
Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

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Item 9 of the provisional agenda

Consideration of the general status and operation of the Convention

Oslo Action Plan: status of implementation

Submitted by the President of the Eighteenth Meeting of the States Parties, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, the Committee on Victim Assistance, the Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance and the Committee on Cooperative Compliance*

1. At their Fourth Review Conference on a Mine-Free World (Oslo, Norway, 25 to 29 November 2019) the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction adopted the Oslo Action Plan (OAP) 2019–2024. Building on the experience and achievements of the Nairobi, Cartagena and Maputo Action Plans, the OAP details the actions States Parties agree to undertake in the five-year period following the Fourth Review Conference to support implementation of the Convention.
2. To ensure the effectiveness of the OAP, the States Parties agreed on the need to regularly monitor progress of the implementation of the actions contained therein. In particular, the States Parties highlighted that the information submitted in the States Parties' annual Article 7 reports will serve as the main source of data to assess progress and that members of the Coordinating Committee and the President will be responsible for measuring progress within their mandate, with the support of the Implementation Support Unit.
3. The information contained in this document draws on information submitted by States Parties in 2020, including Article 7 reports, requests for extension of mine clearance deadlines, updated work plans, and information provided during the 2020 Intersessional Meetings.

* The present document was submitted after the deadline owing to circumstances beyond the submitter's control.



I. Best Practices for Implementing the Convention

Table 1

Best Practices for implementing the Convention

Action	Indicator	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Action #1	1	24 ¹				
	2	76% ²				
Action #2	1	76% ³				
Action #3	1	60% ⁴				
	2	52% ⁵				
Action #4	1	7 ⁶				
	2	0				
	3	13 ⁷				
Action #5	1	76% ⁸				
Action #6	1	25 ⁹				

¹ Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

² 25 of the 33 States Parties implementing Article 5: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

³ 25 of the 33 States Parties implementing Article 5: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen and Zimbabwe

⁴ 20 of the 33 States Parties implementing Article 5: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen, and Zimbabwe

⁵ 45 of the 86 delegations of States Parties registered to attend the 30 June — 2 July 2020 Intersessional Meetings registered women on their delegations.

⁶ 7 of 33 States Parties implementing Article 5: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Serbia, South Sudan and Sudan

⁷ Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan and Thailand.

⁸ 12 of 33 States Parties implementing Article 5 — Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland — reported having national mine action standards based on International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) in place and 13 States Parties of 33 States Parties implementing Article 5 — Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe — reported that they were in the process of updating National Mine Action Standards during the reporting period.

⁹ Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe

<i>Best Practices for implementing the Convention</i>						
<i>Action</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2023</i>	
Action #7	1	6 ¹⁰				
	2	19 ¹¹				
	3	11 ¹²				
Action #8	1	19 ¹³				
	2	18 ¹⁴				
Action #9	1	24 ¹⁵				
Action #10	1	74% ¹⁶				
	2	19 ¹⁷				
<i>Universalisation</i>						
<i>Action</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2023</i>	<i>2024</i>
Action #11	1	0				

¹⁰ Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Thailand and Zimbabwe.

¹¹ Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

¹² Belgium, Canada, Estonia, France, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

¹³ Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

¹⁴ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ukraine and Yemen.

¹⁵ 24 States Parties of 33 States Parties implementing Article 5: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

¹⁶ 122 States Parties have paid their assessed contributions: — Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Cook Island, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, State of Palestine, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela.

¹⁷ Australia, Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey.

<i>Universalisation</i>						
<i>Action</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2023</i>	<i>2024</i>
	2	30% ¹⁸				
	3	3% ¹⁹				
Action #12	1	21% ²⁰				
	2	TBD				
<i>Stockpile destruction and retention of anti-personnel mines</i>						
<i>Action</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2023</i>	<i>2024</i>
Action #13	1	0				
	2	1 ²¹				
	3	216 252 ²²				
Action #14	1	1 ²³				
Action #15	1	0 ²⁴				
Action #16	1	32%				
Action #17	1	0				
<i>Survey and Clearance of mined areas</i>						
<i>Action</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2023</i>	<i>2024</i>
Action #18	1	79% ²⁵				
	2	21% ²⁶				
<i>Survey and Clearance of mined areas</i>						

¹⁸ India, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United States of America registered to attend the 2020 Intersessional Meetings.

¹⁹ In 2020, Morocco submitted a voluntary Article 7 Report.

²⁰ Egypt, Georgia, India, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Morocco and Singapore reported having moratoria in place.

²¹ Sri Lanka has presented a timebound plan for implementation.

²² Ukraine reported destruction since the Fourth Review Conference.

²³ Ukraine reported progress in implementation but has not submitted a timebound plan.

²⁴ Gambia has reported the identification of previously unknown stockpiled mines but has not reported on their destruction.

²⁵ 26 of 33 States Parties — Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Oman, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

²⁶ 7 of 33 States Parties — Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Serbia, Somalia, Zimbabwe.

<i>Action</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2023</i>	<i>2024</i>
Action #19	1	76% ²⁷				
Action #20	1	73% ²⁸				
	2	1 ²⁹				
Action #21	1	7 ³⁰				
Action #22	1	73% ³¹				
	2	55% ³²				
Action #23	1	75% ³³				
	2	25% ³⁴				
Action #24	1	50% ³⁵				
Action #25	1	100% ³⁶				
Action #26	1	55% ³⁷				
	2	18% ³⁸				
	3	3% ³⁹				

Survey and Clearance of mined areas

<i>Action</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2023</i>	<i>2024</i>
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²⁷ 25 of 33 States Parties — Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

²⁸ 24 of 33 States Parties — Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

²⁹ 1 State Party — Chile.

³⁰ 7 States Parties — Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Ukraine, Yemen.

³¹ 24 of 33 State Parties — Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

³² 18 of 33 State Parties — Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

³³ 6 of 8 State Parties — Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger, Senegal and South Sudan.

³⁴ 2 of 8 State Parties — Colombia, South Sudan.

³⁵ 4 of 8 State Parties — Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ukraine.

³⁶ 1 State Party — Chile.

³⁷ 18 of 33 State Parties — Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Peru, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

³⁸ 6 of 33 States Parties — Colombia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Peru, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

³⁹ 1 State Party — Mauritania.

Action #27	1	24 ⁴⁰				
<i>Mine Risk Education and Reduction</i>						
<i>Action</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2023</i>	<i>2024</i>
Action #28	1	64% ⁴¹				
Action #29	1	39% ⁴²				
	2	36% ⁴³				
Action #30	1	11 ⁴⁴				
Action #31	2	8 ⁴⁵				
Action #32	1	25 ⁴⁶				
<i>Victim Assistance</i>						
<i>Action</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2023</i>	<i>2024</i>
Action #33	1	18 ⁴⁷				
	2	15 ⁴⁸				
Action #34	1	13 ⁴⁹				
<i>Victim Assistance</i>						
<i>Action</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2023</i>	<i>2024</i>

⁴⁰ 24 of 33 States Parties — Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

⁴¹ 21 of 33 States Parties — Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

⁴² 13 of 33 States Parties — Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Zimbabwe.

⁴³ 13 of 33 States Parties — Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Zimbabwe.

⁴⁴ 11 of 33 States Parties — Afghanistan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Thailand, Zimbabwe.

⁴⁵ 8 of 33 States Parties — Cambodia, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Zimbabwe.

⁴⁶ 25 of 33 States Parties — Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

⁴⁷ Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand and Zimbabwe.

⁴⁸ Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

⁴⁹ Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand.

Action #35	1	4 ⁵⁰
	2	5 ⁵¹
Action #36	1	7 ⁵²
Action #37	1	7 ⁵³
	2	7 ⁵⁴
Action #38	1	15 ⁵⁵
	2	5 ⁵⁶
	3	6 ⁵⁷
Action #39	1	15 ⁵⁸
Action #40	1	7 ⁵⁹
Action #41	1	14 ⁶⁰

International Cooperation and Assistance

Action	Indicator	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Action #42	1	55% ⁶¹				
	2	19 ⁶²				
	3	1 ⁶³				

International Cooperation and Assistance

Action	Indicator	2020	2021	2022	2023
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⁵⁰ Afghanistan, Colombia, Ethiopia, and Thailand.

⁵¹ Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Sudan and Thailand.

⁵² Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Peru, Sudan, and Thailand.

⁵³ Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan and Thailand.

⁵⁴ Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Peru and Thailand.

⁵⁵ Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand and Zimbabwe.

⁵⁶ Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, Sudan and Colombia.

⁵⁷ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Jordan, Tajikistan and Thailand.

⁵⁸ Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan and Thailand.

⁵⁹ Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan and Thailand.

⁶⁰ Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan and Thailand.

⁶¹ 18 of 33 States Parties — Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Colombia, Mauritania, Niger, Serbia, Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

⁶² Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

⁶³ Angola.

Action #43	1	17 ⁶⁴				
	2	1 ⁶⁵				
Action #44	1	3 ⁶⁶				
Action #45	1	19 ⁶⁷				
	2	5 ⁶⁸				
	3	16 ⁶⁹				
Action #46	1	6 ⁷⁰				
Action #47	1	9 ⁷¹				
<i>Measures to ensure compliance</i>						
<i>Action</i>	<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>2023</i>	<i>2024</i>
Action #48	1	3 ⁷²				
	2	100%				
Action #49	1	0				
Action #50	1	68% ⁷³				

⁶⁴ Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

⁶⁵ Niger.

⁶⁶ Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Tajikistan.

⁶⁷ Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and the United Kingdom.

⁶⁸ Austria, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand and Norway.

⁶⁹ Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

⁷⁰ Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

⁷¹ Afghanistan, Argentina, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Croatia, Ecuador, Estonia, Lithuania, Spain, Thailand and Turkey.

⁷² Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen.

⁷³ 111 of the 164 States Parties.

II. Universalization

Table 2
States Position vis-à-vis the Convention

<i>State not party</i>	<i>Stated Position</i>
Armenia	“Armenia supports the Convention and is ready to take measures consistent with the provisions of the treaty but, to assume legally binding obligations, Armenia expects clearly observed readiness to reciprocate on the part of its regional neighbours. Therefore, Armenia’s full participation in the Convention is contingent upon a similar level of political commitment by other parties in the region to adhere to the treaty and comply with its regime.” (<i>Signing Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 4 December 1997</i>)
Azerbaijan	“Azerbaijan supports the solution of humanitarian mine problems on a global level. Azerbaijan fully supports the principles and philosophy of the Ottawa Convention. (...) The Government of Azerbaijan expressed its hope that in the future, when the armed conflict is settled and the Azerbaijani territories are liberated, the country will be able to accede to the Convention as a full member.”(<i>16 Meeting of States Parties (MSP), 2017</i>)
Bahrain	No official information submitted.
China	The Government of China accepts the principles of the Convention and abides by its humanitarian aspects. China is not a party to the Convention, but it has not ceased cooperating and ensuring exchanges with States Parties. (...) China supports the efforts of the international community to resolve the humanitarian problems caused by landmines. (...) In 1996, China established a moratorium on the import of landmines not conforming to Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons ¹ (CCW) Amended Protocol II (AP II). (...) China also trains demining personnel. (<i>17MSP, 2018</i>)
Cuba	“Cuba shares the legitimate humanitarian concerns associated with the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of mines. (..) It is not possible for Cuba to renounce the use of mines for the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, corresponding to the right of legitimate defence, recognised in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.” (<i>Explanation of vote, United Nations General Assembly resolution on the implementation of the Convention, 2016</i>)
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	No official information submitted.
Egypt	“Egypt acknowledges the humanitarian considerations which the Ottawa Convention attempted to embody and had actually imposed, based on the same considerations, a moratorium on its landmine production and export since the 1980s. However, Egypt views this convention as lacking balance between the humanitarian considerations related to anti-personnel mines and their legitimate military use for border protection. Most importantly, the convention fails to acknowledge the legal responsibility of States for demining anti-personnel mines they themselves have laid, in particular in territories of other

¹ Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

State not party	Stated Position
	States, making it almost impossible for affected States to meet alone the Convention's demining requirements. This is particularly true in the case of Egypt which still has millions of anti-personnel mines on its territories, planted by Second World War powers, requiring vast demining resources. (...) The mentioned weaknesses are only complemented by the weak international cooperation system of the Convention which remains limited in its effect and much dependent on the will of donor States. The mentioned weaknesses of the Convention have kept the largest world producers and some of the world's most heavily affected States outside its regime, making the potential for its universality questionable and reminding us all of the value of concluding arms-control and disarmament agreements in the context of United Nations and not outside its framework." (<i>Explanations of vote, United Nations General Assembly First Committee resolution on the implementation of the Convention, 2010 and 2012</i>)
Georgia	Georgia "has never produced anti-personnel mines and doesn't retain the option to produce them. In 1996, the President of Georgia declared a moratorium on producing, importing and using anti-personnel mines. Due to existing circumstances, it is not reasonable to join the Convention. (...) The main reasons for not acceding to the Convention are the occupied territories and unstable environment surrounding them. (...) This situation will prevent Georgia from the fulfilment of Convention obligations." (<i>Information sent to the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), 15 October 2009</i>)
India	"We support the vision of a world free of the threat of landmines and we believe that the availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can perform, cost-effectively, the defensive function of anti-personnel mines will facilitate the achievement of this goal. India believes that AP II of the CCW strikes the right balance between humanitarian concerns on landmines and legitimate defence requirements, particularly of States with long borders. India has fulfilled its obligations under AP II, related to non-production of non-detectable mines as well as rendering all our anti-personnel mines detectable. India is also observing a moratorium on the export and transfer of antipersonnel mines. (...) India has taken a number of measures to address humanitarian concerns arising from the use of anti-personnel mines. India remains committed to providing capacity building and assistance to countries upon their request. (<i>Fourth Review Conference, 2019</i>)
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Anti-personnel mines have been used irresponsibly and have claimed many innocent lives, a trend Iran wants to stop. However, the Convention does not consider the realities of long borders and the need to defend some territories. In some situations, mines are needed and can be used under strict control, he said, pointing out that new alternatives to mines could be explored. (<i>Explanation of vote, United Nations General Assembly resolution on the implementation of the Convention, 2019</i>)
Israel	"Israel joins all those countries in supporting international efforts to resolve the problem of indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines (...) Due to our unique situation in the Middle East involving an ongoing threat of hostilities as well as terrorist threats and actions along the borders, we are still obliged to maintain anti-personnel mines as necessary for self-defence in general and along borders in particular. (...) At this juncture, Israel, regrettably, is unable to sign the Convention until effective alternative measures are available to ensure the protection of civilians threatened on a daily basis by terrorists and to ensure the protection of Israeli forces operating in areas of armed conflict." (<i>Signing Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 4 December 1997</i>)
Kazakhstan	"Kazakhstan completely supports the humane orientation of the Convention. (...) There are a lot of objective reasons for which Kazakhstan is not ready to liquidate anti-personnel mines: 1) Kazakhstan has a big border with the neighbouring countries which should be covered and protected by armed forces, including by the use of anti-personnel mines in frontier areas of the country at the certain cases of conditions, 2) Full destruction or non-use of anti-personnel mines is unacceptable in the absence of alternative systems to defend the overland borders of the country. (...) At the same time, in 1997, a moratorium on export of anti-personnel mines, including their re-export and transit, entered into force in Kazakhstan." (International Seminar "Confidence Building Measures and Regional Cooperation through Mine Action", Almaty, 25–27 March 2007)

<i>State not party</i>	<i>Stated Position</i>
Kyrgyzstan	“Along with speaking in favour of a complete landmine ban, our country advocates step-by-step advance to this goal. (...) Kyrgyzstan has never produced or exported landmines. All supplies that we have were left after the collapse of the Soviet Union. (...) Today the problem of mine clearance cannot be considered because of demarcation and delimitation of neighbouring countries’ borders. Our border issues with some neighbouring countries remain unsettled.” (<i>First Review Conference, 2004</i>)
Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LAO PDR)	“Recognizing the importance of the Convention, Lao PDR has always been a strong supporter of the humanitarian spirit of the Convention. This has been further reflected in our continued active engagement in all relevant regional and international efforts to promote the spirit of the Convention, including voting in favour of all relevant Resolutions tabled at the United Nations. (...) Moreover, the Lao PDR has previously voluntarily submitted a national report under Article 7 of the Convention in 2011 and is now in the process of preparing the second voluntary report. Being a least developed country with limited resources and capacity, it remains challenging for the Lao PDR at this stage to fully fulfil international obligations under various international conventions as we need to prioritize and maximize our national capacity focusing on the areas that pose greatest constraints to and severely hampered our national social-economic development efforts. Nevertheless, we are confident that with the consistent support and assistance from the international community, Lao PDR would be able to accede the Convention in the near future.” (<i>Fourth Review Conference, 2019</i>)
Lebanon	The Government of Lebanon has adopted a national mine action policy to deal with landmines and explosive remnants of war which affirms its aspiration “to become a State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.” The Minister of Defence, head of the national mine action authority, for the first time, sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2019 stating that the Ministry of Defence has no objection to sign the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. The Lebanese Army is committed to humanitarian mine action and therefore thrives to clear all contaminated areas, and does not use, stockpile, produce and transfer anti-personnel mines. (...) The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) recognises the 2025 objective of a mine free world and works in a spirit of compliance with the Convention and with the IMAS. (<i>Fourth Review Conference, 2019</i>)
Libya	“The interim Government is not in a position to ratify the Convention for the time being. However, Libya shares the international community’s humanitarian concerns with regards to anti-personnel landmines because of their tragic impact on human lives and the environment, which impedes development, particularly since Libya has suffered from mines and war remnants since the Second World War. However, the Convention does not address the damage inflicted on States by the remnants of war and explosives resulting from occupation, or whose territories were the theatre of fighting between foreign countries. The Convention also does not establish a mechanism to assist affected countries suffering from mines placed by colonial States, or commit colonial States to removing, at their own expense, the mines they placed on the territories of other States.” (<i>Explanation of vote, United Nations General Assembly First Committee resolution on the implementation of the Convention, 2015</i>)
Marshall Islands (the)	“Although we still have not yet ratified the treaty, we have not taken any action which is contrary to the goals, objectives and principles and we have provided an unambiguous message of support for the treaty. (...) The Republic of the Marshall Islands government has never produced, used or stockpiled such landmines. We have very limited financial and technical resources, as well as the need to respond to some complex and immediate environmental situations. We value closely our relationship with the United States of America as defined under the Compact of Free Association, in which the United States of America provides primary assistance in our defence, in addition to other commitments. While ratification and implementing actions may be possible by our government, doing so may require an approach which exceeds the level of efforts needed to merely adopt “one size fits all” model legislation. We have also informed of the potential for remaining unexploded ordnance (UXO) from the World War II era. (...) It will not be until we complete an internal review of all signed and unsigned treaties that we can provide member states with an updated timeline for future activity. Until the

State not party	Stated Position
Micronesia (Fed. States of)	<p>moment when we are able to take our next steps — and that moment will occur — please understand that we remain supportive of this treaty as an original signatory and that our national policies are aligned with this treaty overarching goals and principles.” (9MSP, 2008)</p>
Mongolia	<p>“The Government of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) has indicated its full support to the concept of universalization and full implementation of the Convention (...) The FSM considers itself as a mine-free State. Regardless, the aspiration of the Government of the FSM to accede to the Convention remains intact. (...) The Government of the FSM is very close to fulfilling its internal legal requirements in order to accede to the Convention. Presently there is a draft resolution before the Congress of the FSM seeking approval to accede to the Convention. It is expected that Congress will take favourable action on the resolution in the upcoming January 2009 regular session.” (Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, 2 June 2008).</p>
Morocco	<p>“The Government’s policy has laid the groundwork for accession via a step-by-step approach that involved amending legislation to allow release of the amount of stockpile, starting the destruction of stockpile and securing funding for stockpile destruction (...) Mongolia has a stockpile of 206,317 anti-personnel mines and it will destroy 380 mines in 2011. Let me underline that Mongolia seeks to accede to the Convention in the near future. Therefore cooperation, assistance and support through both bilateral channels and international organisations are appreciated for accelerating the process of Mongolia’s accession to the Convention.” (10MSP, 2010) “Mongolia continues to pursue a step-by-step (or phased) policy towards accession to the Convention due to a range of security and economic concerns.” (Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, 20 June 2011)</p>
Myanmar	<p>Morocco has never produced, exported or transferred anti-personnel mines. It stopped importing them and using them way before the elaboration of the Convention. Since 2006, Morocco regularly and voluntarily submits a national transparency report in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention. In accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, mines in storage only serve for training, especially on demining. The mines of the Defence Line are catalogued and monitored according to pre-established laying plans held by military engineering units. These mines were laid before the entry into force of the Convention and will be eliminated as soon as the artificial regional conflict imposed to Morocco is resolved. The issue of mines and remnants of war in the southern provinces of Morocco is greatly due to the separatists of “Polisario” who indiscriminately and voluntarily undertook the propagation of multiple and diverse deadly devices all over the territory of the Moroccan Sahara. Morocco’s accession to the Convention is momentarily delayed because of the sole issue related to the settlement of the regional dispute on the Moroccan Sahara and to Morocco regaining its full territorial integrity. (Fourth Review Conference, 2019)</p>
Myanmar	<p>Myanmar recognizes the importance of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention in putting an end to the suffering and human casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, in saving lives and in returning hope and human dignity. We also believe that universalization of the Convention is vital in reducing humanitarian harms. “The Myanmar Government has been very active in the mine action sector and has expanded the space for humanitarian mine action operators active in the country.” (...) Commitments and efforts in line with the spirit of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention include: a) participating as an observer in meetings of the State Parties since 2003 with an aim to increase our understanding of the convention and its works, b) hosting a workshop in March 2019 with key ministries and the Presidency of the Convention to strengthen the knowledge and the implication of the various articles of the convention in a Myanmar context, c) hosting an international workshop to discuss how Myanmar can establish a National Mine Action Authority to lead and manage a humanitarian mine action programme, d) undertaking various exchange visits to other mine affected states to familiarise various ministries on the process of becoming a signatory, the conventions obligations and how to organise humanitarian mine action in general and e) working closely with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Centre (ARMAC), with the country’s first annual financial contribution to the Centre since 2018-2019 financial year and enhancing technical cooperation in mine action.” (Fourth Review Conference, 2019)</p>

<i>State not party</i>	<i>Stated Position</i>
Nepal	Though Nepal has not yet become a state party to the Convention, we are fulfilling most of the obligations of the Treaty. (...) Nepal does not produce landmines. Nepal has constituted a high-level taskforce to study and evaluate the opportunities and liabilities of the treaty and it will submit a report in near future. In the taskforce, there are representative from different ministries. We have, for the first time, allocated budget for mine action program through Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) where there are funds from donors and Government of Nepal as well. (<i>Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, June 2010</i>)
Pakistan	“Pakistan supports the humanitarian objectives of this Convention and is guided by humanitarianism and respect for International Humanitarian Law and protection of civilian life.” (...) “Pakistan supports the balanced approach of the Amended Protocol-II on anti-personnel mines, which addresses the humanitarian concerns while also taking into account legitimate security requirements of states and the military utility of landmines. (...) While our security needs necessitate the use of anti-personnel mines, this is done in accordance with international norms, safety parameters and humanitarian considerations. The use of landmines is exclusively by the military for defence purposes. Furthermore, Pakistan continues to scrupulously adhere to a policy of ban on all exports of mines and ensures that the private sector is not allowed to manufacture or to trade in landmines. (...) Pakistan has produced only detectable anti-personnel mines since January 1, 1997. (...) Pakistan has itself been a victim of the use of landmines, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs), by terrorists and non-state actors. Notwithstanding their use by terrorists, Pakistan’s security forces do not use mines for the maintenance of internal order and law enforcement or in counter-terrorism operations. Pakistan is supportive of an international legal instrument banning the transfer of anti-personnel mines. Such an instrument will help in preventing the acquisition of landmines by non-state actors and terrorists as a majority of civilian casualties result from use of landmines by such actors. We believe that the objective of the total elimination of anti-personnel mines can be promoted, inter alia, by making available non-lethal, militarily and cost-effective alternate technologies.” (<i>17MSP, 2018 and Fourth Review Conference, 2019</i>)
Republic of Korea	The Republic of Korea aligns itself with the objectives and purposes of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, although we have not yet acceded to the Convention owing to our unique security situation on the Korean peninsula. Demining operations are under way along the demilitarized zone of the Korean peninsula under the military agreement signed in Pyongyang on 19 September 2018 and annexed to the Pyongyang Joint Declaration. As President Moon Jae-in declared in his address to the General Assembly last month, the cooperation of the international community in that regard will be all the more valuable in enabling us to move towards demilitarizing the demilitarized zone and bring lasting peace to the Korean peninsula. The Republic of Korea has also joined the international efforts to support those affected by landmines by contributing to global mine action and will continue to work closely with the international community. (<i>United Nations General Assembly First Committee, 2019</i>)
Russian Federation	Russia does not exclude its possible accession to the Convention in the future and in the meantime continues to work to address a number of technical, organisational and financial issues related to implementation of the Convention. Russia also is undertaking effective measures to minimise the mine threat. (...) Russia has ceased production of the most dangerous blast-type anti-personnel mines. (<i>United Nations General Assembly First Committee, Thematic debate on conventional weapons, 20 October 2017</i>)
Saudi Arabia	“Saudi Arabia has always supported the Convention (...) Saudi Arabia observes and respects the spirit of this Convention. It has never used anti-personnel mines, nor has produced them. Such mines have never been transferred to or from the Kingdom to any destination, be it governmental or otherwise. Saudi law forbids all authorities other than the armed forces from stockpiling mines.” (<i>First Review Conference, 2004</i>)
Singapore	As in the past years, Singapore supports and will continue to support all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines, especially when they are directed at innocent and defenceless civilians. With this in mind, Singapore declared a two-year moratorium in May 1996 on the export of anti-personnel landmines without self-neutralising mechanisms. In February 1998, Singapore expanded the moratorium to include all manner of anti-personnel landmines, not just those without self-neutralising mechanisms, and extended the moratorium indefinitely. We also support the work of the

State not party	Stated Position
	Convention by regularly attending the Meetings of the States Parties. (...) At the same time, like several other countries, Singapore firmly believes that the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defence of any State cannot be disregarded. A blanket ban on all types of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions may therefore be counter-productive.” (<i>Explanation of vote, United Nations General Assembly resolution on the implementation of the Convention, 2016 and 2018</i>)
Syria	“To achieve the goal of clearing the world of mines and the success of the efforts aimed to achieve universalization, the treaty requires addressing the existing concerns and challenges, foremost among them translate political pledges into financial resources to support the achievement of these goals. The Syrian Arab Republic believes in the humanitarian goals of the Convention and if it did not become a party, it is the result of the current circumstances and the surrounding regional conditions. Providing international support, financial and technical resources in good faith away from politicization and conditionality in direct coordination with national authorities would be key for successful mine clearance efforts in Syria. In the same context, the current illegal foreign presence over parts of Syrian territory, and the use of mines and improvised explosive devices by armed terrorist groups. And the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan, where the population is exposed and Syrians are there at the risk of being hit by mines in their homes and around their fields. (<i>Fourth Review Conference, 2019</i>)
Tonga	No official information submitted
United Arab Emirates	“We have a stockpile of anti-personnel mines. We do not produce anti-personnel mines. We do not transfer antipersonnel mines to any party or any other country. We believe that the question of acceding to the Convention still needs further study and consultations before taking any decision.” (<i>Information sent by the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates in Geneva to the ISU, 25 September 2009</i>)
United States of America	<p>Effective January 31, 2020, the Administration rescinded the Presidential Policy concerning anti-personnel landmines (APL), in favor of a new United States landmine policy that will be overseen by the Department of Defense. The United States remains committed to working to minimize risks to civilians posed by landmines and explosive remnants of war. The United States also remains fully committed to complying with its treaty obligations regarding landmines and explosive remnants of war, as contained in Amended Protocol II and Protocol V, annexed to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.</p> <p>Landmines, including APL, remain a vital tool in conventional warfare that the United States military cannot responsibly forgo, particularly when faced with the risk of being overwhelmed by enemy forces in the early stages of combat. Withholding weapons that give our ground forces the ability to deny terrain temporarily and therefore shape an enemy’s movement to our benefit irresponsibly risks American lives. The United States will not sacrifice American servicemembers’ safety, particularly when technologically advanced safeguards are available that can allow landmines to be employed responsibly to ensure our military’s warfighting advantage, while also limiting the risk of unintended harm to civilians. These safeguards require landmines to self-destruct, or in the event of a self-destruct failure, to self-deactivate within a prescribed period of time.</p> <p>The Department of Defense’s new policy allows planning for and use of APL in future potential conflicts, including outside the Korean Peninsula, while continuing to prohibit the operational use of any “persistent” landmines (landmines without a self-destruct/self-deactivation function). Under this policy, if combatant commanders authorizes the use of landmines in a major combat situation, those landmines will include the aforementioned safeguards that will prevent them from being a threat to civilians after a conflict ends.</p>

<i>State not party</i>	<i>Stated Position</i>
	The United States will continue to lead in international humanitarian demining efforts that locate and remove landmines and explosive remnants of war that pose persistent threats to civilians living in current and former conflict areas around the world. The rescission of the previous policy does not reduce this national commitment, and it does not exacerbate the problems associated with unexploded munitions. (US State Department: https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-weapons-removal-and-abatement/)
Uzbekistan	No official information submitted
Viet Nam	“We are of the view that any efforts to ban landmines should take into account the legitimate national security concerns of states as well as their legitimate rights to use appropriate measures for self-defence. We support the humanitarian aspects of the Ottawa Convention but we could not sign it yet as it regrettably does not duly take into account the legitimate security concerns of many countries including Viet Nam.” (<i>Meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, June 2008</i>)

Table 3
Participation of States not party in the work of the Convention

<i>State not party</i>	<i>Voted in favour of 2019 United Nations General Assembly resolution on the implementation of the Convention</i>	<i>2020 voluntary Article 7 report</i>	<i>Participation in meetings of the Convention</i>		<i>Latest participation in an MSP/Review Conference</i>	<i>Moratorium in place</i>
			<i>2020 IM</i>	<i>18MSP</i>		
1 Armenia	√				9MSP (2008)	
2 Azerbaijan	√				17MSP (2018)	
3 Bahrain	√				2RC (2009)	
4 China	√				4RC (2019)	
5 Cuba					2RC (2009)	
6 Egypt					4RC (2019)	√ ¹
7 Georgia	√				2RC (2009)	√ ²
8 India			√		4RC (2019)	√ ³
9 Iran (Islamic Republic of)						
10 Israel					1RC (2004)	

¹ Moratorium on landmine production and export since the 1980s.

² In 1996, the President of Georgia declared a moratorium on producing, importing and using anti-personnel mines.

³ India is observing a moratorium on the export and transfer of antipersonnel mines (2018).

	<i>State not party</i>	<i>Voted in favour of 2019 United Nations General Assembly resolution on the implementation of the Convention</i>	<i>2020 voluntary Article 7 report</i>	<i>Participation in meetings of the Convention</i>		<i>Latest participation in an MSP/Review Conference</i>	<i>Moratorium in place</i>
				<i>2020 IM</i>	<i>18MSP</i>		
11	Kazakhstan	√		√		16MSP (2017)	√ ⁴
12	Korea, DPR of						
13	Korea, Republic of			√			√ ⁵
14	Kyrgyzstan	√				7MSP (2006)	
15	Lao PDR	√				4RC (2019)	
16	Lebanon	√		√		4RC (2019)	
17	Libya	√		√		14MSP (2015)	
18	Marshall Islands	√				9MSP (2008)	
19	Micronesia, Fed.States of	√				11MSP (2011)	
20	Mongolia	√				11MSP (2011)	
21	Morocco	√	√	√		4RC (2019)	√ ⁶
22	Myanmar			√		4RC (2019)	
23	Nepal					10MSP (2010)	
24	Pakistan					4RC (2019)	
25	Russian Federation					10MSP (2010)	
26	Saudi Arabia			√		4RC (2019)	
27	Singapore	√				17MSP (2018)	√ ⁷
28	Syria			√		4RC (2019)	
29	Tonga	√				12MSP (2012)	
30	United Arab Emirates	√				4RC (2019)	
31	United States of America			√		4RC (2019)	
32	Uzbekistan						

⁴ In 1997, a moratorium on export of anti-personnel mines, including their re-export and transit, entered into force in Kazakhstan.

⁵ The Government of the Republic of Korea is enforcing a moratorium on their export for an indefinite extension of time (2009).

⁶ Morocco enforces a moratorium on the use of anti-personnel mines

⁷ Singapore declared a two-year moratorium in May 1996 on the export of anti-personnel landmines without self-neutralizing mechanisms. In February 1998, Singapore expanded the moratorium to include all manner of anti-personnel landmines, not just those without self-neutralizing mechanisms, and extended the moratorium indefinitely (2016).

<i>State not party</i>	<i>Voted in favour of 2019 United Nations General Assembly resolution on the implementation of the Convention</i>	<i>2020 voluntary Article 7 report</i>	<i>Participation in meetings of the Convention</i>		<i>Latest participation in an MSP/Review Conference</i>	<i>Moratorium in place</i>
			<i>2020 IM</i>	<i>18MSP</i>		
33 Viet Nam					12MSP (2012)	
Total (33)	17	1	10			7

III. Article 4 — Stockpile Destruction and retention of anti-personnel mines

Table 4
Status of Implementation

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Total number of anti-personnel mines destroyed</i>	<i>Total number of anti-personnel mines destroyed since the Fourth Review Conference</i>	<i>Total number of anti-personnel mines remaining to be destroyed</i>	<i>Article 4 projected completion date</i>
Greece	1 224 754	0	343 413	As soon as feasible ¹
Sri Lanka	57 033	No report provided	41 357	End of 2020
Ukraine	3 438 492	216 252	3 364 889 ²	2021
Total	4 720 279	216 252	3 749 559	

¹ Statement delivered by Greece at the Fourth Review Conference, 27 November 2019.

² Article 7 report submitted by Ukraine in 2020.

Table 5
Time bound plan of Sri Lanka

<i>Quantity of anti-personnel mines to be destroyed</i>	<i>Time period</i>
23 680	April 2019 to March 2020
5 098	April to June 2020
579	July 2020
12 000	August to December 2020
Total	41 357

Table 6
Anti-personnel mines reported retained by 66 States Parties for purposes permitted by Article 3 of the Convention

<i>State Party</i>	<i>2018 and earlier</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines</i>
Angola		1 304	1 304	Train deminers in rapid detection and destruction of mines. Training and testing of Animal detection (Rats) to accompany manual clearance methods. All operators conduct in-house training courses for detection and clearance techniques. Refresher training is conducted according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and available National Mediator Accreditation System (NMAS) chapters.
Bangladesh	12 050 (2018)			
Belarus		4 505	4 505	
Belgium		2 066	2 044	Education and training of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialists and deminers with live ammunition Training militaries in "Mine Risk Education". The use of M35Bg mines takes place during different sessions of courses organized by the Belgian Armed Forces.
Benin	16 (2008)			
Bhutan	211 (2018)			
Bosnia and Herzegovina		834	834	Training mine detection dogs, testing demining machines and education.
Bulgaria		3 318		
Burundi	4 (2017)			
Cambodia		1 235	3 730 ¹	For supporting operation, Demolition and Museum. For Training and Display.
Cameroon	1 885 (2009)			

¹ This number includes anti-personnel mines as well as other devices.

<i>State Party</i>	<i>2018 and earlier</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines</i>
Canada ²		1 878	1 649	Objective: Force Protection Evaluation. Canada retains live anti-personnel mines to study the effect of blast on equipment, to train soldiers on procedures to defuse live anti-personnel mines and to demonstrate the effect of landmines. For example, live mines help determine whether suits, boots and shields will adequately protect personnel who clear mines. The live mines are used by the Defence department's research establishment located at Suffield, Alberta and by various military training establishments across Canada. The Department of National Defence represents the only source of anti-personnel mines which can be used by Canadian industry to test equipment. A variety of anti-personnel mines are necessary for training soldiers in mine detection and clearance. Counter-mine procedures and equipment developed by Canada's research establishment must also be tested on different types of mines members of the Canadian Armed Forces or other organizations might encounter during demining operations. The Department of National Defence retains a maximum of 2000. This number is to ensure we have a sufficient number of mines for training and for valid testing in the area of mine detection and clearance. Canada will continue to conduct trials, testing and evaluation as new technologies are developed. There will be a continuing requirement for provision of real mine targets and simulated minefields for research and development of detection technologies.
Cape Verde	120 (2009)			
Congo Brazzaville	322 (2009)			
Côte d'Ivoire	290 (2014)			
Croatia		4 973	4 851	In 2019, anti-personnel mines were used by Croatian Mine Action Center for testing, development and training Ltd (CROMAC-CTDT Ltd.) used for testing and by the training company of the Engineering Regiment for trainings.
Cyprus		435	435	
Czech Republic		2 180	2 155	Used for the training in mine detection, mine clearance and mine destruction techniques by the Army of the Czech Republic. The regular special courses to train and/or educate current and new Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel. The EOD specialists are trained to detect and to destroy anti-personnel mines.
Denmark		1 748	1 736	Research and development by Danish Defense Research Establishment and training in mine detection.
Djibouti	2 996 (2005)			
Ecuador		90	90	Will be used for training and training and research of demining personnel. Ecuador plans that 10 anti-personnel mines will be destroyed annually in training activities, as well as their potential use in investigation tasks.
Eritrea	101 ³ (2014)			
Finland	16 192 (2018)		15 982	
France		3 941	1 842	

² In 2018, Canada reported that 57 of the 1 878 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 are without fuses.

³ In its reports submitted in 2013 and 2014, Eritrea indicated that 71 of the 101 mines were inert.

<i>State Party</i>	<i>2018 and earlier</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines</i>
Gambia	100 ⁴ (2013)			
Germany		583	583	Retained for research and testing purposes, for training of mine and explosive ordnance detection dogs, vehicle mine protection programme, accident research and regular dog training.
Greece		5 599	5 585	Anti-personnel mines have been retained for training soldiers in mine detection, clearance and canine detection.
Guinea Bissau	9 (2011)			
Honduras	815 (2007)			
Indonesia ⁵		2 148		
Iraq		20	Unclear	Retained for training mine detection dogs, testing demining machines and studying the effect of the blast of various types of anti-personnel mines on demining equipment at a rate of approximately 20 mines as mentioned in previous Article 7 reports. Following the 2019 annual review of the number of mines retained, the Republic of Iraq has concluded that the number retained mines do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes and we destroyed all anti-personnel mines that were discovered or removed by clearance operations.
Ireland		55	54	1 x SB33 used in a Mine Awareness demonstration.
Italy		617	617	Warfare mines are used for bomb-disposals and pioneers training courses.
Japan		898	803	During the reporting period, Japan used anti-personnel mines for education and training. In 2020, Japan plans to use anti-personnel mines for education and training in mine detection and mine clearance.
Jordan		100	100	
Kenya	3 000 (2008)			
Mali	600 (2005)			
Mauritania		728	728	For training of demining personnel in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques.
Mozambique ⁶		900		
Namibia	1 634 (2010)			
Netherlands		889	868	
Nicaragua		448		
Nigeria	3 364 (2012)			
Oman	2 000 (2017)	No info	No info	

⁴ In its report submitted in 2013, the Gambia indicated that it retains 100 anti-personnel mines under Article 3. While a report was submitted in 2020, it did not contain information on antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3.

⁵ While Indonesia has not yet submitted a report in 2020, it did provide an update on anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 at the 2019 Fourth Review Conference.

⁶ In its report submitted in 2018, Mozambique indicated that 90 of the 1 355 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 are inert without explosive and detonator.

<i>State Party</i>	<i>2018 and earlier</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines</i>
Peru		2 015	2 015	
Romania		2 395	2 249	Training the personnel specialized in EOD or detection and demining. Mine awareness training. Activity/project: Regular training cycles of the EOD personnel or engineers formation. Specific preparation of the troops leaving in operational theatres. The mines retained were used only for practicing detection and demining in the regular training cycles of the EOD and engineer troops and for the specific preparation of the personnel undertaking mission in operational theatres abroad. Mines are only presented to the personnel. Detection, marking and demining techniques are demonstrated and practiced. Mines are not regularly armed or destroyed during this process. Every year, a limited number of mines are blasted for practicing specific demining and EOD procedures. In 2019, 146 pieces (140 pcs. MAI-75 and 6 pcs. MAI-68 without disc) were blasted for such a purpose.
Rwanda	65 (2008)			
Senegal ⁷		50		
Serbia ⁸		3 134		
Slovakia		1 035	1 035	
Slovenia		272	256	
South Africa	576 (2014)			
Spain		1 349	1 357	Surveillance tests — samples are regularly collected from the mine stock for training in order to subject a battery of tests to its various elements — fuze, explosive, body, etc. — to guarantee its good condition and the safety of its manipulation.
Sri Lanka		21 153		
Sudan		739	528	Training and reach. The objective is to improve the demining capacity and to innovate new methodologies which are effective, efficient and saver. Currently the programme retained some of PMN Plastic and Type 35 Plastic mines. The programme plans to destroy all live mines and replace them with the training's mines.
Sweden		6 009	6 009	
Togo	436 (2004)			
Tunisia		4 405	4 375	
Turkey		9259	6552	Dummy training mines/items are used mostly for demining and military trainings in Turkey. However, a limited number of retained mines are also required to conduct efficient training. The Turkish Mine Action Centre plans to reduce number of retained mines for training to a total of 3000 by 2021.
Uganda	1764 (2012)			
Ukraine	605 (2013)	No info	No info	

⁷ In its report submitted in 2019, Senegal indicated that 13 of the 50 mines retained have been defused.

⁸ In its report submitted in 2018, Serbia indicated that all fuses for 494 PMA-1 type and 540 PMA-3 type had been removed and destroyed. While Serbia submitted a report in 2020, no updated information on anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 was provided.

<i>State Party</i>	<i>2018 and earlier</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines</i>
United Rep. of Tanzania ⁹	1780 (2009)			
Venezuela	4874 (2012)			
Yemen	3760 (2017)	No info	No info on numbers	Before 2014 Yemen submitted information on the quantity and types of anti-personnel mines for permitted purpose. After this period, Yemen did not use any anti-personnel mines for training and research activities. Under the current operating procedures forced upon Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) by the current conflicts, at any given time there are a number of anti-personnel mines, including improvised anti-personnel mines held at YEMAC storage locations whilst awaiting destruction. This is caused by the lack of access to explosives or other means to destroy items in place and the need to conduct large scale demolitions once coordination with relative contacts and approval of access to explosives besides burning items such as thermite is allowed. The numbers and types vary and are kept only for so long as it takes to organise their destruction. The conflict created a complex environment and currently Yemen is not performing any plan of development of mine detection, detection techniques for further training of the use of mines retained under Article3. Yemen is committed to give updates about all status and information on it is transparency report. At this stage, anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature are also presented in Yemen in large numbers.
Zambia		907		
Zimbabwe		450	450	
Total			148,210	

⁹ In its report submitted in 2009, the United Republic of Tanzania indicated that it retains 1780 anti-personnel mines under Article 3, including 830 deactivated anti-personnel mines.

IV. Article 5 — Survey and Clearance of Mined Areas

Table 7
Progress reported in Implementation¹

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Number of areas released</i>	<i>Cancelled area (square meters)</i>	<i>Reduced area (square meters)</i>	<i>Cleared area (square meters)</i>	<i>Total area released (square meters)</i>	<i>Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed</i>	<i>Number of other explosive items destroyed</i>
Afghanistan		167 067 368	1 165 618	28 013 603	196 246 589	7 801	380 841
Angola		11 199 573	754 616	1 922 541	13 876 730	1 943	904
Argentina							
Bosnia & Herzegovina ²	39		3.30	0.53	3.83	963	408
Cambodia	755	26 924 403	7 510 682	20 936 706	55 371 791	4 111	4 354
Chad		4 134 152	721 380	4 872 209	4 882 698		507
Colombia					6 368 003	3 733	
Croatia		3 112 829	3 894 443	38 859 668	46 398 985 ³	2 530	449 415
Cyprus							
Democratic Republic of Congo ⁴	139				2 159 893.024	248	
Ecuador					2 898.50	62	
Eritrea							
Ethiopia	109	318 216 508	10 306 621	1 757 947	330 280 076	128	5 812
Iraq	1 229	35 133 307	5 867 702	42 970 229	87 148 310	2 941	
Mauritania							
Niger					57 787 ⁵		
Nigeria							
Oman	11				130 100		
Peru	11	28 530	26 600	81 948.15	137 078.15	1 113	

¹ Source: Information provided by States Parties in their Article 7 reports submitted until 24 September 2020, unless otherwise noted.

² Bosnia and Herzegovina in its 2020 Article 7 reported on progress in implementation in square kilometres.

³ The total figure for Croatia includes an additional area cancelled during non-technical survey of 233 165 square metres and 298 880 square metres cleared by the Ministry of Defence.

⁴ The figures reported for the Democratic Republic of the Congo are sourced from its 2020 extension request for the period 2014–2019.

⁵ The figures reported for Niger are sourced from its 2020 extension request for the period 2014–2020.

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Number of areas released</i>	<i>Cancelled area (square meters)</i>	<i>Reduced area (square meters)</i>	<i>Cleared area (square meters)</i>	<i>Total area released (square meters)</i>	<i>Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed</i>	<i>Number of other explosive items destroyed</i>
Senegal	2		11 288		11 288		
Serbia					606 210	22	15
Somalia	19	207 500	49 925	15 404 312	15 661 737	6	27 619
South Sudan	32	18 138 175	19 946	1 003 647	19 161 768	405	71
Sri Lanka							
State of Palestine							
Sudan	4		6 127 351	876 568	7 003 925	1	13 787
Tajikistan	9	880 304	302 570	535 311	1 718 185	5 219	189
Thailand		128 442 103	13 594 778	95 278	142 132 159	2 677	158
Turkey		6 099 493	136 472	672 725	6 908 690	25 959	21
Ukraine	2						
United Kingdom	36				10 300 000 ⁶	749	8
Yemen						1 414	222 188
Zimbabwe		466 419	8 590 447	2 759 476	11 816 342	39 031	12

⁶ The United Kingdom reported progress in implementation for the period since the submission of their extension request, 29 March 2018.

Table 8
Remaining challenge reported by States Parties

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Article 5 Mine Clearance Deadline</i>	<i>Number of areas known to contain anti-personnel mines</i>	<i>Number of areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines</i>	<i>Total number of areas</i>	<i>Amount of area known to contain anti-personnel mines (square metres)</i>	<i>Amount of area suspected to contain anti-personnel mines (square metres)</i>	<i>Total amount of area (square metres)</i>
Afghanistan	1 March 2023	1 885	213	2 098	135 540 993	55 550 778	191 091 771
Angola	31 December 2025	981	73	1 054	84 792 985	3 237 941	88 030 926
Argentina	1 March 2023						
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 March 2021	799	488	1 287	20 747 593	945 938 493	966 686 086
Cambodia	31 December 2025		9 539	9 539		817 087 387	817 087 387
Chad	1 January 2025	131	3	134	93 267 834	46 689	93 314 523
Colombia	1 March 2021			0			
Croatia	1 March 2026			0	189 083 414	119 717 603	341.4 ¹
Cyprus	1 July 2022			0			
Democratic Republic of Congo ²	1 January 2021			33		0 ³	128 841.7
Ecuador	31 December 2022	3		3 ⁴	40 056		40 056
Eritrea	31 December 2020			0			
Ethiopia	31 December 2025	29	123	152	3 519 538	722 548 937	726 068 475
Iraq	1 February 2028	4 156	529	4 705 ⁵	1 190 398 809	48 785 368	1 239 184 177
Mauritania	31 December 2020			0	4 710 666	3 375 000	8 085 666
Niger ⁶	31 December 2020			0			177 760
Nigeria				0			
Oman	1 June 2028			0			

¹ Croatia reported its remaining challenge in square kilometres. The total remaining challenge indicated includes 309 square kilometres under the role of the Ministry of the Interior — Civil Protection Directorate (Sector of Croatian Mine Action Centre) and 31.4 square kilometres of known or suspected mined areas located near military sites under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence.

² The figures for the Democratic Republic of the Congo are sourced from their 2020 extension request.

³ The Democratic Republic of the Congo indicated in their 2020 extension request the presence of an unknown number of suspected mined areas in Aru territory of Ituri province and Dungu territory in Haute-Uele Province that are projected for survey.

⁴ Ecuador reported a total of 3 mined areas, consisting of 53 objectives remaining to be addressed.

⁵ The total number of areas remaining to be addressed includes 20 IED mined areas under the responsibility of Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA).

⁶ The figures reported for Niger are sourced from their 2020 extension request.

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Article 5 Mine Clearance Deadline</i>	<i>Number of areas known to contain anti-personnel mines</i>	<i>Number of areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines</i>	<i>Total number of areas</i>	<i>Amount of area known to contain anti-personnel mines (square metres)</i>	<i>Amount of area suspected to contain anti-personnel mines (square metres)</i>	<i>Total amount of area (square metres)</i>
Peru	31 December 2024	108		108	369 212		369 212
Senegal	1 March 2021	37	9	46			1 593 487 ⁷
Serbia	1 March 2023		6	6		1 125 310	1 125 310
Somalia	1 October 2022	18	11	29	6 098 836	10	6 098 846
South Sudan	9 July 2021	63	63	126	2 866 060	9 328 668	12 194 728
Sri Lanka	1 June 2028			0			
State of Palestine	1 June 2028			0			
Sudan	1 April 2023	52	43	95	2 402 260	10 877 444	13 279 704
Tajikistan	31 December 2025	164	85	259	7 770 328	4 186 138	11 956 466
Thailand	31 October 2023	82	172	254	14 549 633	203 644 612	218 194 245
Turkey	1 March 2022	3 692	162	3 854		150 418 408	150 418 408
Ukraine	1 January 2021			14			7 000 ⁸
United Kingdom	1 March 2024	4		4			226 958
Yemen ⁹	1 March 2023		326	326			12 995 161
Zimbabwe	1 January 2025	7		7	42 692 666		42 692 666

⁷ The figures for Senegal include 9 suspected mined areas of unknown size.

⁸ Ukraine reported in its 2020 extension request an estimated 7 000 kilometers of area to be contaminated by anti-personnel mines and other explosive ordnance.

⁹ The figures reported for Yemen are sourced from Yemen's 2019 extension request.

Table 9
Milestones for 2021 reported by States Parties

<i>States Parties</i>	<i>Number of Areas to be addressed</i>	<i>Total area to be addressed (in square metres unless otherwise indicated)</i>
Afghanistan	531	56 396 711
Angola	164	17 210 199
Argentina		
Bosnia & Herzegovina		91 300 000
Cambodia		109 600 000
Chad ¹		
Colombia	101	1 328 253
Croatia		53.3 ²
Cyprus		
Democratic Republic of the Congo		112 930.9 ³
Ecuador	14 ⁴	12 250
Eritrea		
Ethiopia		175 807 352
Iraq		178 610 341 ⁵
Mauritania ⁶		
Niger ⁷		
Nigeria		
Oman ⁸		

¹ Chad reported its milestone for the period 2020-2021, including Non-technical survey (NTS) of suspected mined areas in Tibesti and Ouaddaï, to clear the mined areas identified through NTS, make necessary updates to the HCND database, and handover land to the beneficiaries.

² Croatia reported its remaining challenge in square kilometres.

³ The figures for the Democratic Republic of the Congo are sourced from its 2020 extension request.

⁴ Ecuador reported to address 14 of its remaining 53 objectives in 2021.

⁵ Iraq reported that its annual milestone includes 167,708,057.77 square meters to be addressed in 2021 under the responsibility of DMA, and 10 902 284 square meters to be addressed by IKMAA.

⁶ Mauritania in its 2020 extension request indicated that the objective of the extension request period is to carry out further survey and develop a work plan for addressing contamination by 31 March 2021.

⁷ Niger in its 2020 extension request included a work plan for the period 2020-2024. The work plan outlines activities to clear the mined areas located in the Madama military post and the possibility of identifying other suspected areas. The work plan indicates that the training of 50 deminers would take place in 2020 and the actual demining work would be taking place during 2020-2024

⁸ Oman reported that it aims to complete its work plan by February 2025.

<i>States Parties</i>	<i>Number of Areas to be addressed</i>	<i>Total area to be addressed (in square metres unless otherwise indicated)</i>
Peru	20	
Senegal	14	139 975 ⁹
Serbia	1	269 280
Somalia ¹⁰		
South Sudan	20	1 478 400
Sri Lanka		
State of Palestine		
Sudan	45	8 679 404 ¹¹
Tajikistan	34	1 274 964
Thailand		21 159 793
Turkey		4 000 000 ¹²
Ukraine ¹³		
United Kingdom	4	226 958
Yemen ¹⁴		
Zimbabwe		7 542 723

⁹ Senegal reported in its 2020 extension request milestones for the period January – October 2021, including projections to address 78 locations and 9 SHA as well as 12 confirmed dangerous zones.

¹⁰ Somalia reported that it will continue to survey mine, ERW, and IED impacted communities throughout Somalia and recode all of these hazardous areas in the national database.

¹¹ Sudan reported its milestone is for the period 2020 -2021.

¹² Turkey reported its milestone, including the survey of all minefields.as part of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project (EBMCP) for the period 2020-2022 Phase-3 in 2020, 2021 and 2022. Turkey also reported that NTS Teams of TURMAC will support these operations.

¹³ Ukraine reported in its 2020 extension request included an activity plan on Humanitarian Demining of the Liberated Territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions for 2020. The plan includes two purposes and 4 key objectives.

¹⁴ Yemen indicated in its 2019 extension request that aim of the interim extension request is to carry out activities that would allow the mine action sector to recover and to carry out a resurvey of areas, where the security situation allows, and establish a new baseline that will allow Yemen to develop a realistic plan to address the drastic change in the situation by 1 March 2022.

V. Article 6 — Victim Assistance

Table 10

Overview of information provided by the 30 states parties that have indicated having a responsibility for significant numbers of landmine survivors

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Article 7 report submitted in 2020</i>	<i>Information on victim assistance contained in the Article 7 report</i>	<i>Information on Oslo Action Plan victim assistance commitments provided in the Article 7 report</i>	<i>Information on Oslo Action Plan victim assistance commitments provided through means other than the Article 7 report</i>
Afghanistan	X	X	X	
Albania				
Angola	X			X
Bosnia and Herzegovina	X	X		
Burundi				
Cambodia	X	X	X	
Chad	X	X		
Colombia	X	X	X	
Croatia	X	X	X	
DR Congo				
El Salvador				
Eritrea				
Ethiopia	X	X	X	
Guinea-Bissau				
Iraq	X	X	X	
Jordan	X	X	X	
Mozambique	X	X		X

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Article 7 report submitted in 2020</i>	<i>Information on victim assistance contained in the Article 7 report</i>	<i>Information on Oslo Action Plan victim assistance commitments provided in the Article 7 report</i>	<i>Information on Oslo Action Plan victim assistance commitments provided through means other than the Article 7 report</i>
Nicaragua				
Peru	X	X	X	
Senegal				
Serbia	X			
Somalia				
South Sudan	X	X	X	
Sri Lanka				
Sudan	X	X	X	
Tajikistan	X	X	X	
Thailand	X	X	X	
Uganda				
Yemen	X	X	X	
Zimbabwe	X	X	X	

Table 11
Overview of Information provided by other States Parties on Victim Assistance efforts

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Article 7 Report Submitted in 2020</i>	<i>Information on Victim Assistance contained in Article 7 Report</i>	<i>Information on Victim Assistance commitment of the Oslo Action Plan provided in Article 7 Reports</i>
Algeria	x	x	x
Chile	x	x	x
Turkey	x	x	x

Table 12

Overview of latest information (concerning coordinating entity, Action Plan, database and mine survivors) provided by States Parties with Victim Assistance commitments

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Government entity to coordinate victim assistance integration into broader frameworks</i>	<i>National action plans on victim assistance/ disabilities</i>	<i>Database on mine casualties, survivors/ persons with disabilities</i>	<i>Registered Mine survivors¹</i>
Afghanistan	State Ministry for Martyrs and Disabled Affairs (SMOMDA, also known as MMD)	National Disability Strategy (2020-2030) ²	National disability database at the MMD	34 000
Albania	Albanian Mine and Munitions Coordination Office (AMMCO)	Victim Assistance Action Plan & National Action Plan for Persons with Disabilities (2016-2020)		1 003
Algeria	National Council of Persons with Disabilities		Database on mine victims, including on indirect mine victims	7 236
Angola	The Mine Action Centre (CNIDAH) and the Ministry for Social, Family of Women Affairs (MOSFWA)	Victim Assistance Plan (annual)	Database on mine victims at the CNIDAH	9 296
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Victim Assistance Coordination Body at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMIC)	Victim Assistance Action Plan (2019 – 2025) ³	Mine Victims Database at the BHMIC	1 760
Burundi	Ministry of Public Security and Disasters Management (MOPSDM) & Humanitarian Action against Landmines and unexploded ordnance			Approx. 6 000
Cambodia	Ministry of Social Affairs Veteran and Youth Rehabilitation (MOSAVYR) and Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA)	National Disability Strategic Plan (2019-2023) & Victim Assistance Action Plan (annual)	National Centralised Database under the CMAA	Approx. 65 000

¹ Note: The figures are based on the latest information provided by the respective States Parties such as through their Article 7 report, formal statements. In several cases the information is not complete due to challenges in data collection, and in some cases, identification of mine victims has not been completed. Majority of the figures represent only mine survivors — not affected families, such as the individuals that have been killed, their family members, or the family members of mine survivors. In most cases, the figures include survivors of anti-personnel mines as well as other types of explosive devices. Taking these into account, the figures may change in the future.

² The plan was being developed in 2019/2020.

³ Ibid

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Government entity to coordinate victim assistance integration into broader frameworks</i>	<i>National action plans on victim assistance/ disabilities</i>	<i>Database on mine casualties, survivors/ persons with disabilities</i>	<i>Registered Mine survivors¹</i>
Chile	Executive Secretariat of the National Demining Commission (CNAD)			
Chad	National Mine Action Commission (HCND) & Ministry of Women, Social Action and Children (MOWSAC)	National Victim Assistance Action Plan (2018-2022)	Database on Mine Victims at the HCND, limited capacity to collect casualty data	2 834
Colombia	Mine Action Authority & Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MOHSP)	Action Plan of the Technical Secretary for Disabilities (annual)	Anti-personnel Mine Survivors Information Service (SISMAP)	11 801
Croatia	Mine Action Centre at the Civil Protection Directorate within the Ministry of the Interior (MOI)	Victim Assistance has been integrated into relevant national plans		597
DR Congo	Ministry of Humanitarian and Social Affairs (MOHSA) & National Mine Action Centre (CCLAM)			2 743
El Salvador	Protection Fund for War Victims (FOPROLYD) & National Disability Council (CONAIPD)			4 500
Eritrea				Approx. 5 750
Ethiopia	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA)	National Disability Action Plan (2012-2021)	National Database on Persons with Disabilities	16 616
Guinea-Bissau	Secretary of State of Homeland Freedom Fighters			Approx. 1 300
Iraq	Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) & Commission for Persons with Disability Care and those with Special Needs	National Victim Assistance and Disability Action Plan (2019-2021)	Mine Victims Database at the DMA	34 043
Jordan	High Council on Affairs of Persons with Disabilities (HCD) & National Demining and Rehabilitation Authority (NCDR)	Victim Assistance has been integrated into several disability related plans and policies		1 017

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Government entity to coordinate victim assistance integration into broader frameworks</i>	<i>National action plans on victim assistance/ disabilities</i>	<i>Database on mine casualties, survivors/ persons with disabilities</i>	<i>Registered Mine survivors¹</i>
Mozambique	Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Affairs (MOGCSA)	National Action Plan for People with Disabilities including Mine Victims ⁴		Approx. 10 000
Nicaragua				1 101
Peru	Peruvian Centre for Action against Anti-personnel Mines (CONTRAMINAS) & National Council for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS)	Comprehensive Reparation Plan	National Registry of Persons with Disabilities	348
Senegal	National Centre for Mine Action (CNAMS)			831
Serbia	Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Policy (MOLEVSP)			1 123
Somalia	Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)	National Action Plan for Assistance to Survivors of Mines and Explosive Remnants of War (2020 – 2025) ⁵	Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database	Approx. 1 300
South Sudan	Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Work (MOGCSW) & National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)	National Disability/Victim Assistance Action Plan (2020-2025) ⁶	Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database	6 059
Sri Lanka	National Mine Action Centre (MAC)			1 732
Sudan	National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) & National Council of Persons with Disabilities (NCPWD)	National Disability Strategy 2020-2030 & National Victim Assistance Strategy ⁷	Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database	2 171
Tajikistan	Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) & National Mine Action Centre (TMAC)	Victim Assistance has been integrated into disability related plans	Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database	879

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Ibid

<i>State Party</i>	<i>Government entity to coordinate victim assistance integration into broader frameworks</i>	<i>National action plans on victim assistance/ disabilities</i>	<i>Database on mine casualties, survivors/ persons with disabilities</i>	<i>Registered Mine survivors¹</i>
Thailand	Ministries of Social Development, Human Security and Public Health (MOSDHSPH); National Institute for Emergency Medicine (NIEM) & Mine Action Centre (TMAC)	Victim Assistance has been integrated into several disability related plans and strategies	National Disability Database	
Turkey	Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services (MOFLSS) & Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC)	MOFLSS's Strategic Plan (2018-2022)	Database on mine victims	
Uganda	Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MOGLSD)	National Comprehensive Action Plan on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2020-2025)		Approx. 2 000
Yemen	Mine Executive Action Centre (YEMAC)			7 263
Zimbabwe	Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (MOPSLSW) & Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)	National Policy on Rights of Persons with Disabilities	Mine Victims Database maintained by the ZIMAC	260