

Nigeria Ammunition Depot Explosion

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- ❑ **27 January 2002.**
- ❑ **Probably caused by a fire in the adjacent local market.**
- ❑ **Estimated 200+ fatalities from the initial blast and fragmentation hazards.**
- ❑ **Over 2000 fatalities from the resultant panic. Many drowned trying to cross a river to escape the explosions.**
- ❑ **UK DfID deployed 2 x ATOs to assist in post blast safety operations.**




Problems

- ❑ **Total explosive content of blasts unknown.**
- ❑ **Ammunition losses unknown due to incomplete ammunition accounting system.**



Conventional wisdom normally suggests that when you build an ammo compound, the storage buildings should be tougher than the surrounding trees.



Some
stray
rounds
were
easier to
find than
others.



**And some seemed to
make themselves quite
comfortable in their new
surroundings**













Problems and Lessons Learnt

- Inadequate Outside Quantity Distances (OQD) to reduce the risk to the civilian population.**
- Inadequate Inside Quantity Distances (IQD) to reduce the risk of propagation of blast to adjacent explosive storehouses.**

Problems and Lessons Learnt

- No contingency plan for dealing with a disaster of this magnitude.**

Questions ?