia and
Herzegovina | 27. Iceland | 48. South Africa |
| 8. Brazil | 28. Italy | 49. Spain |
| 9. Burkina Faso | 29. Japan | 50. Sweden |
| 10. Burundi | 30. Jordan | 51. Switzerland |
| 11. Cambodia | 31. Latvia | 52. Trinidad and
Tobago |
| 12. Canada | 32. Liechtenstein | 53. Turkey |
| 13. Chad | 33. Luxembourg | 54. United Kingdom
of Great Britain
and Northern
Ireland |
| 14. Colombia | 34. Malaysia | 55. Yemen |
| 15. Cook Islands | 35. Mali | 56. Zambia |
| 16. Costa Rica | 36. Malta | 57. Zimbabwe |
| 17. Croatia | 37. Mauritania | |
| 18. Cyprus | 38. Mauritius | |
| 19. Czech Republic | 39. Monaco | |
| 20. Djibouti | 40. New Zealand | |
| | 41. Nicaragua | |

B. States Parties that have reported that they consider existing laws to be sufficient in the context of Article 9 obligations

- | | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|---|
| 1. Algeria | 13. Ireland | 24. Samoa |
| 2. Andorra | 14. Kiribati | 25. Slovakia |
| 3. Argentina | 15. Lesotho | 26. Slovenia |
| 4. Bulgaria | 16. Lithuania | 27. Tajikistan |
| 5. Central African
Republic | 17. Mexico | 28. the former
Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia |
| 6. Chile | 18. Montenegro | 29. Tunisia |
| 7. Denmark | 19. Netherlands | 30. Ukraine |
| 8. Estonia | 20. Papua New
Guinea | 31. United Republic
of Tanzania |
| 9. Greece | 21. Portugal | 32. Venezuela |
| 10. Guinea-Bissau | 22. Republic of
Moldova | |
| 11. Holy See | 23. Romania | |
| 12. Indonesia | | |

C. States Parties that have not yet reported having either adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 legislation or that they consider existing laws are sufficient

- | | | |
|---|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Afghanistan | 23. Ethiopia | 46. Panama |
| 2. Angola | 24. Fiji | 47. Paraguay |
| 3. Antigua and Barbuda | 25. Gabon | 48. Philippines |
| 4. Bahamas | 26. Gambia | 49. Qatar |
| 5. Bangladesh | 27. Ghana | 50. Rwanda |
| 6. Barbados | 28. Grenada | 51. Saint Kitts and Nevis |
| 7. Benin | 29. Guinea | 52. Saint Lucia |
| 8. Bhutan | 30. Guyana | 53. San Marino |
| 9. Bolivia | 31. Haiti | 54. Sao Tome and Principe |
| 10. Botswana | 32. Iraq | 55. Serbia |
| 11. Brunei Darussalam | 33. Jamaica | 56. Sierra Leone |
| 12. Cameroon | 34. Kenya | 57. Solomon Islands |
| 13. Cape Verde | 35. Kuwait | 58. Sudan |
| 14. Comoros | 36. Liberia | 59. Suriname |
| 15. Congo | 37. Madagascar | 60. Swaziland |
| 16. Côte d'Ivoire | 38. Malawi | 61. Thailand |
| 17. Democratic Republic of
the Congo | 39. Maldives | 62. Timor-Leste |
| 18. Dominica | 40. Mozambique | 63. Togo |
| 19. Dominican Republic | 41. Namibia | 64. Turkmenistan |
| 20. Ecuador | 42. Nauru | 65. Uganda |
| 21. Equatorial Guinea | 43. Nigeria | 66. Uruguay |
| 22. Eritrea | 44. Niue | 67. Vanuatu |
| | 45. Palau | |
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